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Butte, Montana has served as the epicenter of hard rock mining and mineral 
processing in the Upper Clark Fork River Basin (UCFRB) for nearly 150 years. As a 
result, the UCFRB contains the largest contiguous complex of major environmental 
clean-up projects in the United States. Contemporary U.S. environmental problem-
solving is characterized by an emphasis on meaningful public participation in 
environmental decision-making. The U.S. is committed to the realization of 
environmental justice, which requires that affected publics, especially the working 
classes who tend to bear a disproportionate share of the environmental burdens, influence 
environmental clean-up efforts. However, much ofthe critical literature on the subject 
suggests that in practice the public is rarely included as a significant force in decision-
making. In hard-used places like Butte, Montana, the community's ecological problems 
v 
are compounded by their democratic problems. This constitutes an integrated crisis in 
ecology and democracy, the problem at the heart of this inquiry. This dissertation 
presents a pragmatic interrogation of U.S. environmental problem-solving from an ethical 
and environmental communication research perspective. It is a work of pragmatic moral 
philosophy in the tradition of John Dewey. The overarching methodology is Systematic 
Moral Analysis (SMA), which unfolds in five phases: problem recognition, problem 
diagnosis, moral analysis, evaluation, and moral action. This research concludes by 
suggesting philosophically defensible principles to guide future U.S. environmental 
decision-making based on pragmatic criteria emphasizing the health and well-being of 
both democratic and environmental systems as the highest good in environmental 
problem-solving. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Environmental historian Mark Fiege (1999) pinpointed a compelling reason to 
study what he called "hard-used landscapes" when he wrote: 
Always my curiosity carries me back to the hard-used landscapes: to the mines of Butte ... It is in 
these apparently unnatural places, I believe, that we most directly confront the reality of our 
deeply tangled and problematic relationship to the natural world that we inhabit. (1 0) 
This research, born of my experience growing up in Butte, Montana, represents 
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my attempts to understand an often perplexing landscape and community. Butte is a hard-
used place inhabited by nearly 34,000 hard-used people. 150 years of environmentally 
devastating hard rock mining practices have radically transformed the people and place 
through a number "ecological revolutions" (Merchant, 1989) on "the Hill." Today, Butte 
is the point-source and epicenter of the nation's largest complex oftoxic cleanup sites. In 
2003, a journalist from Counter Punch magazine described present-day Butte, Montana, 
this way: 
Butte, Montana isn't a mining town. It's a mined town ... The core of the city is hollow, tunneled 
out. Beneath the shattered surface ofthe Hill, there are more than 10,000 miles of underground 
passages and thousands of shafts, glory holes decending deep feet into the bedrock. Every now 
and then, holes will open in the crust of the earth, swallowing sidewalks, garages, and dogs ... The 
tunnels of Butte are also a catacomb, holding the bones of more than 2,500 miners. (~1-2,4) 
In Butte, it is an unfortunate truth that the working classes and the environment have 
nearly always shared a common and often tragic fate. 
Yet, the community survives. It persists. It hangs on, even if only precariously. 
People have survived in Butte, in part, by banding together to cope with problems they 
share, sometimes by any means necessary. Several historians (Malone, 1981; Calvert, 
1988; Emmons, 1989; Murphy, 1997; Finn, 1998; MacMillan, 2000) have noted the 
importance of social solidarity and organization in the unfolding drama of Butte history. 
The mining camp nearly dwindled into one of the many ghost towns that litter the 
northern Rocky Mountains on several occasions, but it has always managed to hang on 
and survive. The common people of Butte, Montana, continually organized, reorganized, 
and struggled against the entrenched systems of power at work on the Hill. A recent 
nationally syndicated Public Broadcasting System documentary, Butte, America (2009) 
by Edwin Dobb and Pamela Roberts, admirably captured the spirit of these hard-used 
people during their many struggles for justice in Butte during the last century and a half. 
As a member of the Butte community, and as a student of ethics, communication, 
and history, this research represents my attempt to contribute something meaningful to 
the vibrant and ongoing academic conversations about Butte and its history. It is also an 
attempt to discover useful lessons from the city's colorful-and often sorrowful-past. 
Primarily, this research is my attempt to draw lessons from the past that may help us 
reorder the present in ways that might bring about a future that is consonant with our 
interests and values. What we have done, and what we are doing, is not working as well 
2 
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as it ought to be. There must be a way to do better than this. This dissertation is a search 
for better ways to understand and cope with Butte's many serious problems in democracy 
and ecology. 
The Public and Its Environmental Problems 
For the last 25 years, Butte, Montana, and its neighboring communities within the 
Upper Clark Fork River Basin (UCFRB) have participated in a grand experiment in 
democracy and ecology-an extreme makeover of an entire watershed and its 
communities. The UCFRB contains the nation's largest contiguous complex of 
environmental cleanup projects, including "the biggest total floodplain removal and 
restoration on the face of the planet" (Siegner, 2005). The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and Liability Act (1980), also known as Superfund, created the 
legal framework and procedures for this ongoing experiment. CERCLA endeavors to 
restore environmental health to hard-used places and environmental justice to hard-used 
people. 
Since its inception, Superfund has evolved in some interesting ways. Most 
importantly with regard to this research, Superfund cleanup projects have adapted to what 
political philosopher Jolm Dryzek (2000) has called a "deliberative turn" (1) in 
contemporary environmental problem solving in the United States. This deliberative turn 
is characterized by a shift in the federal government's understanding of the importance of 
public involvement in environmental decision-making. "Today, EPA is working 
continuously to increase community participation" (EPA, 2000: 25). These new and 
diligent efforts to involve the public are considered moral issues because they concern the 
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basic needs, rights, and duties of US citizens. Moreover, these new efforts to 
meaningfully include the public revolve around the ethically charged notion of 
environmental justice. 
The environmental justice movement was born of a collective acknowledgment 
that the working class, the poor, and other disenfranchised people tend to bear a 
disproportionate and unfair share of enviromnental problems in the United States and 
around the world. Put bluntly, environmental injustices abound hence the need for the 
restorative measures associated with the environmental justice movement. The 
environmental justice movement, unlike other contemporary green movements, emerged 
from social justice movements such as the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s (Cole and 
Foster, 2000). As the US environmental consciousness was coming to the fore during the 
1960s-70s, the relationships among class, race, gender, and environmental problems were 
made apparent through the work of journalists, social scientists, moral philosophers, and 
environmental justice activists. 
According to the US EPA, environmental justice means the "fair treatment and 
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income 
with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, and policies" (EPA, 2009, emphasis mine). By "meaningful 
involvement" the EPA means that: 
(1) people have an opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their 
environment and/or health; (2) the publics contribution can influence the regulatory agency's 
decision; (3) their concerns will be considered in the decision making process; and (4) the decision 
makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected. (EPA, 2009) 
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The United States, first through Executive Order 12,898 (1994) during the Clinton 
Administration and then through subsequent recommitment statements through the Bush 
and Obama Administrations, is committed to the principle of restoring environmental 
justice today to hard-used people and places. With regard to meaningful involvement, the 
"Public Participation" provisions in CERCLA (sec. 9617) specifically require that 
important information concerning cleanup plans be made public in a variety of ways, and 
that the EPA "provide a reasonable opportunity for submission of written and oral 
comments and an opportunity for a public meeting at or near the facility at issue 
regarding the proposed plan and regarding any proposed findings." 
Environmental justice, at a root level, concerns the restoration of a state of 
wellness and balance to communities which have been harmed through destructive 
environmental practices. Environmental justice requires the restoration of environmental 
health and democratic fairness to the communities who have been environmentally and 
socially harmed. The EPA, by its own criteria, must make every effort to ensure that 
public involvement is meaningful, that the people can influence the decisions of the 
regulatory agencies in charge. If public involvement is not meaningful in this sense, the 
legitimacy of agency decisions is suspect. 
Despite the triumphal rhetoric about the progress and successes of the UCFRB 
Superfund projects espoused by the powerful environmental decision-making agents 
operating in this Superfund complex, many local citizens and citizen groups claim that 
the EPA falls far short of its criteria for environmental justice and meaningful 
involvement. The "Decide, announce, defend" (Hendry, 2004) mode ofbureaucratic 
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decision-making at work in the EPA is problematic because it often ignores the public 
input it seeks. Public participation opportunities are built in to the decision-making 
process, but according to a collection of critical essays edited by Depoe and Delicath 
(2004), the public is rarely a meaningful participant. For example, according to 
environmental justice advocate John Ray concerning the environmental cleanup projects 
in central Butte where a high proportion of the town's working poor live, the .. EPA 
ignored the overwhelming public comments opposing its preferred waste-in-place (i.e., 
threat-in-place) remedy" (2005). 
A report on the status of public participation in Superfund decision-making by the 
American Bar Association (1994) characterized the problem this way: 
The consensus of our panel is that decisional processes under Superfund have resulted in an 
elaborate process for public involvement; however, this involvement is more superficial than 
substantive. (40) 
Butte's many serious environmental problems are thus exacerbated by its 
democratic problems. A gap between what is and ought to be exists in the UCFRB's 
environmental and democratic systems. These rifts prompted this dissertation-a search 
for pragmatic moral guidelines for future US environmental problem-solving. 
Dissertation Overview 
This research is atypical in form, content, and methodology. It is an attempt to 
carry out a largely theoretical inquiry that is ground in the actual problems of the 
community and place I inhabit. It is an attempt to apply a diverse range of conceptual 
instruments-from moral philosophy to environmental history-toward the ends of 
understanding these problems deeply and suggesting principled resolutions to them. I 
attempt to accomplish this through the exercise of mixed methods and "disciplined 
interdisciplinarity" (Hechter, 2003: 1 ). The ultimate goal is to present a new and better 
way of talking about the problems at the heart of the inquiry, a way that ultimately might 
lead to new and better ways of resolving them. The goal is to shift the environmental 
problem-solving conversations in positive ways, in ways that might result in both a vital 
democracy and a healthy environment in hard-used places like Butte, Montana. 
Chapter I-Introduction-introduces the dissertation, provides a broad context 
for the research, and gives an overview of the project chapter by chapter. 
Chapter II-Integrated Crises in Democracy and Ecology in Montana-
recognizes and deeply describes the problems at the heart of this inquiry. It describes 
these problems at both global and local levels, paying particular attention to the 
experience of the communities in the UCFRB complex of Superfund projects originating 
in Butte, Montana. 
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Chapter III-Pragmatic Visions ofNatureculture-defines key terms (nature, 
culture, communication, and environment) and presents a useful alternative way to 
conceive the problems under study, a way grounded in a contemporary understanding of 
natural and human sciences and based on the pragmatic philosophies of John Dewey and 
Charles Sanders Peirce. In this chapter I take words seriously. Chapter III also serves a 
diagnostic function in the overall inquiry, that is, it endeavors to understand root causes 
of the problems described in Chapters I and II. Diagnosis is a necessary first step to moral 
prescription and action, the ultimate aims of this dissertation. 
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Chapter TV-Ethics, Democracy, and Ecology: Moral Dimensions of US 
Environmental Problem-solving-diagnoses ethical aspects of environmental problem-
solving in general, and within the Superfund restoration projects along the UCFRB in 
particular. Because this research is grounded in a pragmatic conception of the 
relationships among nature and culture discussed in Chapter III, Chapter IV concludes by 
exploring the pragmatic moral philosophies of John Dewey, Jurgen Habermas, and 
Andrew Light as they relate to US democratic environmental problem-solving. 
Chapter V --systematic Moral Analysis-interrogates the moral problems under 
study through a rational and systematic process. Chapter V introduces the concept of 
systematic moral analysis (SMA) and explores the analytical processes of several 
communication scholars before it outlines the SMA process developed to examine 
Butte's integrated crises in democracy and ecology. The SMA is carried out in two parts. 
Part I: Recognition, Diagnosis, and Analysis constitutes a descriptive/analytic mode of 
the SMA. Part II: Evaluation and Action constitutes an evaluative/practical mode of the 
SMA. The ultimate goal of Chapter V is to come to principled conclusions that will set a 
course for future moral action in hard-used places like Butte. 
Chapter VI-A Short Environmental History of Butte, Montana, 1864-2009-
describes the conditions and guiding forces that worked in concert to shape Butte's 
injured ecological systems from a critical materialist perspective. In this chapter I take 
worlds seriously. Butte's ecological problems are the result of a perfect storm of 
animating forces including the logic of capitalism, technological innovation, and human 
labor. This chapter is a history of environmental problems in Butte, 1864-present. 
Chapter VII-Conclusion-summarizes and evaluates key insights and 
contributions of this research, examines limitations of the work, and suggests future 
directions for academic inquiry into the ethical dimensions of US democratic 
environmental problem-solving systems. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
INTEGRA TED CRISES IN DEMOCRACY 
AND ECOLOGY IN MONTANA 
10 
This thesis is predicated upon a warranted assertion that our very real and 
pressing problems in the public sphere (our democratic crises) exacerbate our very real 
and pressing problems in the ecosphere (our environmental crises). Put another way, our 
democratic public problem-solving systems are themselves in crisis, and because of this, 
seem to be ill-suited to the task of effectively coping with our serious environmental 
problems. 
By crisis I mean a time of acute difficulty, a problem that presses for solutions, a 
decisive moment. Crises are crucial stages in the lifespan of dynamic systems, like 
democracies and ecosystems. Crisis states are problematic circumstances, turning points 
that require immediate, measured responses in order to avert impending disasters. Today, 
the term is frequently used to describe the scale and scope of the problems we confront in 
politics, economics, ecology, and culture. A defining characteristic of the present moment 
may well be our seemingly perpetual state of complex and integrated crises. 
This chapter will describe integrated crises in democracy and ecology at global 
and local levels, paying special attention to the particular experience of the hard-used 
hard rock mining community of Butte, Montana, USA. Butte is my home town and 
ground-zero within the largest complex of toxic Superfund sites in the nation. The 120-
mile stretch of injured watershed from Butte to Missoula, Montana is the result of more 
than a century of hard rock mining and mineral processing in a harsh, rugged, and 
sometimes unforgiving landscape. 
Environmental Problem-solving in Montana: 
A Model of the World? 
11 
In Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005), Jared Diamond 
ably demonstrated that the effectiveness of a civilization's problem recognition and 
response systems softly determines the future viability of that civilization. Societies that 
recognize and adapt their collective behaviors in response to pressing needs continue to 
exist. Several socially complex pre-modern societies-Maya, Easter Islanders, Greenland 
Norse, and Anasazi, to name a few-failed to recognize and/or effectively respond to the 
social and ecological crises they faced. These societies blinked out of existence. They 
collapsed. 
Diamond, a Pulitzer Prize winning historian and UCLA geography professor, 
intended that Collapse might help us learn "practical lessons" ( 417) from the past, lessons 
applicable to the complex social and ecological crises we currently face. While Diamond 
did not believe the US is in imminent danger of collapse, he did believe that certain 
places in the United States today are good analogs for comparison with past societal 
collapses. The state of Montana is his primary example and case study. 
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In the first chapter of Collapse, titled "Under Montana's Big Sky," Diamond 
wrote, "Montana provides an ideal case study with which to begin this book on past and 
present environmental problems" (32). Why? Because the state is precariously situated; it 
persists but, at least in certain respects, it hangs in the balance. Montana is distant from 
the cities and markets upon which it depends, for example. The state is known for its 
beautiful landscapes, but relative to lands closer to the equator, Montana is only 
marginally productive. We do not often think of Montana as environmentally imperiled, 
but according to Diamond, "Montana's environmental problems today include almost all 
of the dozen types of problems that have undermined pre-industrial societies in the past, 
or that now threaten societies elsewhere in the world as well" (35). In short, 
contemporary Montanans are like the Maya and Anasazi in certain ways. They live 
precariously close to their ecological carrying capacity. 
Also like the Maya and Anasazi, the decisions Montanans make softly determine 
future viability and well-being. Will contemporary Montanans recognize and effectively 
cope with their immediate and pressing environmental problems? Or, will we fail to act? 
Will we falter? Will we act decisively but make poor decisions? Will Montanans choose 
to fail or succeed? According to Diamond we ought to monitor what happens in modern 
Montana because it may well be "a model for the world" (73-75). 
Before I turn to a discussion of the integrated crises in democracy and ecology as 
they are expressed in the environmental restoration projects of Butte, Montana, I will 
13 
outline the contours of both the democratic crisis and our environmental crisis in broad 
strokes. This discussion is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather, it is an attempt to 
identify and describe each crisis alone before considering them as an integrated 
phenomenon. 
US Democracy in Crisis 
In a 2005 keynote address to journalists and media professionals, Al Gore warned, 
"American democracy is in grave danger." 
It is no longer possible to ignore the strangeness of our public discourse. I know that I am not the 
only one who feels that something has gone basically and badly wrong in the way America's 
fabled marketplace of ideas now functions. 
Critics from across a broad spectrum of American political thought-from 
Republican Congressman Ron Paul to Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich-tend 
to agree (though for sometimes wildly different reasons) that in the United States we have 
a "democracy in the balance" (Gore, 2007). American democracy is in a state of crisis. 
Four Ways to Think about American Democracy 
For this purpose of this discussion, I define US democracy in four ways: (1) 
democracy as an expression of popular sovereignty-democracy as people power; (2) 
democracy as a systematic method of recognizing and addressing problems of a diversely 
constituted public-democracy as public problem-solving; (3) democracy as a 
purposeful, open, and free public conversation-democracy as deliberative discourse; 
and ( 4) democracy as a way of community life-democracy as culture. 
----~-------------------------------------
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First, the radical meaning of democracy is "people power." The word is derived 
from Greek roots demos (the common people) and cratia (power, influence). Democracy 
is any form of government in which the common people, and not the elite, hold the 
power. Democracy is, according to Aristotle, "that form of government in which the 
greater number are sovereign" (Jowett and Twining, 1957: 96.) Democracy, as Lincoln 
put it in the Gettysburg Address, means "government of the people, by the people, for the 
people." According to the New Oxford American English Dictionary (2007), democracy 
is "that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a 
whole, and is exercised either directly by them (as in the small republics of antiquity) or 
by officers elected by them." Democracy means people power. 
Second, democracy is a public problem recognition and response system. 
According to the US State Department web site, "Democracy is in many ways nothing 
more than a set of rules for managing conflict." As Xavier Briggs put it in Democracy as 
Problem-solving (2008): 
At their best, democracies confront important public problems ... The theory and practice of what 
makes democracy work necessarily include the study of problem-solving in action and of the 
collective capacity to problem-solve-not only to deliberate about the world and set directions for 
government, but to change the state of the world through collective action, not only to devise and 
decide but to do. ( 4,8) 
Third, democracy is a purposeful and ongoing conversation-deliberative 
discourse. For John Dewey (1927), the ideal democratic community-"the Great 
Community"-should be a "communicating community." Our decision-making processes 
should be born of open and free discourse within the public sphere. And, these 
conversations should be pointed, that is, deliberate-purposeful and methodical 
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conversations aimed at addressing the problems we share. American democracy is how 
the people influence problem-solving processes through deliberative discourse. This 
conception of contemporary American democracy is captured by the terms used by 
political theorists like John Dryzek (1997) and Collin Farelly (2005) to describe 
American democracy: deliberative and discursive democracy. 
Finally, democracy is a way of life-a culture. Democracy is more than 
democratic structures and rules, it is also cultural practice. "A healthy democracy 
depends in large part on the development of a democratic civic culture" (US State 
Department). Democracy requires certain cultural structures and processes, a democratic 
communication framework. Dewey (1927) described democracy as the very "idea of 
community life": 
The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its 
best. To be realized, it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, 
industry, religion. And even as far as political arrangements are concerned, governmental 
institutions are but a mechanism for securing to an idea channels of effective operation ... Regarded 
as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of 
community life itself. (327) 
These four aspects of democracy, of course, are not a comprehensive way to look 
at subjet. But they do provide us a framework for understanding the nature of our 
democratic crisis. 
The Is/Ought Gap: a Democracy in Name Only? 
Is the United States a democracy in the radical sense of the word; that is, does our 
democracy express the will of the people? Does our democracy effectively cope with our 
common problems? Does our democracy emerge from free, open deliberative discourse 
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in the public sphere? Is our democratic way of life--our democratic culture-flourishing 
or languishing? 
First, let's consider the power of the people. In the sociological sense, according 
to Max Weber, power is the ability to realize one's visions, even in spite of resistance. 
The radical meaning of democracy is people power; but in practice, our forms of 
government tend to leave people feeling impotent-powerless. In a blurb for Frances 
Moore Lappe's book Democracy's Edge (2006), Noam Chomsky wrote, "A great many 
people do not like what is happening to their lives and their country, and what is being 
done in their name, but [they] feel isolated and helpless, victims of forces beyond their 
control." For Lappe (2006) the fundamental aspect of our prevailing crisis in democracy 
lies in our collective perception that that we are incapable of solving problems we 
confront. "The problems aren't the crisis ... the crisis is our feeling of powerlessness to 
address them" (5). If democracy means people power, but the people feel powerless, a 
chasm exists between what is and what ought to be. 
Second, does US democracy effectively cope with the real and pressing problems 
we face in our daily lives, problems in education, healthcare, the economy, or the 
environment? The current state of dis-ease in each of these aspects of the American 
experience would suggest that our democratic decision-making structures and processes 
are ineffective at solving, or even adequately coping with, the problems that press for 
solutions. 
Our public K-12 education systems are underachieving and producing students ill-
prepared for the rigors of the 21st century global economy. Our healthcare system leaves 
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the most vulnerable among us uninsured and uncared for. Those lucky enough to be 
covered by insurance end-up struggling their way through bureaucratic mazes to meet 
basic healthcare needs, and still often come up short. The US economy has crashed to a 
level not seen since the Great Depression, leaving millions without work and with 
dramatically depleted retirement savings, as we simultaneously "rescue" the corporate 
lenders responsible for the crisis in the first place. Environmental problems, from local 
watershed pollution to global climate change, immediately affect the health and well-
being of every human being on the planet. Our problems are many and varied, I argue, 
partly because our democratic problem-solving systems are failing to realize the promise 
of democracy. 
What about the discursive and deliberative aspects of our contemporary crisis in 
democracy? In The Assault on Reason (2007), Gore identified the problem when he 
wrote: 
There is ... something fundamentally new and different about our current crisis of democracy ... It is 
based on several serious problems that stem from the dramatic and fundamental change in the way 
we communicate among ourselves. (15-16) 
The technological mediation of human communication in the 21st century, the 
rhetorical tendency toward debate and argument instead of deliberative dialogue, 
dogmatic attitudes and failure to think critically, public apathy and alienation from 
political communication, structural obstacles limiting access to vital information, and 
decreasing opportunities for meaningful public participation in decision-making all 
contribute to the discursive aspects of our contemporary democratic crisis. 
Finally, what does the democratic crisis look like in terms of democratic culture, 
democracy as a way of life. Harvard Sociologist Theda Skocpol (2004) documented the 
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shape-shifting of America's vibrant participatory civic culture, the democratic culture 
that so fascinated Alexis de Toqueville in the 1830s, into a management culture that 
relies on dues-paying members and boards of directors. Before, people directly 
participated; today they are members ofmemberless organizations. The title ofher book, 
Diminished Democracy, suggested that contemporary American civic culture is somehow 
lacking in important ways. Our democratic culture is less than it ought to be. 
Each of the four ways I suggest for viewing democracy reveals an incongruity 
between the way things are and the way things ought to be based on our basic pragmatic 
standards for US democracy. Put otherwise, we have an important is/ought gap. There is 
inconsistency and a failure to realize our guiding ideals and principles. Our democracy 
does not walk its talk; it is not true to its promises. Government action, though 
consequential, is too often the expression of bureaucratic inertia, or market forces, and 
not, as democracy requires, a response to the needs of the public. 
Our guiding pragmatic conception of democracy is not just a form of 
government-it is a way oflife, the very "idea of community itself." As such, democracy 
affects all modes of human association and decision-making. Democracy disconnected 
from social practice is irrelevant and disconnected, like the free-floating signifiers of the 
postmodemists. 
In a speech to the House of Commons in 194 7, Winston Churchill said, "No one 
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is 
the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time 
to time" (Keyes, 2006: 43). Democracy is messy and difficult and seems to move in 
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lurches and fits, toward and away from our collective democratic ideals. Nevertheless, as 
I will address in Chapter IV, there are sound moral reasons to support democracy. 
My main points are these: if the people are powerless to influence decision-
making, if our problem-solving systems do not or can not recognize let alone solve our 
problems, if public participation is smoke and mirrors obfuscating the real mechanisms of 
decision-making, and if our democratic way of life-our culture-is languishing, what 
we have is a democracy in name only. This constitutes a democratic crisis. 
Ecological Crisis: Something New Under the Sun 
In the previous section I tried to describe the chasm that exists between our 
pragmatic democratic ideals and our actual "democratic" practices, and I further 
suggested that this inconsistency constitutes a crisis in democracy. 
In this section I intend to describe the ecological crisis we face. From the polluted 
rivers that flow through and connect our communities to global climate change, each and 
every human being on the planet is confronted by some kind of serious environmental 
threat today. In part, the simple act of living is difficult and necessarily a problematic 
endeavor. Life is struggle. But, the problems we confront today are new problems we 
have added to the struggle of life, problems we have created only in the last several 
hundred years. 
In Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the 20th Century 
(2000), environmental historian J.R. McNeill challenged the wisdom of King Solomon as 
expressed in Ecclesiastes (1 :9): 
What has been is what will be 
and what is done is what will be done, 
and there is nothing new under the sun ... 
According to McNeill, there is in fact something new under the sun. Human 
societies have transformed in significant ways, and their modes of social organization, 
their political economies, their energy and technology regimes, and their "ecological 
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revolutions" (Merchant, 1989) have resulted in fundamentally new relationships between 
humans and the environment. 
This section describes our global environmental crisis, and concludes by 
identifying the symptoms of crisis-the ecological signs, indeces, and indicators of the 
scope and scale of our problems. 
Earth in the Balance: the Vulnerable Planet 
Critics often charge influential environmental thinkers with presenting 
apocalyptic, millenarian, or doomsday scenarios in the titles of their major works on the 
present state of the environment. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962), Carolyn 
Merchant's The Death of Nature (1980), AI Gore's Earth in the Balance (1993), and John 
Bellamy Foster's The Vulnerable Planet (1999) are a few such titles. In the essay, "The 
Scale of our Ecological Crisis", Foster (2002) noted that critics try to paint the authors as 
emotional, irrational criticizers of a fundamentally robust and integral global ecosystem. 
David Harvey (1996), one such critic, wrote: 
The subtext is that the earth is somehow fragile and that we need to become caring managers or 
caring physicians to nurse it back from sickness into health ... Against this it is crucial to 
understand that it is materially impossible for us to destroy the planetearth, that the worst we can 
do is to engage in material transformations of our environment so as to make life less rather than 
more comfortable for our own species. (194) 
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Foster noted that Harvey is correct when we apply a geological time-scale to our 
analysis of global climate change. The earth as a dynamic and living system has existed 
without humans for almost all of its existence, and life from bacteria to mammals will 
likely live on after we pass from the planet. Yet, we are human, and a more human time-
scale of analysis suggests that human-hastened planetary change and instability will 
likely shock our social orders into radically new forms. That the earth will live on with 
without us likely is true, but Harvey's statement is only an interesting (and practically 
irrelevant) thought experiment. What matters is what is in front of us now. How we 
respond to crisis will determine, again referring to Diamond's words, whether we fail or 
succeed. 
In Marx's Ecology (200 1 ), Foster described our problematic relationship with our 
environment as another form of alienation-a "metabolic rift." The scale and intensity of 
our biophysical transformations have fundamentally altered the dynamics of the living 
systems we depend on for continued survival. Humans have always lived in 
unsustainable ways on a small scale (Easter Island, for example). What is new is the scale 
and intensity of our ecological metabolism and the resulting rift. The earth is home to 
more of us, and our metabolic footprints are bigger, deeper, and longer lasting. The 
earth's responses to our new ways ofliving in relationship to the planet are increased 
volatility and decreased ecological resilience. The earth and its inhabitants hang in the 
balance. 
Before Gore wrote about our "democracy in the balance" (2007) he wrote of our 
"Earth in the balance" (1993): 
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Now that our relationship to the earth has changed so utterly, we have to see that change and 
understand its implications ... Global warming, ozone depletion, the loss of living species, 
deforestation-they all have common cause: the new relationship between human civilization and 
the earth's natural balance. (31) 
In The Vulnerable Planet (1999), Foster put it this way: 
Human society has reached a critical threshold in its relation to its environment. The destruction of 
the planet, in the sense of making it unusable for human purposes, has grown to such an extent 
that it now threatens the continuation of nature, as well as the survival and development of society 
itself. ( 11) 
The precarious nature of our ecological conditions render the planet vulnerable-
it exists in harm's way. Ecological problems are human problems because humans are 
ecologically situated and dependent upon their environments for continued existence. 
While the earth-especially when considered in geological time-is not in immediate 
peril, human societies are, at the very least, precariously situated-poised somewhere 
between order and chaos. 
Signs of Ecological Crisis 
What forms do our environmental problems take? What are the indicators of 
environmental crises? Foster's (1999) "long list of urgent problems" includes: 
... overpopulation, destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, extinction of species, loss of 
genetic diversity, acid rain, nuclear contamination, tropical deforestation, the elimination of 
climax forests, wetland destruction, soil erosion, desertification, floods, famine, the despoliation of 
lakes, streams and rivers, the drawing down and contamination of ground water, the pollution of 
coastal waters and estuaries, the destruction of coral reefs, oil spills, overfishing, expanding 
landfills, toxic wastes, the poisonous effects of insecticides and herbicides, exposure to hazards on 
the job, urban congestion, and the depletion of nonrenewable resources. (11-12) 
Diamond (2005) lists a dozen of what he calls "the most serious environmental 
problems facing past and present societies" ( 486). The first four concern destruction or 
losses (destruction of habitat, threats to wild food populations, loss of biodiversity, and 
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loss of farmland and soil); the next three involve ceilings on natural resources (loss of the 
world's major energy sources, pollution of freshwater resources, and loss of 
photosynthetic capacity); the next three are about "harmful things that we produce or 
move around" (toxic chemicals, alien species, and global climate change); and the last 
two deal with human population (human population growth and increased human 
impact). 
According to Diamond (2005), each of these problems is connected to and 
sometimes exacerbate the others. Human population growth and the growth in the use of 
toxic chemicals, for example, sometimes combine to contribute to global climate change, 
the destruction of habitat, and threats to wild food populations. Moreover, each of these 
problems alone, and all of them together, "are like time bombs with fuses ofless than 50 
years" ( 498). These problems press for solutions and thus constitute an ecological crisis. 
Integrated Crises in Ecology and Democracy: 
The Case of Butte, Montana 
I started this chapter by asserting that our real and pressing problems in the public 
sphere (our democratic crises) exacerbate our real and pressing problems in the ecosphere 
(our environmental crises). These distinct and recognizable categories of problems-
democratic and ecological-are mutually defining, co-evolving phenomena. Because 
democracy is one way we recognize and cope with common problems, when democracy 
is in crisis, our problem-solving capabilities are diminished. Thus, our democratic crises 
lead to dysfunctional problem-solving, which by definition, fails to adequately cope with 
other kinds of problems, such as those we confront in our environment. The ecological 
problems associated with our earth in the balance, our vulnerable planet, will not likely 
be solved by our dysfunctional democracy in practice. These crises are complex and 
integrated. My research is an attempt to identify, define, and cope with these problems. 
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Abstract notions such as the one I have presented above-integrated crises in 
ecology and democracy-are practically insignificant if they fail to help address the real 
problems of real people. This is a fundamental tenet ofDewey's notion of Pragmatism as 
amelioration and problem-solving. Put differently, academic inquiry is irrelevant if it fails 
to arise from and address real human suffering. Therefore, I begin this systematic look at 
the integrated crises I have situated at the heart of this work by examining the particular 
experience of one of the places Diamond (2005) suggested we use as a model for the 
world: Butte, Montana. 
This research is born of my experience growing up in Butte, Montana-a 11hard-
used" (Fiege, 1999) place populated by a hard-used people. The community of Butte 
emerged as the epicenter of industrial hard rock activities during the Civil War 
Reconstruction Era in the Rocky Mountain West. Butte was born where the Western 
frontier and the industrial revolution overlapped and merged. 
Hard rock mining is one of the most ecologically transformative processes in 
which humans engage (McNeill, 2000; Hooke, 2000). In Butte, massive amounts of earth 
have been mined: blasted, shoveled, treated, and dumped. For every ounce of gold or 
pound of copper, tons of waste rock are produced (Power, 1996). Open mine pits 
measured in miles, like the Berkeley and Continental pits, border the community of 
roughly 34,000 people. In Butte, mountains of mine waste create man-made foothills to 
the Continental Divide. The community's horizontal contours are a fluid and dynamic 
feature of the landscape. Significant mountain peaks and old neighborhoods (like East 
Butte, Meaderville, and McQueen) have disappeared as, ever so slowly, the mine pits 
grow wider and deeper. 
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Hard rock mining and processing dramatically altered the dynamics and integrity 
of the living communities in Butte's Summit Valley. For most of Butte's history the idea 
of protecting the environment was a non-issue. Although this impulse was expressed 
through ephemeral toxics movements in the early part of the 20th century (MacMillan, 
2000; Diamond, 2005), industrial mining activities continued apace with little or no 
regard for the health and wellness of the living communities residing atop "The Richest 
Hill on Earth"-that is, until the second half of the 20th century and the rise of a broad-
based environmental movement in the United States. 
In the 1960s and 70s, a diverse coalition ofMontana citizens united under the 
banner of environmental protection. In 1973, they rewrote Montana's State Constitution. 
Article II Section 3 of the document defines the right of every Montanan to live in a clean 
and healthful environment. During this same period, federal and state governments 
enacted new laws designed to protect human health by insuring that the environments 
within which humans live and recreate themselves are also healthy (e.g., Clean Water 
Act, 1977, etc.). Under the Nixon Administration, agencies such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA, established 1970) were created to execute US environmental 
law and policy. 
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However, by the end of the Carter Administration such mediagenic environmental 
tragedies as Love Canal made clear the impotence (powerlessness) of existing 
environmental protection systems. As one of his final acts, in December of 1980, 
President Carter signed CERCLA into law. Superfund put teeth in existing environmental 
laws, provided opportunities for public participation in environmental decision-making, 
established a tax on environmentally destructive industries (this tax funded the 
"Superfund") to be used to reclaim and restore hard-used places, and created legal 
mechanisms for recovering environmental clean-up costs from responsible parties. 
One of the first tasks of the EPA under Superfund was the creation of aN ational 
Priorities List (NPL)-a list of the country's most pressing environmental problems. In 
1982 four sections interlocking around the stream channel of the Upper Clark Fork River, 
originating in Butte and extending to the Milltown Dam near Missoula, were included on 
the EPA's NPL. According to Diamond (2005), "The Clark Fork River, including the 
Berkeley Pit, is now the largest and most expensive Superfund cleanup site in the US" 
(39). 
For 25 years, federal, state, and local governments have been working with the 
responsible corporate parties and citizen groups to create an extreme make-over of 
polluted watershed and its communities. The process is a slow and complex experiment 
in environmental remediation, restoration, justice, and democracy. 
The Upper Clark Fork River Superfund projects are often propped up as 
exemplary models for environmental problem-solving by the federal government and the 
responsible corporate parties. Local government, citizens, and citizen groups, however, 
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frequently voice dissatisfaction with the structures, processes, and consequences of the 
system in practice. Some feel as though they've been left out; others are included but 
marginally. They feel as though their participation falls far short of the EPA's guiding 
ideal of "meaningful participation"-the procedural measuring stick legitimate decision-
making for the EPA. 
According to a letter written to the EPA from environmental justice advocate Dr. 
John Ray (2005), several problems converge in Butte's Superfund projects. First, the 
environmental contamination is concentrated in areas inhabited by the poorest of Butte's 
citizens. 
The [Butte] area is contaminated with arsenic, lead, mercury, cadmium, and copper. The site is 
also unique in that people live and work amidst the taxies. The Butte Hill also has a 
disproportionate number of low-income citizens. The dust in many of their homes and yards is 
contaminated with lead, arsenic, and mercury. Health surveys of the area show elevated levels of 
cancer and other illnesses directly related to heavy metals exposure. 
Second, the low-income people most directly affected have been ignored, and 
"Ignoring public comment is contrary to EPA national policy and contrary to sound, 
democratic public decision-making" (2005). 
Along the Upper Clark Fork River Basin complex ofNPL Superfund sites, the 
ecological crises associated with mega-mining and its aftermath are, in the view of the 
affected publics, exacerbated by democratic crises in decision-making. These integrated 
crises have prompted this academic project in applied moral philosophy-a search for a 
normative guidance for US environmental problem-solving. 
CHAPTER III 
PRAGMATIC VISIONS OF NATURECULTURE 
In Communication as Culture (1989) James Carey noted that we hardly need 
social scientists and philosophers to tell us certain things. That culture is born of 
communication, for example. Or, that nature and culture influence each other. These 
observations are obvious to anyone who takes a moment to consider them. 
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However, especially in light of the integrated crises in nature and culture I 
described in the second chapter, pragmatically minded social scientists and philosophers 
can and should describe the dynamics of nature-culture relationships through critical 
inquiry. Once understanding is reached through deep description, we ought to interpret 
and suggest meaning. We should submit our ideas to the scrutiny of a critical community 
of inquirers. And, by virtue of pragmatism's necessary search for practical wisdom, we 
should suggest careful and rational paths of action as experimental correctives to our 
most pressing crises. 
Chapter II described Butte, Montana's integrated crises in ecology and democracy 
as a connected complex of problems entangling nature and culture. Chapter III considers 
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the meaning of nature and culture, and the related terms of environment and 
communication. My intentions are to ground the problems outlined in Chapter I, and all 
future discussion, in a pragmatic and integral vision of nature-and-culture, an alternative 
vision to the deep-seated, commonly held, and problematic notion that nature and culture 
are somehow distinct and oppositional. 
In the present chapter, I also suggest that environmental communication (EC)-a 
relatively new and vital field of inquiry and practice that studies where nature and culture 
overlap and merge-is well-positioned to contribute to a more sophisticated 
understanding of nature-and-culture by exploring and integrating relevant work across the 
natural and human sciences. The ultimate goal, as Clifford Geertz (1973) put it, is "to 
make better the precision with which we vex one another" (29). 
I conclude Chapter III with a discussion of two under-considered visions of 
natureculture put forward by Pragmatism's principal philosophers: Charles Sanders Peirce 
and John Dewey. Peirce's triadic semiotics and Dewey's philosophy of experience (late in 
life he changed this term to "culture") and nature are useful instruments that help ground 
environmental communication theory in both natural and cultural reality. These 
philosophies can help us realize Donal Carbaugh's (2007) normative prescription for 
environmental communication studies as a crisis discipline: to serve a dual allegiance to 
both words and worlds. 
Defining Key Terms 
Nature and culture are two of the most complex words in the English language, 
according to Raymond Williams (1983: 87; 1988: 221). Nature and culture are also 
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defined, at least in part, in relation to one another and, in this dissertation, function as a 
kind of semantic couplet: nature-and-culture. Or, better yet, the words function as a 
hybrid or internetwork, as in Bruno Latour's nature-culture (1987), or Donna Haraway's 
contraction, natureculture (2003). Here, I will define these ideas in working form. I will 
also define the related terms of environment and communication. 
Nature and Environment 
Nature, according to the American Heritage Science Dictionary (AHSD, 2002), 
refers to "the world and its naturally occurring phenomena." Nature is a process noun, 
referring to both the things of nature and the processes by and through which nature 
unfolds. 
When I use the word "nature" I mean something very similar to what Aldo 
Leopold meant when he referred to the land in his essay, "The Land Ethic" (1949). For 
Leopold, the physical environment, along with the plants and animals that inhabit it, form 
an ecological unit, a living community composed of biophysical elements in constant 
transactive relationships. He called all of this "the land." Nature unfolds through 
interactions among living systems, and between living systems and the non-living 
systems they rely upon for survival. Nature is most concisely defined by the AHSD as, 
"living organisms and their environments." 
Nature and the concept of "the lifeworld" are synonymous. The lifeworld is a 
complex, dynamic, and integrated phenomenon born of the interactions among what 
ecologists call the "physiosphere" (the abiotic elements of earth) and the "biosphere" (the 
biotic elements of earth). This realm of abiotic/biotic interactions is also called the 
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"ecosphere." Nature as "living organisms and their environments" conjoins the organic 
and the inorganic elements of life into integrated and biophysically enacted ecosystems-
the lifeworld. 
Nature, the lifeworld, defined as "living organisms and their environments" is a 
useful starting point, but does not do the job of more fully communicating the dynamic 
interplay and continuities between living organisms and their environments. 
The word environment comes from the French, environ, which means to surround, 
envelop, or enclose. An environment does not simply surround an organism like a bubble, 
however. A continuity between an organism and its environment exists. Organisms have 
a unique relationship to their immediate, subjective, perceptual environments-their 
umwelts (Deely, 2004). Organisms emerge within hospitable environments and renew 
themselves through biochemically enacted metabolic transactions, the biological build up 
and breakdown of the organismic body. Humans, for example, metabolize what they eat, 
breathe, and absorb through the skin into flesh and bone. Environments enflesh in living 
creatures. Conversely, living organisms, also through metabolic processes, eventually 
transform living tissues into the stuff of environments. 
Deweis theory of experience proves useful here because it is, as Kevin Armitage 
(2003) noted, fundamentally dynamic, ecological, and embodied. For Dewey, experience 
is born of and defined as organism-environment transactions. He wrote, "Life goes on in 
an environment; not merely in it but because of it, and through interaction with it. .. The 
career and destiny of a living being are bound up with its interchanges with its 
environment, not externally but in the most intimate way" (Dewey, 1934: 13). 
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Karl Marx, a dialectical materialist and humanist who like Dewey, studied both 
Darwinian evolution and Hegelian dialectical thought, elegantly described this continuity 
between organism and environment by referring to the environment as an organism's 
"inorganic body" (Marx, 1844). 
In general, the environment is that which surrounds something. In particular, 
when that something is alive, functionally the environment becomes more than just the 
stuff around the living organism; it becomes the stuff from which life renews and sustains 
itself. The environment becomes the medium by and through which living systems carry 
out the business of living. Organisms emerge within, are coupled with, comprised of, 
conditioned by, and dependent upon their environments. As they are born of their 
environment, so, too, do they recreate their environment. 
For the purpose of this discussion, nature refers to the things and processes of the 
lifeworld. Nature refers to organisms and environments, and to the ways that organisms 
and environments mutually constitute each other in the process of bringing forth this 
buzzing, blooming, living world. 
Culture and Communication 
Human beings are live creatures living in transactional relationships with their 
environments. We are part of nature; we are natural. Yet, we are a peculiar kind of 
animal: cerebral, social, creative, moral, technological, rational, irrational. 
In part, our peculiarity is derived, not from the fact that we communicate, for life 
of all kinds is communicative, but from the relative sophistication of our communication 
as a species. We are semiotic creatures, a "symbolic species" (Deacon, 1997). We make 
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meaning through communication, and our communication changes the general drift and 
direction of the unfolding lifeworld. 
I define "communication" as the semiotic negotiation of meaning and behavior. 
And in spite of a living spiritualist tradition of communication that views the process as 
disembodied sharing of ideas in some distinct mental plane-soul to soul (Peters, 
1999)--I take communication to be a fundamentally embodied and biological process. 
The following ideas are nuanced variations of this notion of communication: semiosis 
(Peirce, 1955), symbolic interaction (Mead, 1934), symbolic action (Burke, 1966), 
encoding/decoding (Hall, 1980) and languaging (Maturana and Varela, 1987 /92). 
Through communication we semiotically negotiate meanings and coordinate 
actions. Together, we nudge and guide nature, bend the world around us and signify the 
meaning of it all. 
The lifeworld is the context of our cultural practices, and it also is the material 
and energetic limit and potential of culture. Nature often pushes back, sometimes in ways 
we have trouble coping with, a sign that crucial ecological thresholds have been crossed 
and that a metabolic rift exists. Nature and culture are conjoined through this negotiation, 
this push and pull of one upon the other. 
The dynamic and recognizable patterns that come about because of our incessant 
reorganization ofthe living world, along with the processes of meaning-making, are what 
I mean by culture, the subject of this section. 
Culture, like nature, is a process noun describing both the things of culture and the 
processes by and through which culture emerges, most notably, communication. 
-- --------------------------------------------------------
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Williams (1981) noted that the earliest meanings of the term culture were 
associated with the cultivation of crops and with the rearing and breeding of animals. 
Culture, in this sense, refers to coordinated and purposeful human intervention in natural 
processes, the re-directing of the lifeworld to better realize human needs and desires. 
The meaning was later extended to include the cultivation of the human mind 
through learning and the arts. In 18th century Germany and England, culture came to 
signify the spirit that informed "a whole and distinctive way of life" (Williams, 1981: 1 0). 
As Williams pointed out, culture is both the general drift and direction of common 
human social experiences and a creative process (poiesis). Sometimes we make it up as 
we go along. Communication and meaning-making constitute culture-in-process. 
Williams (1981) thought of culture as a "signifying system," that is, an emergent 
and dynamic network of communication among people sharing common cause and 
making this life significant. Geertz (1973) described a similar view of culture (culture as 
a network of meaning) when he poetically wrote, "man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun .. .I take culture to be those webs" (5). 
Cultures are dynamic networks of meaning-webs of significance-that emerge 
through communication among people sharing common cause and trying to cope with the 
world they have inherited-and the one they create anew. Culture, like nature, is a way 
of bringing forth the world. 
In defining each of these key terms, I intended to clarify, not what separates them, 
but what connects them. In the pragmatic understanding of natureculture I propose, 
nature and culture, communication and environment, are all inextricably bound with one 
another in a mutually constituted and structurally coupled intersystemic living 
materiosemiotic network-a natureculture, the lifeworld. 
Nature and Culture 
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Next, I will examine three ways of thinking about the relationships between 
nature and culture. The first two are questions of ontology and consider what exists and 
how existing things are related to each other. The first of these is a deep-seated, 
commonly held, and problematic vision of nature and culture as distinct and oppositional 
phenomena. The second is an alternative vision, more in line with contemporary 
philosophical and scientific understandings of nature and culture, which sees culture as 
an expression of nature. The third is an epistemological view. It sees nature and culture as 
different ways to know the world. I contend that we ought to expose the faults of the first 
and shift our notions of common sense toward the two alternative visions based on 
contemporary scientific understanding ofhmnans and the living world. 
Nature and Culture as Distinct and Oppositional 
"It is commonly accepted that the western view of humanity's place in nature," 
wrote Raila (2000), "is dominated by a dualistic opposition between nature and culture" 
(156). This is one way to think about the relationship between nature and culture, as 
"radically different ontological spheres, hyperseparated and oppositional" (Hawkins, 
2006: 3). Our Western philosophical traditions, from Plato to Descartes and beyond, have 
passed on to us a predisposition toward dualistic thought, a tendency to define dyads as 
distinct and polar opposites. Dewey described the Western philosophical tradition as a 
"brood and nest of dualisms" (1920: xix). 
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In this view, the emergence of human culture marked the birth of something new. 
And, that something is somehow separate from and opposite of nature. While born of 
nature, the emergence of culture represents a higher, and ontologically distinct, 
phenomenon. 
This view of the relationship between nature and culture is expressed in one of 
Western literature's dominant themes: man vs. nature. In this theme, humans represent a 
peculiar form of God-touched animal, and civilization and culture represent a 
transcendence of the brutal natural world. Culture tames nature. As Leo Marx (1964) and 
others have documented, America's westward expansion-in fact, the entire notion of 
manifest destiny-is a sign of the cultural belief that culture can and ought to transform 
nature (wilderness) into something more and better (culture/civilization). Katherine 
Hepburn's character embodied this common-sense American notion in African Queen 
(1951) when she said, "Nature .. .is what we were put in this world to rise above." 
This line of thought represents a cognitive map that sees culture as somehow 
different than, superior to, and opposite from, nature and the lifeworld. This notion 
lacerates culture from nature and has led to several interesting varieties of 
anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism in the humanities and social sciences. For 
example, environmental sociologist Raymond Murphy (2001) criticized what he called 
the dominant sociological paradigm as "sociology as if nature did not matter" (27-42). 
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This view mistakes a map for the living world. It is still prevalent and deep-
seated, and, at least in part, helps explain the natural blind spot of so much contemporary 
inquiry in the humanities and social sciences. 
Culture as Another Form ofNature 
Another way to view the relationship between nature and culture is to see culture 
as expression of nature. Like the previous vision of nature and culture, this view sees 
culture as an emergent property of nature. However, unlike the other, culture is not 
necessarily elevated, separated, or oppositional. Culture is how nature expresses itself 
through human social action. 
Nature unfolds in the ecosphere, and culture unfolds in what Yuri Lotman (1989) 
named the semiosphere. The semiosphere is an integral part of the ecosphere. Jesper 
Hoffmeyer (1997) wrote the global semiosphere "is a sphere like the atmosphere, the 
hydrosphere, or the biosphere. It penetrates these spheres and consists in communication" 
(~ 1 ). This is as elegant a way as I have ever encountered to describe the interconnection 
of communication and culture to the natural environment. 
Dewey's philosophy of experience with its emphases on continuities among 
organisms, communities, and environments represents this second way to think of nature 
and culture. For Dewey, humans are simultaneously natural and cultural. In fact, human 
social experience entangles nature with culture. For Dewey, culture is another form of 
nature. 
Nature and Culture as Ways ofKnowing 
A third way to view nature and culture is to see them as ways of knowing, as 
epistemic, as modes of cognition. 
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One of the most interesting contemporary definitions of life and living systems 
was developed by Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana and his colleague, cognitive 
scientist Francisco Varela. Their theory was outlined inAutopoiesis: The Organization of 
the Living (1973). Autopoiesis literally means self-creating or self-generating. According 
to autopoietic theory, a fundamental characteristic of life and living systems is the ability 
of organisms to continually self-generate their biological structures by metabolizing 
environmental elements into the stuff of life. 
Fritjof Capra (2002) has noted that the central insight of autopoietic theory "is the 
identification of cognition, the process of knowing, with the process of life" (34). This 
expanded definition of cognition, a concept once limited to the world of mind, means that 
the biophysical transactions (metabolism) that occur between organisms and 
environments are a basic biological way of knowing the world. "Cognition," according to 
Capra is, "the continual bringing forth of a world through the process ofliving" (36). 
Organisms are structurally coupled with and dependent upon their environments 
for survival. According to autopoietic theory, the most basic mode of biological cognition 
occurs as organisms self-create through metabolic transactions with their environments, 
their inorganic bodies. 
Human beings, as noted earlier, are a peculiar kind oflive creature. We know and 
bring forth a world, not only through the biophysical transactions of our earthly bodies 
(cognition as metabolic autopoiesis), but also, as Niklas Luhmann (1989) has observed, 
through communication and culture (cognition as symbolic autopoiesis). 
Humans, social creatures that we are, are the knot that binds nature and culture. 
Nature and culture are coupled, resonant, and mutually constitutive. Nature and culture 
are connected through the conduit of social experience in the human species. Humans 
simultaneously inhabit both worlds and, thus, we connect nature to culture in a 
materiosemiotic web. 
Environmental Communication: 
Inquiry at the Nexus of Nature and Culture 
In the inaugural volume of Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature 
and Culture (2007), editor Stephen Depoe described environmental communication 
studies as a nexus, "a place of global connection and conversation among scholars 
working in a variety of academic disciplines who explore communication about and 
within both natural and cultural environments" (1). 
Mark Meisner, founder and director of the Environmental Communication 
Network (ECN), defines environmental communication on the ECN web site as "a 
diverse synthesis of communication and environmental theory that examines the role, 
techniques, and influence of communication in environmental affairs"(, 4). 
Environmental communication studies occur where systematic inquiries into 
environmental issues overlap and merge with systematic inquiries into human 
communication, culture, and society. As such, it is one of the modern hybrid modes of 
inquiry peculiar to 201h century academics (see Peters, 1993). Environmental 
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communication studies endeavor to transcend and include traditional disciplinary 
boundaries, theories, and methods in an effort to acquire useful knowledge about-not 
nature and culture in isolation-naturecultures as an integral phenomenon. 
Generally speaking, EC studies have existed for as long as communication and 
rhetorical scholars have considered environmental issues and as long as environmental 
scholars have considered communication a significant ecological process, about forty 
years or so. 
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Shanahan and McComas (1999) observed that mass communication research 
started looking into environmental issues during the period in the late 60s and early 70s 
when the US environmental consciousness emerged and coalesced into a mass social 
movement. Early mass media and environmental research was structurally and 
theoretically identical to other mass communication research of the period. The only 
significant difference was that the media content under scrutiny took the environment as 
its subject. 
Cox (2006), Stephen Depoe (2007), Mark Meisner and others associated with the 
Environmental Communication Division (ECD) within the National Communication 
Association (NCA) and the Environmental Communication Network (ECN), trace the 
origins of environmental communication studies to the pioneering critical environmental 
rhetorical studies of Christine Oravec (1981, 1984). The ECN began to coalesce around a 
body of recognizable research in the 1990s, and at the turn of the 21st century, has 
become a living field composed of a diverse array of organized and practically minded 
scholars and practitioners. 
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Today, EC inquiry is broad and deep. Cox's typology of environmental 
communication research has expanded to include the following seven primary areas of 
study: environmental rhetoric and discourse, media and environmental journalism, public 
participation in environmental decision-making, advocacy campaigns, environmental 
collaboration and conflict resolution, risk communication, and representations of nature 
in popular culture (2006: 6-11). 
In the first comprehensive textbook on the subject, Environmental 
Communication and the Public Sphere (2006), Cox defines environmental 
communication, through Kenneth Burke (1966), as a form of symbolic action. For Cox, 
environmental communication is: 
the pragmatic and constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as well as our 
relationships to the natural world; it is the symbolic medium that we use in constructing 
environmental problems and negotiating society's different responses to them. (12) 
By "pragmatic" Cox means that environmental communication studies is 
practically concerned with environmental problem-solving through purposeful 
communication (deliberative discourse). By constitutive, Cox means that environmental 
communication is not simply descriptive, but rather, that symbolic actions concerning 
environmental affairs help create, guide, and influence our perceptions, beliefs, and 
creaturely behaviors. Environmental communication partly constitutes and creates our 
relationships to each other and the living world. 
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Toward a Dual Allegiance to Words and Worlds 
In "Social Practice and Biophysical Process,'1 a phrase inspired by Niklas 
Luhmann's Ecological Communication (1989), Peterson, Peterson, and Grant (2004) 
wrote, " ... applied ecologists rarely address human society with the intellectual or 
analytical rigor they normally employ for evaluating ecological processes and functions, 
and social scientists and humanists rarely analyze nonhuman nature" (15). This makes 
sense given the charge of both natural and social scientists. However, through the looking 
glass of EC research, disciplinary myopia is limiting. Several scholars have suggested a 
broader, deeper, trans-disciplinary mode of research, one that considers nature and 
culture as mutually constitutive and coevolutionary. 
In a Journal of Communication article titled "Biosocial Theory and 
Environmental Communication" (1995), David Backes wrote, "Research to date has 
focused on problems and processes related to human social systems, and has almost 
entirely ignored linkages to problems and processes in biophysical systems" (147). 
According to Backes, environmental communication is communication-centered and 
neglects (or lightly considers) the living world. He observed that this is ironic based on 
the fact that most environmental communication scholars conduct their research because 
of a recognition of our serious environmental problems. 
Not much has changed between then and now in this regard, according to Donal 
Carbaugh (2007), who described this problem as the tendency of EC research to 
emphasize words, not worlds. Carbaugh warns, "We must be careful not to load the dice 
in favor of our own interests in the linguistic, rhetorical, socially constructed nature of 
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things" (69). He further suggests that environmental communication researchers take 
ecological processes seriously, and that "we ground our views of environmental 
communication in a dual allegiance to words and worlds" (71 ). 
Pragmatic Visions of Natureculture 
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So far in this dissertation, I have devoted much space to pragmatic philosophy, 
especially to the thought of Dewey. His ideas about culture, communication, community, 
democracy, ethics, nature, and the environment are the narrative threads that run through 
this work from beginning to end. However, as I hope to make clear, another seminal 
thinker from this philosophical tradition also plays an important role in framing the 
pragmatic visions of natureculture that ground this research. In this section I present both 
Peirce's triadic semiotics and Dewey's philosophy of culture and nature as useful 
"orienting generalizations" (Wilber, 1996) for environmental communication research. 
Charles Sanders Peirce: Triadic Semiotics 
Charles Peirce, "the principle of pragmatism" according to William James (1907: 
18), provides the philosophical groundwork for a practical theory of ecological 
communication, especially through his influential writings such as "Logic as Semiotic: 
the Theory of Signs" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (Peirce, 1955). Peirce's ideas 
provide a practical alternative semiotic theory to that of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism. 
In Community Over Chaos: An Ecological Perspective on Communication Ethics 
( 1997), James Mackin offers a useful critique of "postmodernism's inability to produce a 
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theory of practical action" (35). Mackin suggests that postmodernism's problems begin 
with an over-emphasis on Saussure and his dyadic theory of the sign, composed of the 
signifier and the signified. "Postmodernism in general and poststructuralism in particular 
have grown out of the dyadic perspective, and they are both susceptible to the critique of 
being irrelevant to the real problems of our world11 (37). 
For Mackin, Peirce's irreducibly triadic semiotics, a theory of the sign that 
considers not only the signifier and the signified but also real objects and ground of 
signification, represents what he calls the "the pragmatic alternative" to postmodernism, 
an alternative that is literally grounded in the dual realities of ecology and human 
expenence. 
By Mackin's reckoning, Saussure's dyadic semiology, developed half a generation 
after Peirce's work, provides useful insights into the structural code-function of language 
(langue). However, this code-function tmderstanding oflanguaging ought not be used as 
a method for understanding actual speech acts (parole). The free-floating signifiers and 
the entropic spin that result from such disconnection of the postmodernists are based on a 
misapplication of Saussure's dyadic semiology to the actual communicative behaviors of 
human creatures. "The dyadic model, if it is taken to be complete, is irrelevant to the 
problem of coping with the real world" (Mackin, 1997: 36). 
In general, when people engage in semiotic exchanges (communication), their 
signs refer to existing things and are therefore grounded in some notion of the real. That 
is why, despite the open-endedness and ambiguity of communication in general, humans 
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are pretty good at coordinating meanings and behaviors in the real world. We get things 
done. 
Signs, in Peirce's pragmatic view, are mind-instruments that humans use to cope 
with their dynamic environmental circumstances. Peirce's triadic semiotics-a theory of 
signs that takes the signifier, the signified, the object of signification, and the ground 
seriously-therefore provides a useful theoretical groundwork for environmental 
communication studies. Peirce's triadic semiotics meets Carbaugh's normative criteria by 
taking both words and worlds seriously and therefore could serve (and to some extent, 
already has served) as a useful instrument in the development of a pragmatic theory of 
natureculture. 
Dewey: Experience, Culture, and Nature 
In Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), Richard Rorty described Dewey as his 
"principal philosophical hero" because his philosophy sheds light on the hidden 
connections that tie living (and nonliving) networks together into a complex living matrix 
referred to in this dissertation as "natureculture." Dewey's pragmatic visions of 
natureculture characterize humans as environmentally situated co-creators of the 
lifeworld through communication and cultural practice. Rorty observed: 
... for pragmatists there is no sharp break between natural science and social science, nor between 
social science and politics, nor between [sic] politics, philosophy, and literature. All areas of 
culture are part of the same endeavor to make this life better. There is no deep split between theory 
and practice, because on a pragmatist view all so-called 'theory' which is not wordplay is always 
already practice. (1999: xxv) 
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While best known for his human-concerned theories of psychology, education, 
and democracy, Dewey's work, though not often taken as such, is profoundly ecological. 
According to Kevin Armitage (2003): 
Dewey's fundamental philosophical presupposition is the ecological premise that an understanding 
of organisms demands full consideration of their constant interactions with the surrounding 
environment. Dewey thereby rejected dualistic formulas for ascertaining knowledge, stressing that 
knowledge derives from material interactions with the social and natural world, rather than 
idealistic speculation or dispassionate observation. Humans produce knowledge through their 
interactions with nature. (50) 
Experience and Nature (1925) is the most comprehensive version of Dewey's 
integral philosophy of nature and culture. In it, he described continuities among human 
experience of nature through communication and cultural practice. Near the end of his 
life, Dewey lamented his choice of the word "experience" in the title. "Were I to write (or 
rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would entitle the book Culture and Nature .. .! 
would substitute the term 'culture' because with its meanings as now firmly established it 
can fully and freely carry my philosophy of experience" (Campbell, 1995: 68). 
Dewey viewed human experience as irreducibly social negotiations with each 
other and with the environment. Humans exist in cultural and natural environments 
simultaneously. In fact, human beings themselves are the conduit that connects one to the 
other. The Platonic dualism that separates the material world from the ideal world 
represents a false dichotomy to Dewey. Humans, by virtue of their irreducibly social 
nature and their ecological embodiment, entangle nature and culture together through 
social experience of nature through communication. "In other words," wrote Dewey 
(1929), "the social participation affected by communication, through language and other 
tools, is the naturalistic link which does away with the often alleged necessity of dividing 
the objects of experience into two worlds, one physical and one ideal" (xvii). 
Naturecultures exist because we exist in nature and culture. 
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Dewey, like Peirce, takes words and worlds seriously and binds them together 
through embodied human social experience. Moreover, like Peirce, words and language 
are instruments to Dewey. He called them "the tool of tools" (1929: 140). This 
instrumental understanding of language is significant and prompted Rorty to urge 
pragmatically minded philosophers to make a Gestalt shift in our perception of signs, 
words, and language-away from traditional representationalist modes of thought and 
toward the semiotic instrumentalism of Peirce and Dewey. Rorty (1999) urged us to "stop 
thinking of words as representations and to start thinking of them as nodes in the causal 
network which binds the organism together with its environment" (xxiii). We know and 
create the world, in part, through our semiotic exchanges. I believe this is what Robert 
Cox (2006) meant by describing environmental communication as the "pragmatic and 
constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as well as our relationships 
to the natural world" (12). 
CHAPTER IV 
ETHICS, DEMOCRACY, AND ECOLOGY: 
MORAL DIMENSIONS OF US ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
This chapter sets out to identify and examine ethical aspects of environmental 
problem-solving in general, and within the Superfund restoration projects along the 
Upper Clark Fork River Basin in particular. 
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First, I will establish working definitions of the central concepts at the heart of 
this chapter: ethics and morality. Next, I will situate the integrated crises outlined in 
Chapter II as moral problems. Because this dissertation is firmly grounded in the 
pragmatic vision of nature and culture discussed in Chapter III, I will conclude this 
chapter by examining "democratic pragmatism" through the moral decision-making 
frameworks associated with both Dewey and Jurgen Habermas, arguably two of the most 
important thinkers in this tradition. I will conclude by examining Andrew Light's (1996, 
2004, 2005) "environmental pragmatism," a critical and practical response to the overly 
metaethical debates that have characterized much of the environmental ethics discourse at 
the end of the 20th century. Light's work takes the living systems of democracy and the 
environment seriously and combines them into a vision of "ecological citizenship" as a 
means of realizing what he refers to as "the democratic promise of restoration" (2005). 
Ways to Think about Ethics and Morality 
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What do the words ethics and morality mean? In Greek, the word ethikos meant 
pertaining to ethos--character, manners, customs, and habits. The Romans translated 
ethikos into moralis, derived from the Latin word mores, which referred to the same ideas 
in Roman culture. For more than 2,500 years, philosophers have maintained that human 
beings are a peculiar kind of animal, one predisposed to deliberations about such things 
as goodness, right action, justice and compassion. Our ethical predisposition is one of 
humanity's defining characteristics. As a species, we have been demonstrably concerned 
with goodness and right action across cultures, through space and time. 
Today, ethics is sometimes defined as a branch of philosophy generally concerned 
with such things as character, virtue, the good life, justice, care, right and wrong, etc. To 
study ethics is to study humanity's collective grasp toward what is good and right. 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1999), "the general study of 
goodness and the general study of right action constitute the main business of ethics" 
(285). 
Four Branches of Moral Philosophy 
Ethics, sometimes called moral philosophy, is often further distinguished into four 
branches: metaethics, descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and practical ethics. 
Metaethics refers to inquiry into the nature and ground of moral thought and 
action, the philosophical questions at the heart of ethics. According to the Stanford 
Online Dictionary of Philosophy (2007), "Metaethics is the attempt to understand the 
metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and 
commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice" (~ 1 ). Metaethical inquiry seeks to 
understand the meanings and implications of the words and ideas we use in our moral 
deliberations and actions. Metaethics is the branch of moral philosophy concerned with 
answering the fundamental questions of ontology and epistemology: When considering 
moral things, what is real? And, if we can know moral things, how do we know them? 
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Descriptive ethics are sometimes called comparative ethics. This is the sub-branch 
of moral philosophy and inquiry concerned with describing human ethical systems as 
they unfold in actual human practice through space and time. Descriptive ethics are a 
form of anthropological inquiry charged with observing actual human behavior, inquiring 
into the "habitudes" (Dewey, 1927) that animate such behavior, and ultimately describing 
the emergent patterns of morality in individuals, communities, and across cultures. 
Normative ethics are usually defined in relationship to descriptive ethics. 
Descriptive ethics describe ways the world is, and normative ethics prescribe ways the 
world should be. Normative ethics seek to uncover moral principles that ought to guide 
moral practice. Normative ethics seek to steer moral decision-making in certain ways 
based on certain philosophically defensible arguments. 
Applied ethics, also called practical ethics, are concerned with real, situated, 
moral problem-solving. In the Western tradition, they can be traced to Aristotle's 
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philosophical distinction between theoria and phronesis, that is, contemplation for 
contemplation's sake vs. contemplation as a means of realizing practical and desirable 
ends. Phronesis refers to practical wisdom. Most moral philosophy has practical 
intentions, that is, the ideas are meant to guide one through the actual complex thicket of 
moral problem-solving. Applied ethics identify moral problems; this approach uses 
metaethics, descriptive ethics, and normative ethics as instruments for coping with, and, 
and one hopes, solving ethical problems. 
This dissertation, then, is an attempt to: (1) understand the deep metaethical 
structures and ground of environmental problem-solving, (2) describe the moral 
dynamics of a particular community in the throes of environmental restoration, (3) work 
through their real moral problems, and (4) uncover and prescribe reasoned and practable 
actions to help meliorate these pressing problems. 
Anthony Weston's Definition ofEthics 
Anthony Weston (2008), a pragmatic ethical thinker focused on developing 
creative and systematic ways of engaging in moral decision-making that take both nature 
and culture seriously, has defined ethics as "a concern with the basic needs and legitimate 
expectations of others as well as our own" (5). This definition, as I hope to make clear, is 
another interesting and relevant way to apply ethical theory to the analysis of Butte's 
integrated crises in ecology and democracy. 
Why? Because Weston emphasizes the notion of concern for which we might 
substitute interest as in, "I am interested in (concerned about) human trafficking." To 
have an interest in something means you have a stake in it, or you are simply curious 
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about and paying attention to it. Concern could also mean "care" as in, "I am concerned 
about (I care about) the basic well being of others." Concern, interest, and care are all 
morally charged ideas. Moreover, they represent a kind of prehension-a grasp. My 
definition of ethics-humanity's collective grasp toward the good and right-is an 
attempt to communicate the importance of, as Weston describes it, our "steps into ethics" 
(2008: 3). Moral thought is not passive consideration, it is active inquiry, it involves 
grasping for and stepping into a moral situation because you care about, are concerned 
with, or have an interest in a particular moral problem. 
Weston describes ethics as a concern for "basic needs and legitimate 
expectations" as two categories of moral things about which we ought to be concerned 
(5). Basic needs are, by definition, essential and necessary to sustain life: things like food, 
water, and shelter. However, fulfilling basic needs-sustaining or subsisting-is not a 
useful guiding moral ideal. It is, in fact, the moral minimum. Therefore, meeting basic 
needs does not represent what we might call the highest good. It represents a basic moral 
requirement. The Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, or flourishing, represents a 
transcendence of basic needs. When flourishing is used as an ideal and controlling 
reference, then our notion of basic needs expands, especially in the American context, to 
include things like health, education, and freedom, etc. These things, in addition to basic 
environmental needs associated with food, shelter, and water, are required to live a good 
life, a life of health and wellness. Weston's legitimate expectations translate to basic 
human rights. In the context of the 21st century, these include life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, as stated in our founding documents. 
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Weston's definition identifies the morally considerable as others and self. Thus, 
his definition of ethics emphasizes care for, interest in, and concern with our basic needs 
and legitimate expectations and those of others. This aspect of moral thought entangles 
moral agents-decision makers-in what I call a moral ecosystem: a dynamic system of 
interconnections among humans and other morally considerable parts of our 
environment-human and more-than-human. 
In the pages to follow, I will draw and expand upon these ways of thinking about 
ethics. The next sections characterize the integrated crises in ecology and democracy as 
moral problems and then explore moral frameworks associated with the established 
philosophical tradition of democratic pragmatism and the emerging approach of 
environmental pragmatism, an integral way of applying principled democratic 
pragmatism to environmental problems in particular. 
Integrated Crises in Ecology and Democracy 
as Moral Problems 
In Chapter II, I defined a crisis as a crucial moment in the lifespan of dynamic 
systems, where systemic integrity is precariously poised between order and chaos. This is 
a moment that requires an immediate and measured response to ensure future integrity 
and viability. Crises states are those where the integrity of living systems, that is, the 
ability of these systems to reproduce healthy and adaptive versions of themselves and 
their environments, is threatened. Crises are, by definition, problematic circumstances. 
And, because the crises of which I speak put humans and nature in harm's way and 
render them vulnerable, they are also moral problems. 
Let's use Weston's (2008) definition of ethics provides an instrument for 
understanding the moral nature of the problems the citizens of Butte, Montana, face as 
they attempt to cope with their profoundly injured ecological and social systems. 
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Weston suggested that ethics and morality is characterized by a concern for the 
basic needs and legitimate expectations of self and other. Basic needs, in this context, 
refer to the basic biological requirements of human beings, their environmental 
conditions: clean water, consistent food supply, shelter, etc. In essence, our most basic 
needs are inextricably bound to our environmental conditions and our biological needs. 
Put differently, the general well-being of organic bodies is determined by the general 
state of, in Marx's terms, our inorganic bodies. In order to live, we require environmental 
conditions that foster healthy biological reproduction at both organism and community 
levels. In fact, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), health and wellness are the basic 
biological metaphors for ethics and morality. Being healthy is a basic, biological, and 
moral good (292). 
In Butte, a place where the environment has been hard-used and transformed from 
hospitable to inhospitable in a relatively short time period, the basic biological 
requirements of the humans that inhabit the area are threatened. It is this threat to human 
health in particular, and to biological health of the living communities in general, that 
prompted the initial investigations under the Superfund program. The ecological 
revolutions discussed in Chapter III created an environment hostile to life and living 
systems and thus created circumstances where the ability of these systems to reproduce 
their basic biological structures was rendered vulnerable. 
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Recall that autopoietic systems are systems that recreate themselves by 
transforming the stuff of environments into their biological structures (Maturana and 
Varela, 1973; Capra, 2002). They are living systems that know the world through 
metabolic activity. When their environments are toxic, they metabolize toxins and 
transform them into diseased bodies. The ability of the diseased body to reproduce a 
healthy and adaptable new version of itself is diminished. It exists in a state of metabolic 
rift and is subject to disease, and in the worst-case scenario, death. Clean and healthy 
environments are thus a basic biological requirement of the living systems that constitute 
the lifeworld. When the environment is toxic, a basic biological need is violated. When a 
basic need is violated, a fundamental moral problem exists. 
Legitimate expectations-rights-are related to, but qualitatively different than, 
basic needs. Legitimacy is conventionally conferred, not basic. Legitimacy, as Habermas 
( 1979) noted, is a function of social agreement about community values and interests. 
Legitimate expectations are therefore culturally situated. Specifically, in this discussion, I 
am referring to contemporary US culture, and more particularly, to Montana's expression 
of US environmental problem-solving culture. The democratic and environmental values 
that characterize this culture create the evaluative criteria by which legitimacy is 
determined. 
The Role of Environmental 
Problem-solving Discourses 
In the United States, environmental problem-solving occurs through a 
combination of cultural discourses-deliberate conversations with recognizable cultural 
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traits. John Dryzek (1997) has identified three primary discursive modes or cultures that 
affect environmental problem-solving: economic rationalism, bureaucratic rationalism, 
and democratic pragmatism. 
Economic rationalism operates according to the logic of the market and can best 
be understood by the phrase: Let the market solve our environmental problems. 
Bureaucratic rationalism operates according to the logic of scientific and technical 
management: Let the experts decide how to solve our environmental problems. 
Democratic pragmatism operates according to the belief that the affected publics ought 
play a role: Let the people decide how to solve their problems. 
While economic and bureaucratic rationalism are strong animating forces in 
contemporary US environmental problem-solving (arguably, the most powerful forces), 
democratic pragmatism provides the normative criteria by which legitimacy is measured. 
Environmental justice, for example is an explicit moral ideal. One aspect of 
environmental justice is captured in the public participation provisions in Superfund law 
(CERCLA, 1980). That is, our decisions are judged legitimate or not based on the extent 
to which affected publics are included in the decision-making process. I will speak to this 
in more detail in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
To return to the topic at hand, Weston's emphasis on basic needs and legitimate 
expectations, when coupled with Dryzek' s identification of powerful environmental 
problem-solving discourses, provides yet another way to identify and characterize the 
nature of the moral problems we face due to our integrated crises in ecology and 
democracy. The moral problems emerge from the fact that, as discussed in Chapter one, 
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affected publics primarily composed of the common people who live amid the toxic 
environments in Butte, have been largely ignored in the decision-making and problem-
solving processes under Superfund law. This is a violation of the legally encoded 
legitimate expectations (rights) of these people to be meaningful participants in problem-
solving. Here, again, we have a violation of legitimate expectations and rights, and where 
our rights are violated, moral problems exist. 
The problems the hard-used community of Butte faces, when read in light of 
Weston's definition of ethics, are moral problems. Vulnerable and affected people are left 
out of the decision-making processes as the market and bureaucratic experts determine 
the general drift and direction of environmental restoration, often by steamrolling over 
the affected publics. Both basic needs (i.e., a clean and healthy environment) and 
legitimate expectations (i.e., the right to meaningful participation) have been violated in 
the process. These integrated crises are a kind of moral crisis as well. 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to identifying and examining pragmatic 
moral decision-making traditions concerning democracy, the environment, and 
democratic environmental problem-solving. The practical intention of this exploration is 
a search for a set of philosophically defensible principles of right action for 
environmental decision-making. The principles identified will also serve as an evaluative 
measuring stick for existing environmental problem-solving systems. 
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Ethics and the Public Sphere: 
Democratic Pragmatism as a Moral Framework 
As stated above, while the discourses of bureaucratic rationalism and economic 
rationalism tend to determine the direction and focus of environmental problem-solving, 
it is the discourse of democratic pragmatism that serves as the evaluative measuring stick 
for legitimate decision-making. The requirement of meaningful public involvement in US 
environmental law, for example, explicitly states that those publics most affected by an 
environmental problem should influence and guide the decision-making processes in 
order for a decision to be legitimate, that is, consonant with the values and interests of the 
people (EPA, 2009). 
What's more, the moral concept of environmental justice is tied to idea of 
meaningful public participation and involvement. The Executive Branch of the US 
government is committed to realizing environmental justice (Executive Order 12898, 
1994). Environmental justice requires the meaningful participation ofthe affected 
publics. We can surmise that any decision that fails to include the public in a meaningful 
way is less than legitimate and therefore subject to public scrutiny and challenges. 
Democratic pragmatism is the mode of public problem-solving that values public 
participation in environmental problem-solving above all. Its principal philosophers, 
Dewey and Habermas, while differing in significant ways, also work toward a common 
end: understanding and creating the requisite conditions that would facilitate intelligent 
decision-making by powerful agents in concert with affected publics. 
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John Dewey and the Communicating Community 
John Dewey has been called "the philosopher of American Democracy" (Hook, 
1939/1995: 226). His view of democracy is expansive, experimental, creative, pluralistic, 
deliberative, historicist, non-essentialist, critical, meliorative, and ultimately, hopeful. 
In The Public and Its Problems (1927), a critical response to Walter Lippmann's 
trenchant critique of the possibilities of democracy and argument for expert control of 
public decision-making in Public Opinion (1927), Dewey acknowledged the validity of 
Lippmann's claims about the complex nature of modern public problem-solving, but 
offered a fundamentally different solution, one that expressed his basic faith in the 
capability of the everyday citizen, if provided good information and given freedom of 
inquiry and communication, to make intelligent choices. 
Dewey's ideal community, "the Great Community," was, in his words, "a 
communicating community" (1927: 142). Dewey was trying to describe the 
environmental conditions and structural requirements necessary for his deliberative and 
participatory vision of American democracy: "The essential need, in other words, is the 
improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion" (1927: 
208). These conditional changes when married with a culture of democratic participation 
produced the possibility of intelligent democratic problem-solving. Dewey expressed a 
"faith in the common man to respond with commonsense to the free play of facts and 
ideas which are secured by effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly, and free 
communication" (1939: ~ 10). 
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Jurgen Habermas and Discourse Ethics 
Discourse ethics is a tradition of normative moral philosophy primarily associated 
with the scholarship ofHabermas. Habermas, though familiar with some of Dewey's 
work on philosophy and education, was influenced more by the work of Dewey's 
protege, George Herbert Mead. The subjects and approaches to inquiry of Dewey and 
Habermas are remarkably alike in several respects. Antonio and Kellner (1992), noted: 
Both theorists attack positivism, technocracy, bureaucratic domination, and other cultural and 
social conditions that thwart the democratic potentialities of modern society. They also criticize 
the modern philosophic tradition, especially the idealist "philosophy of consciousness" and its 
subject/object dualism. Both call for a reconstruction of philosophy and social theory, offering 
intersubjective alternatives based on their respective theories of communication. In addition, they 
call for a unification oftheory and practice, and provide systematic critiques of conservative 
ideologies and of speculative, quietistic, and conformist patterns of thought.. .Following in the 
footsteps of Dewey, Habermas stresses the importance ofuncoerced communication for 
strengthening the progressive features of liberal social and political institutions. (277 -278) 
Habermas' s main contribution to democratic communication ethics come through 
his theory of communicative action; his moral reference point theory of the ideal speech 
act; and his normative prescriptions for what he calls discourse ethics. His theory of 
communicative action is less important to this inquiry and beyond the scope of the 
chapter. Here, I will discuss Habermas's ideal speech act and discourse ethics. 
Like Dewey, Habermas focused on human communicative behavior and the 
conditions within which that behavior unfolded. His explorations led him to develop a 
controlling reference point-a communicative ideal-associated with his theory of the 
ideal speech act, which he took to be both a goal for democratic communication and a 
critical standard for evaluating democratic discourse. 
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Habermas believed that each speech act, each utterance meant to be heard by 
another, makes a statement about the world and invokes a relationship between the 
speaker and the hearer. The implicit goal of speaking to one another is to reach common 
understanding through semiotic exchange. 
Habermas also believed in what he called "communicative rationality," that is, the 
emergence of reason through discourse provided certain conditions are met. In this view, 
reason is not some a priori phenomenon or Platonic ideal-it is an emergent property of 
inquiry and discourse. Reason happens through free and open inquiry and dialogue, the 
unforced force of critical deliberation. Habermas offers a Peircean definition of reason as 
an emergent property of a critical community of inquirers. Here, Habermas also echoes 
Dewey by emphasizing the conditions and the processes of critical discourse. 
Habermas (1989) laid out several explicit rules for creating the conditions of 
intelligent communication. These were the conditions required to realize the ideal speech 
act. 
The first rule, the rule of participation, states that any one with an interest in a 
conversation who is capable of participating in the conversation should be allowed to 
engage in discourse. 
The second rule, the rule of equality of communicative opportunity, has three 
components: a) all proposals can be questioned, b) new proposals can be introduced, and 
c) attitudes, sincere beliefs, wishes, and needs can be expressed in any deliberation. 
The final rule, the rule against compulsion, prohibits any behavior that is coercive 
in any deliberation. 
Habermas's discourse ethics also lays out some evaluative criteria by which 
validity and legitimacy are determined through practically minded discourse. 
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The first of these general principles is: "Only those norms may claim to be valid 
that could meet with the consent of all concerned, in their role as participants in practical 
discourse." Second, "For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its 
general observances for the satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be 
freely accepted by all" (1989: 40). 
Dewey and Habermas provide a set of philosophically defensible principles for 
the evaluation of moral actions concerning democratic forms of problem-solving. Their 
normative reference points can help orient future discussions about the moral dimensions 
of environmental problem-solving. Next, I will transition to a critical discussion of the 
other moral tradition of relevance to this inquiry, environmental ethics and the emerging 
moral framework of environmental pragmatism. 
Ethics and the Ecosphere: 
Environmental Pragmatism as a Moral Framework 
The environment is the context of culture. It provides the limits and potentials of 
culture. The environment is culture's media and milieu. All cultures emerge partly 
because of the way they respond to their environments together. Through space and time, 
different groups of people developed different ways of knowing and ultimately valuing 
the environment. A central argument of this thesis relies on understanding that the 
environment is valuable to human beings in a very basic way, without appeals to notions 
ofthe intrinsic value of nature. As such, my approach dovetails with the work of Andrew 
Light, one of the articulators of what he calls "environmental pragmatism" (Light and 
Katz, 1996). 
Andrew Light and the Democratic Promise of Restoration 
Light's environmental pragmatism has been developed primarily within the 
professional conversations taking place in the field of environmental ethics, though the 
implications of his work have been realized and successfully applied in actual 
environmental restoration projects in the United States. Environmental pragmatism is a 
critical response to what Light considers to be the overly metaethical debates within the 
field since its florescence in the 1970s. 
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According to Light, for many years the general subject of conversation in 
environmental ethics has concerned questions about how human beings value nature, and 
whether or not nature has value apart from the value humans assign to it, what Leopold 
called "intrinsic value" (1949). Following Varner (1998), Light refers to the early 
approaches to environmental ethics as its two dogmas: the critique of anthropocentrism 
and the exploration of intrinsic value. Light believes that questions such as, "Are human 
environmental problems exacerbated by hard anthropocentrism?" or "Does nature have 
intrinsic value?", are non-starters. They may be philosophically interesting, but they are 
practically irrelevant. 
Instead of endlessly debating the deep structures and meta-ethical aspects of the 
human relationship to the environment, Light suggests a more pragmatic project, one that 
involves exploration of the relationships and values people already demonstrate in 
relation to their cultural and natural environments. Instead of speculating about the nature 
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of the wild things and places, we ought to be working to identify, extend, and strengthen 
the values we already express with regard to the wild. 
Light (2005) has developed a vision of environmental democracy that draws on 
aspects of democratic pragmatism and his own formulation of environmental 
pragmatism, a practical approach to the cultivation of "ecological citizenship" by 
realizing what he calls "the democratic promise of restoration." 
Light sees our environmental problems as opportunities to teach active democratic 
participation while engaging in restorative actions in hard-used places. In this way, 
Light's work is an attempt, not to talk about the nature of our values, but to put our values 
into practice and in so doing extend and develop them while actively engaging in 
environmental restoration projects. This produces a two-fold good: active democratic 
participation and environmental restoration. This vision entangles nature to culture in a 
way that creates a mutual benefit for both. It helps to cultivate two living systems-
democratic systems and ecosystems. In this vision, the public sphere sparks and 
facilitates meaningful changes in the ecosphere. 
Light's vision focuses more on what I've been calling hard-used places: 
Superfund sites, urban parks, etc. Instead of focusing on frequently spoken-for landscapes 
like wilderness areas or national parks, Light suggests we engage the world immediately 
surrounding us, our home landscapes, and work to restore their ecological health and 
well-being. In the process of doing this both democracy and ecology develop in healthier 
ways. In this way, both our basic need for a clean and healthful environment, and our 
socially agreed upon legitimate expectation of public participation in problem-solving, 
are realized. 
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Of course, for all of the reasons addressed in the first chapter, sparking civic 
participation in a languishing democratic culture-our diminished democracy-is easier 
said than done. Over the years, Butte has served as a prime example of the apathetic 
public. Trying to spark democracy in a hard-used place is often even more difficult 
because these people, like their landscapes, have been hard-used. The spiral of despair 
tends to spin steadily downward. This is the reason for the integrated crises in the first 
place (see Curran, 1996). 
For Light (2005), not surprisingly, these are fundamental moral questions. He 
wrote, "There is also an important moral dimension to a good restoration, namely the 
degree of public participation involved in such projects" (8). Here, again, a vibrant and 
deliberative democratic culture is required for the restoration of environmental justice to 
hard-used places. In the process, the public sphere ought to translate to active 
participation in the restoration of the ecosphere. This is an important moral prescription. 
Moreover, it is an evaluative tool that helps us measure the legitimacy of a decision. 
My intentions for this chapter were to come to some working definition of ethics 
and morality, to situate the integrated crises in democracy and ecology as moral 
problems, and to explore two significant and pragmatic ways of examining these 
integrated crises in general, and Butte's experience in particular. Now that the moral 
dimensions of the crises at hand have been drawn-out (in broad strokes, to be sure), I will 
move to a systematic analysis of the problems in democracy and the environment as they 
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have unfolded in Butte, Montana, under Superfund through the last quarter century. The 
analysis is the next necessary step in deriving normative guidelines for environmental 
democracy, the ultimate aim of this dissertation. 
CHAPTERV 
SYSTEMATIC MORAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
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Intelligent moral problem-solving requires informed decision-making. It requires 
deep description and critical analysis before moral decisions are enacted. It is a general 
principle of moral reasoning that one should describe and diagnose before one prescribes 
and responds to a moral problem. Before we suggest how things ought to be changed, we 
must first critically examine a problem in some depth and detail, and through a variety of 
perspectives and interpretive frameworks. Moreover, there should be some 
philosophically defensible logic of inquiry at work. This is especially true when we are 
talking about weighty moral judgments such as those about our very real and pressing 
integrated crises in ecology and democracy. The general well-being of the human and 
more-than-human communities in places like Butte are at stake, as are some of our most 
valued moral ideals, like democracy and justice. Chapter V is my attempt to 
systematically analyze the moral problems at the heart ofthis inquiry. 
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Systematic Moral Analysis 
By systematic moral analysis I mean the imposition of some philosophically 
defensible logic of moral inquiry into the moral deliberation process. Systematic moral 
analysis is an attempt to be logical, thoughtful, careful, and humane throughout the 
process of moral decision-making. According to Deni Elliott (2006): 
Systematic Moral Analysis (SMA)is the process of dissecting a case ... in a step-by-step way to 
insure that no ethical aspect is ignored. A good analysis is systematic in two ways. First, it 
provides a general system, or process, to be followed in any case analysis. It is also systematic in 
that it is based on theoretical foundation that provides conceptual support for each step taken in 
the analysis. (88) 
Elliott (2009: vii) suggested that SMA's are useful for three reasons. First, they 
help the moral agent clarifY their decision-making process. Second, employing a SMA 
helps the moral agent make consistent decisions. Finally, according to Elliott, SMA's 
also help people make complete decisions. 1 
Clarity, consistency, and completeness are worthwhile virtues, and to a point, 
make worthy moral ends. But, they do not represent the highest good in moral decision-
making. It is possible to imagine a systematic moral analysis that is clear, consistent, 
complete, and blatantly wrong. The highest good requires more than clarity, consistency, 
and completeness-it requires that our decisions are intelligent, wise, sagacious. Our 
moral actions will be judged wise if they are born of virtuous intentions and good will, if 
they are informed by critical description and analysis, if they contribute to the overall 
health and well-being of the community, and if they facilitate learning and growth. 
1 By complete, Elliott seems to mean thorough within the system, and not necessarily comprehensive. 
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The goal of this chapter and the next is to systematically examine the ethical 
problems at the heart of this work in a philosophically defensible way, a way that might 
lead to intelligent normative guidance for future US environmental problem-solving 
endeavors. 
Toward Intelligent Moral Problem-solving 
Nearly each and every significant and influential moral thinker attempted to 
contribute a system of moral decision-making to their cultures. Aristotle suggested we 
focus on virtue and character as he provided systematic ways of understanding virtue and 
vice through mind-instruments like the golden mean. Bentham, Mill, and Kant described 
their own systems, each placing different value and emphases on different ideas and 
methods in decision-making. Happiness, utility, consequence, cost-benefit analyses, and 
the greatest good for the greatest number were emphasized by Bentham and Mill. For 
Kant, duty, will, human dignity, the universal law, and reason were emphasized through 
systematic moral analysis. 
The purpose and function of moral decision-making systems is facilitate 
intelligent moral problem-solving. There are many step-by-step systems (Day, 2000; 
Bivins, 2004; Elliott, 2009). Each offers a unique set of principled suggestions for 
systematically engaging in moral deliberations. 
Day (2000) boils his system of moral decision-making down to three steps he 
calls the SAD process: (1) situation definition, (2) analysis of the situation, and (3) 
decision. 
Elliott (2009) suggested a four-step process: 
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(1) define the problem in terms ofviolation of moral rules, (2) determine the role-
related responsibilities of the moral agents, (3) explore plausible justifications for causing 
moral harm, and (4) identifY what actions are ethically prohibited, required, permitted, 
and ideal. The ultimate goal in Elliott's system of applied ethics is to make a decision and 
put it into action. 
Bivins (2004) provided a seven-step checklist for moral decision-making: (1) 
define the moral problem; (2) describe the problem in terms of relevant facts; (3) identifY 
moral claimants and any obligations the moral agent has to them; ( 4) list alternative 
actions and consider best and worst-case scenarios, harm, and moral rules; (5) consider 
ethical guidelines; ( 6) determine a course of action; and (7) defend your decision to your 
most adamant detractor. 
No two systems are exactly alike. However, there does appear to be a common tie 
that binds them structurally. Each system includes, sometimes implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly, five phases of systematic moral analysis: recognition, diagnosis, analysis, 
evaluation, and action. 
These phases are not completely differentiated from one another. In the process of 
recognition, for example, diagnosis happens. And as we diagnose, we analyze. Still, the 
phases of moral problem-solving serve as a useful framework for the organization of a 
step-by-step, systematic process. 
Overview of My Approach to SMA 
The method I have developed to systematically cope with the problems at the 
heart of this moral inquiry is based upon the underlying meta-structure outlined above. It 
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is further organized in to two parts. Part 1: Recognition, Diagnosis, and Analysis, is a 
descriptive/analytical mode of inquiry. Part II: Evaluation and Action, is an 
evaluative/practical mode. Before I conduct the SMA, I will define each phase and say a 
few words about the specific moral reasoning behind my approach. 
Phase I: Recognition 
In order to solve problems, we must first recognize them and communicate about 
them. If we do not, or can not, as Diamond (2005) has demonstrated, the problems can 
metastasize and lead to disease or death in living communities. Failure to adequately cope 
with pressing problems threatens the integrity of living systems; it threatens the ability of 
those systems to recreate healthy, adaptive versions of themselves and their 
environments. Diamond (2005) listed failure to recognize problems as a key factor in the 
collapse of several of the pre-modern societies he chronicled in Collapse. 
Etymologically, to re-cognize means "to know again." When we recognize 
something, we identify it in relationship to the flux of our worldly experiences. The thing 
becomes a figure against the ground of our operational cognitive maps of the living 
world. We make a thing significant. We attribute meaning to it. We signify it. 
In Ecological Communication (1989), Niklas Luhmann noted that we must first 
collectively recognize and encode a problem in our language and communication before 
we can intelligently cope with the problem. This point is an important one, especially 
within this inquiry, because it takes worlds and words, both nature and culture, seriously. 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1877/1955) described the process of problem recognition 
as the "irritation of doubt" that occurs when we encounter dissonance or incongruence 
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between the way we think the world is and the way the world actually is. At a basic 
· perceptual level, this is an expression of the irritation that comes when we encounter 
meaningful gaps between the way things are and the way we think they ought to be. This 
irritation of doubt initiates the process of resolving the inconsistencies through inquiry, 
according to Peirce. Of the four methods of restoring belief from doubt,2 Peirce identified 
critical scientific inquiry as the most intelligent way to cope with newly recognized 
problems. It is the surest way to, again in Peirce's words, make our ideas clear. 
Recognition is the process of knowing a problematic situation and signifying it. 
Recognition involves some kind of symbolic encoding of the problem, some sort of 
semiotic bringing forth of the problem by and through discourse. Recognition involves 
introducing the problem into the deliberate problem-solving conversations of the group. 
In this dissertation, Chapter one described the recognition of the problems at the heart of 
this inquiry, the integrated crises in ecology and democracy in Butte, Montana. 
Phase 2: Diagnosis 
After we have introduced the problem into our deliberate conversations about 
environmental problem-solving, the diagnostic phase begins. Diagnosis is defined as "the 
identification of the nature of a problem ... by examination of the symptoms" and as the 
"characterization of a phenomenon in precise terms" (NOAED, 2007). It is an attempt to 
transform data and information, signs and symptoms, into real and useful knowledge. 
Thick, purposeful, and critical description undertaken with a scientific diagnostic attitude 
is an intelligent way to understand a moral problem. Factual and sober descriptions are 
2 Tenacity, authority, a priori, and science. 
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most likely to lead to useful diagnoses of a problem's sources and contributing factors. 
For ethicists and physicians alike, careful and accurate diagnosis sets one on a path more 
likely to lead to intelligent moral action. Conversely, careless and inaccurate diagnosis 
sets one on a path of probable failure. 
Diagnosis requires sober description ofthe problem and its symptoms. It involves 
clear articulation of the nature of a moral problem through precise scientific description. 
Diagnosis is a method of pinpointing the causes of moral problems and is the necessary 
precursory step to conducting moral analysis. In this dissertation, Chapters two, three, 
and four serve as diagnostic descriptions of relevant aspects of the integrated problems 
and their contributing factors. 
Phase 3: Moral Analysis 
Once the problem has been recognized and diagnosed, most moral problem-
solving systems suggest some form of moral analysis. Analysis is "the detailed 
examination of the elements or the structure of something, typically as a basis for 
interpretation or discussion" (NOAED, 2007). 
My framework for systematic moral analysis involves three sub-steps: 
• identification of the morally considerable; 
• articulation of basic needs, rights, and obligations; 
• application of relevant moral theories as analytical instruments. 
The first sub-step requires the identification of those who are affected by the 
decision. These are the morally considerable. They include all moral agents (the decision-
makers) and moral claimants or stakeholders (the affected). The purpose of this step is to 
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describe the actual network of beings whose lives and experiences will likely be affected 
by moral problem-solving efforts. This network of the morally considerable composes a 
moral ecosystem and is characterized by an ecology of moral relationships. 
The second sub-step requires the clear articulation of these moral relationships 
through consideration of basic needs, rights, and duties. Each moral subject makes basic 
moral claims on each other subject in the moral network. In addition to claiming basic 
needs and rights, each subject bears certain basic moral duties and obligations to the other 
inhabitants of the moral network. In this way, each subject in the moral ecosystem is 
related to each other subject to varying degrees, resulting in differential ethical pull on 
one another (Steiner and Okrusch, 2006). Thus, the moral ecosystem is a dynamic 
network of moral beings pushing and pulling upon one another through their basic 
struggles among their basic needs, human rights, values, interests, habitudes, notions of 
good and bad, right and wrong, etc. 
The final sub-step, application of moral theory, requires the pragmatic use of 
relevant moral theories as analytical instruments in the moral inquiry. Within this step, 
the precisely diagnosed moral problem is considered through a variety of philosophical 
concepts and interpretive frameworks. This step requires consideration of the living 
moral theories that guide community problem-solving as well as consideration of relevant 
alternatives to these guiding moral frameworks. For example, when considering the 
integrated crises in ecology and democracy, the traditional ethical philosophies of virtue 
ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism should be used in the analytical process because 
they tend to guide community decision-making. In addition, because the problems at the 
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heart of this inquiry concern the ideas associated with ecological integrity, environmental 
justice, and deliberative democracy, contemporary moral frameworks derived from 
environmental and democratic ethics should be considered as analytical instruments. In 
this case, given the pragmatic orientation from which I approach the problems, I work 
through democratic and environmental pragmatisms. 
This step is not intended to be an exhaustive exposition on the total implications 
of each moral framework. The purpose of this step is to run the problem through a 
gauntlet of potentially useful moral theory in order to get a variety of ethical perspectives 
on the problem from which to derive an informed evaluation that leads to intelligent 
moral action. 
Phase 4: Strong Evaluation 
Theories of practical ethics eventually require the exercise of moral judgment or 
evaluation. Judgment refers to the ability to reach sensible conclusions. Evaluation 
involves assessing or determining the worth or value of one's options. While judgment 
and evaluation involve making choices, they should not be reduced to mere choosing. 
Charles Taylor (1989) made a distinction between two forms of evaluation, weak 
and strong. Weak evaluation can be equated to mere choosing. Should I eat an apple or an 
orange for lunch? This kind of choice is not necessarily a moral decision. It is an 
expression of preference. 
Strong evaluation, however, is qualitatively different. Peggy Bowers (2002) noted 
that Taylor's concept of strong evaluation demands "a certain type of vocabulary" and 
taps into "the sorts of abstractions we associate with worth and the meaning of living a 
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life in which our humanity in all its potential for both good and evil are expressed ... " 
(39). Strong evaluation involves choosing between good and evil, competing goods, 
competing evils, etc. Strong evaluation, in short, has deeper moral implications. It is 
moral through and through. Should I eat the orange that was grown in an orchard that I 
know exploits its labor force? Or, should I eat the apple that I know came from an 
organic farm that pays its laborers a living wage? In this light, the same choice-apple or 
orange-becomes a judgment call, an exercise in strong evaluation. It cannot be reduced 
to mere preference. The stakes are higher and morally charged because our decisions 
have consequences that affect others. Strong evaluation requires reasoned deliberation 
and the exercise of good judgment based on morally defensible evaluative criteria. If 
intelligent action is the goal, a reasoned judgment and evaluation is the logical 
precondition of moral action. 
Phase 5: Moral Action 
The final step in this SMA process-moral action-requires that one puts one's 
strong evaluations into real and meaningful practice. The overall intention of the SMA 
process is to cultivate the practical wisdom necessary to cope with our most pressing 
problems. In order to accomplish this, we must, every now and again, put our 
experimental solutions to work to see if they are good and useful. All moral deliberations 
that do not end in moral action can be classified as intellectual busy-work or 
philosophical game-play. A pragmatic moral attitude, however, requires action in the 
world. This final step ensures that our carefully derived judgments might become actual 
solutions to our most pressing problems. 
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In the next and last section of Chapter IV, I put my SMA system into practice by 
analyzing key aspects of democratic environmental decision-making in Butte, Montana, 
over the last 25 years of Superfund Restoration. 
SMA Part 1: 
Recognition, Diagnosis, and Moral Analysis 
This section initiates the execution of the SMA as a critical mode of ethical 
inquiry into the problems at hand. Much of the heavy-lifting occurred in Chapters I 
through IV. When necessary, I refer to and summarize key insights from these previous 
chapters and discuss the role they play in the overall inquiry. 
So far, Chapter V has introduced and explained my method of SMA as an 
instrument for deriving informed and critical moral responses. From this point on, I 
engage in Part I, the descriptive/analytical mode of the SMA, which consists of problem 
recognition, problem diagnosis, and moral analysis. This descriptive/analytical mode of 
inquiry provides a solid foundation for the normative/evaluative mode to come. 
Recognition 
This dissertation does not focus on democratic crises or environmental crises in 
isolation, but rather, on the moral dimensions of the integrated crises we face in 
democracy and ecology. Our real and pressing problems in the public sphere, our cultural 
realm, contribute to our failure to adequately cope with our real and pressing problems in 
the ecosphere, our natural realm. In this sense we are in double-trouble because our 
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cultural problem-solving systems fail to cope with our serious ecological problems. Our 
problem is problem-solving. 
Recall, problem recognition occurs as we collectively begin to respond to the 
irritation of doubt that exists when we engage the living world and find it lacking in some 
important way. In this case, citizens in the Upper Clark Fork River Basin recognize that 
something was wrong, that the world is not how it should be with regard to the health and 
well-being of their natural environment and our democratic culture. 
For example, in the democratic realm at a national level, many careful observers 
have recognized that local democratic problem-solving systems are neither democratic 
nor do they help us solve our problems. In Chapter II, I noted that if the common people 
are powerless, if our participation is functionally meaningless, if we fail to solve 
problems, and if our democratic culture is languishing, we have a democracy in name 
only. 
In the ecological realm, we recognized that the integrity of the natural systems 
humans depend upon for survival is threatened thus rendering the ecosystems we need 
vulnerable, in harm's way. Integrity refers to the ability of a living system to reproduce 
healthy, adaptive versions of itself and its environmental circumstances. As ecologically 
dependent creatures, this puts us in harm's way. In Butte and other hard-used places, this 
is well-documented and universally understood. Diseased environments lead to diseased 
communities because those communities recreate themselves by transforming their 
environments into the human bodies that together compose the community. 
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In Butte, Montana, local activists such as Professor John Ray and Fritz Daly have 
served as harbingers of our integrated crises in democracy and ecology by introducing 
them into the problem-solving conversations of the group through newspaper editorials, 
comments at public meetings, and through various other methods of public outcry 
(Curran, 1996). They have recognized that the problems are connected, and that without 
addressing our problematic democratic problem-solving systems, we cannot hope to 
address our ecological problems intelligently. 
Chapter II identified the integrated crises as the primary problem to contend with 
in this dissertation. This recognition is the necessary first step to intelligent moral 
decision-making. The next step requires diagnosing the deeper nature of the problems 
under study. 
Diagnosis 
Diagnosis requires the identification of the nature of a problem through precise 
characterization of the problem's signs and symptoms. Chapter III diagnosed semantic 
problems and suggested practical semantic solutions via the adoption of a Pragmatic 
vision of nature and culture as found in Peirce and Dewey. Chapter IV diagnosed moral 
dimensions of our integrated crises in ecology and democracy. 
Chapter III diagnosed semantic dimensions of the problem through precise 
definition of some of the basic terms and subjects in this dissertation: nature, 
environment, culture, and communication. It took words seriously. I argued that our 
deeply seated and problematic cultural understanding of nature and culture and their 
relationships are significant contributing factors to our integrated crises in ecology and 
80 
democracy. Our problems in democracy are treated as distinct from, even oppositional to, 
our problems in the environment. They occur in separate realms. We tend to treat them as 
distinct and disconnected and thereby miss an opportunity to cope with them as an 
integrated complex of problems. 
Semantic distinctions constitute what we believe about the world and thus guide 
our behaviors. Our actions are born of our beliefs and habitudes. Any clarification of 
terms creates an increased likelihood that we will render informed decisions. Chapter III 
was meant to rectify our basic category errors by healing our problematic ontological 
laceration of nature from culture and communication from environment. I tried to 
demonstrate that culture is not separate from nature, it is an expression of nature. Culture 
is the way nature works through communication. Humans simultaneously inhabit nature 
and culture. Therefore nature and culture are connected through human experience. 
Diagnosing these philosophical problems puts us on a path more likely to lead to 
intelligent environmental decision-making because when we make these important 
semantic distinctions, our mind-tools become valid and useful in ways they previously 
were not. Moreover, as Dewey and Peirce would have appreciated, they are more precise 
and informed by contemporary scientific insights and are thus an expression of the way 
we think the world works at present. 
Chapter IV diagnosed ethical aspects of the problems under study. In it, I 
precisely defined ethics and morality and explored several ways that Butte's integrated 
crises can be considered moral problems. First, by Weston's (2008) definition, there have 
been violations of both basic needs (i.e., our basic human right to live in a clean and 
healthful environment) and our socially agreed upon legitimate expectations (i.e., our 
explicitly guaranteed rights to meaningful participation in environmental decision-
making). Violations of either or both result in moral problems, according to Weston. 
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The moral problems within the democratic realm-ethics and the public sphere-
were analyzed through Dewey and Habermas and their unique forms of democratic 
pragmatism. Each placed emphasis upon the structures and processes of democratic 
decision-making and they outlined normative ideals for deliberative democracy in 
practice. These ideals serve as the goals for communication as well as the evaluative 
criteria for judging the democratic nature of actual problem-solving discourses. In this 
light, the ethical issues arising in the public sphere within this inquiry can be identified 
and evaluated based on their congruence with the moral ideals associated with Dewey's 
notion of the Great Community as a communicating community, or against Habermasian 
reference points such as the ideal speech act, discourse ethics, or communicative 
rationality. 
The nature of the moral problems in the ecological realm-ethics and the 
ecosphere-were considered through the lens of Light's (1996, 2004, 2005) notion of 
environmental pragmatism. Light suggested that the overly meta-ethical debates 
characterizing much of the environmental ethics discourse were philosophically 
interesting but practically irrelevant. Light's (2005) notion of "ecological citizenship" is 
realized through the "democratic promise of restoration." In Light, we find a pragmatic 
approach to our integrated crises. He provides an evaluative framework that considers 
democracies and ecosystems as living systems. Moreover, he suggests that the best way 
to restore hard-used environments is to cultivate the integrity of the democratic cultures 
that inhabit them. 
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By locating factors contributing to the crises at hand, the diagnostic phase 
produced a valid and useful understanding of the basic moral problems in this thesis. The 
next phase is an attempt to extend this descriptive understanding through the process of 
moral analysis. 
Moral Analysis 
The moral analysis phase requires three sub-steps. The first of these involves the 
identification of the morally considerable members of the moral community, the 
stakeholders. The second requires the identification and articulation of basic needs, 
rights, and duties of each of the stakeholders. These comprise the moral forces, the 
pushes and pulls we exert upon one another, which in turn constitute the dynamics of the 
moral ecosystem. The final sub-step involves interrogation of the moral problems through 
living and relevant moral theory. 
IdentifYing Stakeholders: Moral Agents and Claimants 
I define the moral ecosystem as a dynamic internetwork of communities of beings 
(human and more-than-human) connected through the basic moral claims we make upon 
one another, along with the moral duties we have to one another. This moral network 
comprises stakeholders-interested parties who influence and are influenced by the 
actions of the other members of the network. Stakeholders are either moral agents or 
moral claimants. 
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Moral Agents 
Moral agents make decisions that affect others. Moral agents shape the world we 
inhabit together through their actions. They are powerful actors. Because of this, 
communities place make certain moral demands on them. To whom much is given, much 
is required. 
Power is defined as the ability to realize one's visions, even in spite of resistance. 
Power is the ability to do work. It is the ability to deliberately marshal resources. It is the 
ability to bend space around you and alter the dynamics of the unfolding lifeworld to 
realize one's ideas. 
Power is the ability to coordinate meanings and behaviors, which is also a 
definition of communication. Power, then, can be measured through communicative 
capacity, that is, the capacity of a moral agent has to coordinate meanings and actions 
toward the ends of realizing their will and intentions. Moral agents are situated at the 
center of the moral ecosystem because their moral actions guide and influence the world 
we inhabit together. They produce and reproduce the biophysical and semiotic boundaries 
of our common experiences. That is why I have focused on the discursive aspects of our 
integrated crises. Our environmental problems are entangled with our democratic 
problems. 
Within the Superfund environmental decision-making system, a complex network 
of moral agents are consulted in the environmental problem-solving process. Each of 
them engaging in environmental problem-solving through a different set of discursive 
ideals and constraints. These are the decision-makers, the environmental problem-solvers. 
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The network of moral agents within this inquiry is composed ofthe following people and 
groups: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the common people-the public 
federal bureaucrats from the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (US EPA) 
the Governor of the State of Montana who serves as a trustee of 
Montana's peoples and lands 
the legally defined principal responsible parties as determined by 
CERCLA and Montana's CECRA laws (i.e., British Petroleum-ARCO, 
Montana Resources Incorporated, etc.) 
state bureaucrats from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality 
(MDEQ), including a powerful subset of lawyers and scientists within 
Montana's Natural Resources Damages Program (NRDP) 
local governmental agencies from each of the affected communities along 
the UCFRB complex of Superfund sites (Butte-Silver Bow, Anaconda-
Deer Lodge, etc.) 
Moral agents do not exercise power equally. For example, those people who make 
final decisions (i.e., the Governor of the State of Montana and the EPA Superfund Project 
Manager) are more powerful than those who merely contribute to deliberations regarding 
environmental problem-solving. The public at-large, for example, is listed as an agent 
because of the legal requirements outlined in US environmental law and the Montana 
State Constitution (1972). The public is supposed to be a "meaningful participant" in 
environmental decision-making in order for such decision-making to be considered 
legitimate. However, as Depoe and Delicath (2004) noted, the public rarely act as a 
powerful force in environmental decision-making, especially within projects the scale 
and scope ofthe UCFRB complex of Superfund projects. This is problematic because the 
normative principles guiding environmental law are legitimate to the extent the affected 
publics, especially the working classes who tend to inhabit the hardest-used places, are 
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included in the problem-solving deliberations. The moral measuring stick is based on the 
principles of democratic pragmatism. 
Moral Claimants 
Claimants are subject to the will and intentions of moral agents. They are affected 
by agents' decisions. They live in a world that agents' influence and guide. Moral 
ecosystems are dynamic because of the differential ethical pulls that claimants exert on 
moral agents. 
The three categories of moral claimants in this model are immediate, proximate, 
and distant. Immediate claimants are directly affected by the decisions of the moral 
agents; they tend to exert the strongest ethical pull on moral agents. Proximate claimants 
are affected, but to a lesser degree than immediate claimants. Distant claimants are 
affected, but still further removed from any immediate affect by the decisions of the 
moral agents. Proximate and distant claimants, though further removed than immediate 
claimants, may still factor heavily in the decision-making of moral agents despite their 
apparent distance. 
The immediate claimants in this case are those humans (and more-than-humans) 
who inhabit this toxic landscape-the community members of the UCFRB. Agreeing 
with Leopold (1949) that moral consideration ought to be extended to the environments 
we inhabit, in this SMA the land itself is considered a part of the community as well. The 
land is the context of and the media by and through which the community reproduces 
itself. A community's ecosystem is its inorganic body. 
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The health of a living thing depends on the health of its immediate environment. 
That is a basic and fundamental moral claim and primary metaphor for the good: health 
and well-being (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). 
Any being that metabolizes water from the injured river system, or transpires air 
contaminated with dust from the Berkeley Pit's wind-blown waste piles or those of the 
Opportunity Ponds, is an immediate claimant. Any person or animal that eats a trout 
caught from the Clark Fork River is biologically affected and therefore makes a basic 
moral claim on the decision-making agents responsible for creating the next version of 
the hard-used places in the UCFRB. Any living community within the bounds of the 
Upper Clark Fork River Basin is an immediate claimant in environmental problem-
solving because these community-members metabolize the toxic world into their 
individual and collective blood, bones, and flesh. Health and wellbeing are basic goods 
for living systems. 
The proximate claimants in this case are humans (and more-than-humans) one 
step removed from the toxic ecosystems. These community members also hold a stake in 
the health and well-being of the people and places in this case. The lands and peoples of 
the State of Montana, along with the lands and peoples of the Columbia River watershed, 
are interested parties because what happens in the UCFRB potentially affects what 
happens to them if put in a similar situation. Future generations who will come to inhabit 
the next version of the U CFRB are proximate claimants, removed from the toxic 
landscape in time only. 
The distant claimants include hard-used peoples and places in the United States, 
and ultimately, any hard-used lands and peoples on planet Earth. In Water Wars: 
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Privatization, Pollution, and Profit (2002), Vandana Shiva refers to the powerful role 
"cowboy economics" is playing in environmental law and policy in India. The "prior-
appropriation doctrine" that initially emerged as common law in mining frontiers of the 
American West, now guides water law on the Indian subcontinent. The citizens of the 
world make a claim because they are still sometimes subject to the consequences of such 
decisions by virtue of Western influence and political economic hegemony. Others from 
across the globe, in as much as they are influenced by our policies, make moral claims, 
even if these are limited from a distance. 
Needs, Rights, and Duties 
In this section I will articulate the basic needs, rights, and duties operating within 
the moral ecosystem. The purpose, once again, is to describe the ethical dynamics at 
work in this case by outlining essential requirements (basic needs), legitimate 
expectations (rights), and obligations (duties). Again, these are the forces that factor into 
moral deliberation. They create the pushes and pulls of the dynamic moral ecosystem in 
this model. 
First, I will consider basic needs apart from rights and duties. Next, I will consider 
the concomitant relationship between rights and duties. Finally, I will delineate 
specifically enumerated rights and duties of distant, proximate, and immediate claimants. 
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Basic Needs as Fundamental Moral Goods 
Basic needs are requirements for life and living systems. As such, I contend, they 
are prior to and more basic than negotiated rights. Basic needs are the necessary 
preconditions for existence and are thus basic goods. When I speak about basic needs in 
moral terms, it is not based on some philosophical appeal to metaphysics. Rather, this 
conversation is based on an embodied and embedded understanding of human 
experience. Each of the stakeholders share a set of fundamental, biological basic needs: 
food, water, shelter. These needs are environmental-they constitute the inorganic body 
of embodied "live creatures" (see Dewey, 1934 ). They are necessities of life and thus 
basic goods. 
"Morality is about human well-being" according to Lakoff and Jolmson (1999). 
Morality is about health and wellness at a basic level, one that does not require external 
appeals to a priori Platonic ideals such as justice or virtue. Lakoff and Johnson's research 
indicates that basic human metaphors we use to communicate about morality are 
experientially grounded and tied to our basic needs. They emerged from our embodied 
and embedded experiences. 
These metaphors are grounded in the nature of our bodies and social interactions, and they are thus 
anything but arbitrary and unconstrained. They all appear to be grounded in our various 
experiences of well-being, especially physical well-being. In other words, we have found that the 
source domains of our metaphors for morality are typically based on what people over history and 
across cultures have seen as contributing to their well-being. For example, it is better to be 
healthy, rather than sick. It is better if the food you eat, the water you drink, and the air you 
breathe are pure, rather than contaminated. It is better to be strong, rather than weak ... And it is 
better to be upright and balanced, than to be off balance or unable to stand. (290-91) 
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Each of the stakeholder domains I refer to share common basic requirements for 
life. These needs are incontrovertible. If basic needs are not met, health and well-being 
are impossible. If health and well-being are impossible, so too is the possibility of the 
good life. Each stakeholder, then, holds in common a set of basic biological needs. These 
needs are fundamental and permeate the entire moral ecosystem. I claim that these needs 
are inviolable and that any violation of them results in a basic moral problem. 
Rights and Concomitant Duties 
By rights, I mean moral or legal entitlements and protections that, in Weston's 
words, "allow people to become what they are" (2008: 141 ). Rights are legitimate 
expectations. They are the basic moral claims humans make upon one another that 
command respect. By making such a command, in a Kantian sense, one has a 
concomitant duty to respect the rights of others. By duty I mean moral or legal 
obligations-binding ethical requirements. Rights and duties often arise in relationship to 
one another. 
The rights and duties I identify in this phase of moral analysis are explicitly 
prescribed in constitutional documents, laws, and policies. I refer specifically to the 
Montana State Constitution, to the US Constitution, to relevant US laws and policies, and 
to the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
My intentions are not to validate subjective and arbitrary rights-claims, but rather 
to use the concepts of needs, rights, and duties as analytical instruments in the process of 
systematic moral analysis. When explicitly drawn out in constitutions, laws, policies, and 
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international declarations, the claims to rights become legitimate to the extent they 
represent the norms of the people laying claim to them: signatories to the U.N. Charter, 
the US Constitution, or the Montana Constitution, for example. The UN's Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is significant in as much as it is applied in 
international law and policy, though in the United States it holds less sway than our state 
and national constitutions, laws, and policies. 
My statements of rights and duties do not represent any final statement 
philosophically. They do represent useful analytical instruments. The rights and duties I 
discuss are constituted-they are officially and explicitly granted powers and fimctions of 
the body politic as enumerated in constitutions, laws, and policies. 
In the analysis to follow, I will move from the distant claimants, to the proximate, 
then to the immediate claimants. 
Basic Needs, Rights, and Duties of Distant Claimants 
The distant claimants in this model are the hard-used people and places of the 
world and the United States. According the UN's Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), each and every citizen of the world claims certain universal human rights 
by virtue of one's personhood. Among these are the rights to "life, liberty, and security of 
person" (Article 3); the right to "equality before the law" and "equal protection under the 
law" (Article 7). The charter also claims every person has the "right to public 
participation in government affairs" (Article 21 )-which comes with the concomitant 
"duty to participate fully" (Article 29). No specifically enumerated international 
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environmental rights exist, as such, but there has been much discussion recently of 
amending the declaration to include specific language articulating environmental rights. 
In addition to the human rights declared above, US citizens claim certain rights 
with regard to their role in environmental problem-solving. These rights, according to 
Cox (2006), have evolved as a partial response to the deliberative tum in public problem-
solving in the US during the last 35 years. US environmental law from this period is 
characterized by an attitude that requires public agencies to "make diligent efforts to 
include the public" in environmental problem solving (National Environmental Policy 
Act, 1969: 1506.6[a]). 
Cox specifically enumerates three basic rights, each of which is authorized by US 
law. Each of the rights engenders a certain mode of democratic participation and works 
toward the realization of key democratic principles. 
According to Cox (2008: 83 -116), the first of these, the right to know, creates the 
mechanisms allowing the public to access critical information about the complex 
environmental problems that affect them. This right enacts the democratic principle of 
transparency. These rights are authorized by the Freedom of Information Act (1966), the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (1986), and other legislation that 
generally falls under the category of "Sunshine" laws. This right, when viewed in light of 
democracy's normative requirement of an active and informed citizenry, creates a civic 
duty to know about those issues that have consequences for their communities. Here 
again, the right comes with a concomitant duty. 
The second right Cox identifies is the right to comment. This right, which is 
granted in the National Environmental Policy Act (1969) and included as part of the 
public participation provisions in CERCLA (1980), enacts the democratic principle of 
direct democratic participation. It grants citizens the right to give testimony at public 
hearings, to participate in advisory committees, and to provide written commentary on 
pressing environmental problems. The right to comment and act as a meaningful 
p~icipant also requires an active citizenry and thus results in the duty to comment. 
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The third right Cox identifies is the right of standing. This grants citizens and 
organizations the right to legal standing in courts by allowing them to act as plaintiffs in 
law suits regarding environmental decision-making. This right enacts the democratic 
principle of accountability and is granted authority from enviromnentallegislation such 
as the Clean Water Act ( 1977) and Supreme Court Rulings such as Sierra Club v. Morton 
(1972). This right led to Montana vs. ARCO (1983) under CERCLA (1980). 
Basic Needr;, Rights, and Duties of Proximate Claimants 
The proximate claimants in this case are the people and places in the state of 
Montana and within greater Columbia River watershed ecosystem. Here, I have also 
listed future UCFRB generations because they are removed from living immediately in 
the UCFRB complex of Superfund sites in time only. 
The people and places of the Columbia River watershed can generally claim each 
of the rights already given by virtue oftheir US and world citizenship. In this section, I 
pay more attention to the rights of Montana citizens as enumerated in the Montana 
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Constitution of 1972. This document is remarkable in many ways and extends certain US 
rights while it also grants rights to Montana citizens that are not explicitly enumerated in 
either US or international law and policy. 
The Montana Constitution was re-written in 1972, a time of emerging 
environmental awareness in the United States and the world. The Constitution's 
provisions are sovereign within the state and are subject only to limits imposed by the US 
Constitution and federal laws. 
Article II of the Montana Constitution (1972) outlines the state's "Declaration of 
Rights" which include claims to states rights such as popular sovereignty (section 1), self-
govenunent (section 2), individual dignity and equal protection under the law (section 4), 
the administration of justice (section 16), and the right to due process of the law (section 
17). These are familiar and already granted under the US Constitution. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1972 also resulted in some innovative and far-
reaching rights in the newly conceived document. In Montana, the right to participation 
(section 8) and the right to know (section 9) are explicitly granted in the 1972 
Constitution. The revised Montana Constitution reinforces these rights, already granted 
by and through federal law and policy, as such, they are doubly guaranteed within the 
state. 
Perhaps the most far-sighted, progressive, and artfully constructed section of the 
Montana Constitution concerns the inalienable rights of every Montanan as outlined in 
Article II, section 3: 
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All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and 
healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending 
their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, 
health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize 
corresponding responsibilities. 
Three things are particularly interesting here. First, the explicit reference to the 
inalienable (unable to be taken away from) right "to a clean and healthful environment 
and the rights of pursuing life's basic necessities .... " The state of Montana here 
recognizes and constitutes the basic biological and ecological conditions of life as a 
granted right. Neither the US Constitution, nor the UN's Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) goes so far as does Montana's revised Constitution. 
The second noteworthy aspect of section 3 is its emphasis on health. Montanans 
are granted the right to the basic conditions of health and well-being-a clean and 
healthful environment-in addition to the right to seek health in all lawful ways. 
The third interesting aspect of section 3, from the perspective of moral 
philosophy, is the explicit enjoining of the state's citizens with "corresponding 
responsibilities" that come with the rights granted. In Montana, the notion of rights and 
concomitant duties is clearly drawn-out in the language of the Constitution of 1972. In 
Montana, the pushes and pulls, the dynamics ofthe moral ecosystem, are precisely 
defined. 
Basic Needs, Rights, and Duties of Immediate Claimants 
The immediate claimants in this case are the hard-used people and places of the 
Upper Clark Fork River Basin. These immediate stakeholders claim all of the rights thus 
far described; however, they make these claims with an urgency that the proximate and 
distant claimants do not experience. They, too, are duty-bound to participate in the 
environmental problem-solving taking place in their name. 
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When the US EPA included the UCFRB complex of Superfund projects on the 
National Priorities list in 1982, it acknowledged and validated the potential harms to the 
people and places within the UCFRB experience as inhabitants of a toxic landscape. The 
basic, inviolable rights ofUCFRB citizens were violated, thus setting the stage for the 
restoration of environmental justice to the sacrificed watershed and its communities. 
Relevant Moral Theory 
The final step in Part I, the descriptive/analytic phase of this SMA, requires a 
critical interrogation of the moral issues through relevant moral philosophy. Here, I will 
think through the conceptual instruments outlined in the living traditional moral 
philosophies of Aristotelian ethics and deontological ethics. These approaches to moral 
thought are inextricably woven into the fabric US culture. By using them as mind-tools 
(sometimes in ways that the originators ofthese ideas may not have intended), I 
acknowledge the importance of these inherited wisdom traditions. 
The pragmatic temper of this thesis also requires that we acknowledge the 
limitations of inherited wisdom by seeking alternative explanations and moral 
philosophies. To this end, I consider the problems through Leopold's (1949) Land Ethic, 
as well as democratic and environmental pragmatisms. In running the problems through 
this gauntlet of moral theory, I do not intend to give a comprehensive exposition on the 
implications of each of the moral frameworks to follow, but rather, to give a useful 
accounting of the insights each philosophy yields with regard to our integrated crises in 
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ecology and democracy. This step is a means to the end of making a philosophically 
defensible evaluation of the situation as a basis for intelligent moral action. 
Aristotle and Eudaimonic Ethics 
Aristotle grounded his moral and political philosophy in a natural vision of human 
experience in which he "situates the human being in the larger context of nature" 
(Johnstone in Audi, 2002: 29). As such, it is consonant with the pragmatic visions of 
nature and culture guiding this dissertation. 
.. 
For Aristotle, humans are moral and political animals in nature trying to make 
choices that lead to "energetic self-fulfillment" (Feinberg and West, 1977: 9), flourishing, 
happiness, eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is a state of vital health and well-being, the highest 
good in Aristotle's moral philosophy. Eudaimonia is that state to which all living things 
strive. The purpose of human experience is not to merely get by, but rather, to live well. 
Humans, individually and collectively, strive for this state of vital health, well-being, and 
flourishing. In order to live well, people and groups must cultivate the ability to make 
wise practical decisions, decisions that create the circumstances that allow them to 
flourish. Aristotle called this phronesis, or practical wisdom. 
We become good through the exercise of good judgment. We learn to make good 
judgments through the thoughtful exercise of our passions tempered by reason. Making 
good decisions, doing the right things in the right ways, leads to Eudaimonia. 
Aristotle's notion of the highest good makes sense. Living well, flourishing, and 
intelligent decision-making constitute the highest human good. Moreover, Aristotle's 
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ethics makes flourishing and happiness the highest good for both individuals and groups. 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, "the state ... also has eudaimonia 
as its goal" (Aristotle, 51). It provides principled reference point, in Aristotle's words, "a 
mark to aim at" (the Ethics, Book I: 63), a guiding reference point for moral action. 
Aristotle suggested a way to cultivate practical wisdom by developing good 
character, a deeply entrenched predisposition to make wise decisions. Character 
development occurs by living a balanced life, which for Aristotle, is synonymous with 
living virtuously. Virtues are habituated character traits worthy of emulation. Virtues 
exist somewhere between the vicious states of excess and deficiency. Virtues are not 
absolute and universal for Aristotle; they context-dependent and natural. Individuals and 
groups are capable of acting either virtuously or viciously. 
If moral excellence (arete) and the highest good for people, communities, and 
nature is a state ofhealthy vitality, and people, communities, and nature are currently in 
states of disease, basic moral problems exist in an Aristotelian framework. The current 
state of disease in both our diminished democracy and our injured environment indicates 
basic moral problems based on a failure to realize the highest good in each living system. 
We have not cultivated the virtues and character required to enact practical wisdom. Wise 
decisions lead to vital health; unwise decisions lead to disease and failure to thrive in 
dynamic natural and cultural systems. Our diminished democracies and injured 
ecosystems can thus be viewed as a sign of our failure to choose wisely within the moral 
framework of Aristotelian Eudaimonic ethics. 
98 
Kantian Deontology 
Immanuel Kant's moral theory rests on his belief that, given the commitments of 
his transcendental metaphysics, through rational inquiry humans can understand universal 
moral principles. As Isaac Newton and others determined the laws of motion through 
logic and rational inquiry, so too can humans come to understand the universal laws of 
ethics and morality through logic and rational inquiry. The moral law, in Kantian terms, 
is constituted by certain moral requirements and duties which he referred to as the 
categorical imperative. 3 A Kantian categorical imperative is "a basic obligation that 
applies to us regardless of our goals or situation" (Weston, 2008: 138). Here, I rely on 
Kant's two primary formulations of the categorical imperative. 
Kant's transcendental metaphysics lead him to the following formulation of the 
categorical imperative which concerns the universal law: 
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law. (Kant, 2004) 
In a moral world in which everybody acts justly and according to the highest 
principles of reasoned deliberation before making moral choices, Kant believed that we 
should do what reason tells us everybody should do in a similar situation. Our choices 
should be made according our reasoned understanding of an a priori universal moral law. 
Always and everywhere we are duty-bound to follow these laws, according to Kant. 
3 
"Kant's remarks about categorical imperatives can be confusing because although he explicitly says there 
can only be one categorical imperative he repeatedly writes as though there are many" (Hill, Jr., 2000: 
235). 
The implications for environmental decision making are interesting. By Kant's 
reasoning, any choices the moral agents make ought to be universally applied in similar 
situations across the earth. 
Kant's ethics of universal duties was a method of realizing his ideal "universal 
kingdom of ends," a hypothetical state composed of rational beings making choices in 
accord with the universal law. In order to realize this perfect moral community, Kant 
formulated this version of the categorical imperative: 
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end. (Kant, 2004) 
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Because humans are rational creatures, they have inherent dignity and should not 
be used as means to ends; they ought to be treated as ends-in-themselves. This applies 
universally to all humans, according to Kant. 
What are the implications of Kant's universal duty ethics to the integrated crises 
in ecology and democracy in the UCFRB? First, whatever decisions made ought to be in 
accord with the Universal law and universally applied in similar situations. Second, the 
human dignity of every affected member of the community ought to be respected and 
each moral claimant ought to be regarded "always and at the same time as an end and 
never merely as a means to an end" (Kant, 2004). 
The Land Ethic 
Aida Leopold's influential essay, "The Land Ethic" (1949), describes moral 
philosophy in ecological terms: 
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This extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological 
evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as philosophical terms. An ethic, 
ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, 
philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of 
one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals to evolve modes 
of co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses. Politics and economics are advanced 
symbioses in which the original free-for-all comptetition has been replaced, in part, by co-
operative mechanisms with an ethical content. (202) 
His presentation of ethics as ecologically embedded and enacted inspired my 
model ofthe moral ecosystem and community. Leopold's ethics relies on his 
evolutionary extension of our idea of the community. He called ethics "a kind of 
community instinct in-the-making" (1949: 203). He wrote: 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a 
community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the 
community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate ... The land ethic simply enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land. 
(203-204) 
Leopold's most succinct formulation of his ecological moral philosophy is: "A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong with it tends otherwise" (1949: 224-225). Leopold's highest 
goods-the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community-are reminiscent of 
the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia as energetic self-fulfillment. The highest good is 
the health and well-being of the land and the communities that constitute the living 
members of the biotic community. 
What are the implications for Leopoldian ethics as a moral guide for 
environmental problem-solving in Butte? His standard for the good, the right, and the 
beautiful is based on a healthy biotic community. A healthy biotic community is a 
community with stability and integrity. Integrity is the ability of a living system 
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(individual, collective, human, and more-than-human) to recreate healthy, adaptive 
versions of themselves and their environmental conditions. All decisions made with this 
in mind value basic ecological health as a basic requirement, the highest good, and the 
necessary goal of environmental problem-solving. 
Pragmatisms 
The democratic pragmatism of Dewey and Habermas, along with Andrew Light's 
version of environmental pragmatism mark the last moral challenge in the moral analysis 
gauntlet. By taking the systemic dynamics of nature and culture seriously, these moral 
decision-making frameworks provide a useful integrative model with which to guide and 
evaluate environmental problem-solving along the Upper Clark Fork River. 
For Light (2005), instead of debating metaphysical questions about the limits of 
hard anthropocentrism or the ontological reality of concepts like the intrinsic value of 
nature, we should work together to restore hard-used places together as a means of 
realizing "the democratic promise of restoration." In Light's normative moral philosophy, 
democratic participation is the means by which we should realize the restoration of hard-
used places. According to Light (2005): 
To achieve these moral values, a good restoration should maximize the degree of hands-on public 
participation appropriate for a project, taking into consideration its scale and complexity. 
Volunteers should ideally be engaged in all aspects of a project, including planning, clearing, 
planting, maintenance and so on. This does not mean that expertise should be abandoned in 
restorations; it just means that whenever possible, restorations are better when experts help to 
guide voluntary restorationists. Based on such arguments I have claimed that the practice of 
restoration ecology is as much about restoring the human relationship with nature as it is about 
restoring natural processes themselves. Not to attempt to achieve both of these ends in restorations 
is to lose the potential moral benefits of restoration. (8) 
Light's vision requires the restoration of living democratic participation as the 
best way to restore ecological integrity to hard-used places. 
Habermas and Dewey have outlined what democratic participation should look 
like. Dewey (1927) emphasized freedom of critical inquiry and non-coercive 
communication as the means to the end of creating his "Great Community" which he 
described as a "communicating community" in The Public and Its Problems. 
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The democratic pragmatism of Habermas also emphasizes freedom and equality 
of participation. He also requires non-coercive discourse in the democratic problem-
solving process. He further suggests that decisions are only valid if freely accepted by 
those who will be affected by decisions. 
In the democratic and environmental pragmatisms of Dewey, Habermas, and 
Light, an invigorated public sphere, if certain conditions exist, becomes means by and 
through which the injured ecosphere is to be restored. Pragmatic moral agents value the 
free, fair, open, non-coercive, pluralistic, honest structures and processes associated with 
the democratic environmental problem-solving processes. As Light (2005) suggested 
above, this does not require giving the whole of the process over to the public, but does 
require taking public opinion seriously by making "diligent efforts to include the public" 
(NEP A, 1969). The pragmatic approach requires that the commitment to "meaningful 
participation" be facilitated and enacted by the decision-making agents. By involving the 
public in a meaningful way, the legitimacy of the restoration is ensured. Anything less 
than meaningful participation is less than legitimate. 
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Part I was a critical descriptive/analytical mode of analysis in three phases: 
recognition, diagnosis, and analysis. Part II picks up where Part I leaves off and draws the 
inquiry to a close by engaging in the evaluative/practical mode in two phases: evaluation 
and action. 
SMA Part II: 
Strong Evaluation and Moral Action 
Strong Evaluation 
Charles Taylor (1989) believed that moral decision making required strong 
evaluation, that is, 
... discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid 
by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer 
standards by which they can be judged. (4) 
Taylor's notion of strong evaluation required critical reference to moral standards. 
The previous discussion presented several standards by which to judge the diminished 
democracy and injured environment of the UCFRB. I included a discussion of basic 
needs, constituted rights, and concomitant duties; of relevant laws and policies; and of the 
salient aspects of the moral theories of Aristotle and Kant. I chose each of these 
independent standards because they comprise influential living moral discourses. That is, 
these laws, policies, and philosophies guide and influence our actions and behaviors here 
and now. They are deeply entrenched moral instruments on which we frequently rely 
within contemporary US environmental problem-solving. 
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Because I share a common pragmatic and ecological attitude and perspective with 
the moral theories of Dewey, Habermas, Leopold, and Light, I included their 
philosophies as alternative frameworks with which to evaluate environmental problem-
solving in and around Butte, Montana. The assertions I make are warranted against my 
understanding of the nature of the problems under study. At this point, judgment and 
evaluation are required. 
My Deweyan Moral Perspective 
By this point in the thesis, my inescapably Deweyan perspective is evident. The 
entire dissertation is peppered with references to Dewey's embodied and embedded 
theory ofhuman experience, culture, and nature. Because I evaluate the strength of moral 
arguments partly against my Deweyan perspective, it is necessary to outline pertinent 
aspects of this moral approach before engaging in a strong evaluation of the moral 
problems in this case. 
Dewey's project to reconstruct moral thinking and action is based on several 
commitments that, when viewed together, result in a pragmatic perspective, attitude, and 
orientation. Dewey's pragmatism is born of his understanding of human experience as 
biologically embodied, ecologically embedded, historically situated, contingent and 
precarious, evolutionary, irreducibly social, and educative. It requires critical engagement 
of the material and ideal worlds as we find them, always with an eye toward deep 
understanding of problems as a means to coping with them effectively. Like Aristotle, 
Dewey emphasizes the cultivation of practical wisdom through the constant development 
of one's method of inquiry and decision-making. 
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Dewey an pragmatism is melioristic, that is, it rests on a belief that the world can 
be improved through our collective critical inquiries if we inquire intelligently. It is 
possible, and we should, solve (or at least mitigate) the pressing problems we confront 
together. He holds out hope, despite the complexities of the crises we face, that we can 
mindfully come to some understanding of the causes and conditions of our problems and 
adjust our beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors in ways that lead to learning and growth, the 
highest moral goods in Deweyan moral thought. 
Jan Garrett (2001) has identified several key characteristics ofDeweyan moral 
philosophy. First, moral inquiry requires deep historical situation. Each problem must be 
understood in its historical context. Moral problems are born of their circumstances, and 
each problem is shaped by the unique situational factors contributing to the problem. To 
engage in an ahistorical moral problem-solving effort makes no sense in a Deweyan 
moral framework. Dewey's historical emphasis results in what Garrett refers to as the 
"primacy ofthe concrete and situational" in his approach to moral problem-solving. 
Second, scientific inquiry ought to serve as a model for moral problem-solving. 
For Dewey this meant: (1) ideas are instruments for solving problems; (2) problems arise 
in concrete situations; (3) inquiry and discovery require systematic environmental 
engagement and observation; and ( 4) any insights gained are not final, but rather, become 
hypothetical understandings leading to further inquiry (Garrett, 2001). 
Dewey's notion of science is more than scientism. Dewey's notion of science 
refers to a attitudes and methods of critical, systematic, and rational collective inquiry. 
Moral problems ought not be decided by intuition, feelings, or emotions alone-though 
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these should factor into the scientific investigation of a problem. Moral problem-solving 
ought to be engaged with a scientific attitude and the answers one comes up with ought to 
be considered, once again, as ''hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed 
consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences" 
(Dewey, 1920: 173). 
Regarding Dewey's scientific moral attitude, Garrett (2001) wrote: 
In Dewey's approach, the sciences of fact become part of the apparatus of moral inquiry. Isolated 
and by itself, discussion of moral values often seems shrill or nagging or pedantic. But when 
natural sciences can be combined with ethical concerns, the combination loses these off-putting 
qualities and is much harder to ignore. It is to the benefit of both scientific and ethical practice 
when science is pursued for its social relevance and its vital imprtance to life. (~53) 
Third, Deweyan ethics rejects the "brood and nest of dualisms" the Western 
tradition has inherited in philosophical thought. Nature and culture, means and ends, 
material and ideal, arise in relation to one another and not as ontologically distinct 
phenomena for Dewey. This logical dismantling of dualistic thinking is especially 
important for this inquiry because one of the primary tasks here has been to engender a 
non-dualist understanding of the relationship between nature and culture, ecology and 
democracy, enviromnent and community. Dewey, once again, provided the model. 
These pragmatic insights, combined with the others I have sketched throughout 
this dissertation provide the evaluative framework by and through which I exercise moral 
judgment in the pages to follow. To be clear, as I evaluate the moral arguments to follow 
and categorize them as either stronger or weaker, I am not referring to the logical 
strength or consistency of the arguments. Kant, Bentham, and Mill were surely more 
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systematic thinkers than I am. I am evaluating these arguments in relationship with the 
pragmatic worldview I have adopted. 
The Weaker Moral Argument 
Kantian Ethics 
The moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant leads to conclusions and prescriptions 
for moral action that are potentially useful in moral deliberations. The notion of inherent 
human dignity, for example is beautiful and rings true in the moral philosophies of many 
wisdom traditions. The problem with Kantian Universal Duty ethics is not the 
conclusions it draws, but the means by which those conclusions were determined. 
According to Johnston (2006): 
A central criticism of Kant is that he lacks a proper psychology of experience. This lack, noted by 
Hegel and his successors, concerns the ontological and transcendental underpinnings of Kant's 
concepts of experience; the pure, transcendental, a priori nature of his categories. As Kant does not 
draw these from experience, Dewey criticizes him as producing a rift between the existentially real 
world and the perceiving knower. Dewey feels that Kant, in searching for a solution as to how to 
bring the two realms together, strikes upon the idea of a transcendental self. This self brings itself 
to bear upon sense-material through the categories of understanding. These categories are pure, a 
priori logical rules for the ordering of sensory material (intuitions). An experience is created when 
the two realms are conjoined. The ideal realm of the categories is parasitic upon the real realm of 
sensory material. (518-519) 
Moreover, Kant's insistence upon the absolute and universal nature of the 
categorical imperatives is problematic from a pragmatic perspective. Dewey insists on 
radical particularism, or, the primacy of the concrete and situational, as opposed to the 
universal moral imperatives. Absolutes lead to the end of inquiry and prevent the 
possibility of adaptive learning and growth, Dewey's highest goods. 
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Kant's conclusions are not necessarily problematic, for there are many paths to 
similar conclusions. In fact, it is easy to see the moral value ofKant's emphasis on good 
will and intention, or on the inherent dignity of the human being. The problem, according 
to Dewey, comes from the idealistic transcendental logic born of Kant's inadequate 
psychology of human experience. 
The Stronger Moral Arguments 
Aristotelian Eudaimonic Ethics 
From an embodied and embedded perspective, health and vitality, energetic self-
fulfillment, flourishing, eudaimonia, make a sensible highest good. In fact, as Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) demonstrated in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its 
Challenges to Western Thought, health and well-being is the basis for our fundamental 
metaphorical understanding of morality and the good life. The idea is to live well, not to 
merely subsist or get by. Living systems-whether they be organisms, commtmities, 
ecosystems, or democracies-are at their best when healthy and thriving. The good life is 
synonymous with a flourishing life. Aristotle's Eudaimonic ethics thus provide a sensible 
moral goal: health and vitality in living systems. 
Aristotle further suggested that the cultivation of good and virtuous character by 
living a balanced life would lead to the development of practical wisdom. Practical 
wisdom is the ability to make intelligent decisions when confronted with problematic 
choices. Here again, Aristotle provides sensible moral goals as well as methods for 
realizing those goals. To live well we must develop strong character, that is, we must 
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cultivate the habitual predispositions that lead to intelligent decision-making. Flourishing 
is born of practical wisdom and moral excellence. Our ability to solve problems reflects 
the state of our character. From an Aristotelian perspective, diminished democracies and 
injured environments indicate weak character and a lack of practical wisdom. Such 
systems are vicious, deficient, and lacking in important ways. 
Leopoldian Ethics of Ecological Integrity 
From and embodied and embedded orientation, Leopold's (1949) conclusions are 
consistent with Aristotle's in important ways. A decision is right when it promotes the 
stability, integrity, and beauty of the biotic system for Leopold. Stability, integrity, and 
beauty are consonant with vital health, well-being, and flourishing. A decision is wrong 
when it leads to instability, disintegration, and ugliness. It is wrong if it leads to disease 
and languishing. When evaluated against Leopold's notion of the highest good, the 
current state of our diminished democracy and injured environments constitute serious 
moral problems. 
Leopoldian ethics also provide a sensible justification for the extension of moral 
considerability to our inorganic body-the ecological systems we inhabit-the land. His 
emphasis on the extension of the concept of commtmity to refer to our greater ecological 
community requires us to take environmental health and well-being seriously in a way 
that narrow anthropocentric ethics has not. Whether or not nature has intrinsic value, as 
Light (2005) pointed out, is less important than the fact that it is an act of enlightened 
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self-interest to cultivate environmental conditions that lead to our own integrity, stability, 
health, and well-being. 
In a Leopoldian moral system, one must take the integrity of living systems 
seriously. Integrity refers to the capacity of a living system to reproduce healthy and 
adaptive versions of itself and its environment. It is a basic characteristic of life and 
living systems. Autopoiesis means self-creation. If life cannot reproduce itself, it 
eventually ceases. Disrupting integrity is harmful at a basic level because it leads to 
disintegration and death in living systems. As such, making decisions that promote 
integrity and resilience is a basic moral good within the moral decision-making 
framework I propose. 
Environmental Pragmatism 
Andrew Light's (1996, 2004, 2005) environmental pragmatism enlists the 
participation born of a commitment to democratic pragmatism as the surest means to the 
end of legitimate environmental restoration of hard-used places. Citizen participation in 
enviromnental restoration leads to the two-fold good of a dynamic and invigorated public 
sphere and increased vitality and well-being in the ecosphere. Dewey and Habermas 
provide the normative criteria for the democratic dimensions of public participation in 
environmental decision-making, and Light articulates the mutual beneficence among 
living democracies and living environments. 
In Community Over Chaos: An Ecological Perspective on Communication Ethics 
(1997), James Mackin offered a pragmatic and ecological grounding for moral decision-
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making based on a simple principle: nourish the systems that nourish you. He wrote, 
"The basic principle of my theory of communication ethics is that the individual should 
support the communicative ecosystem that supports the individual" (33-34). Mackin's 
prime moral directive is consistent with Aristotle, Dewey, Leopold, Haberrnas, and Light. 
By nourishing the systems that nourish us, we work toward the realization of what Light 
refers to as "ecological citizenship" as a means to the end of realizing the "democratic 
promise of restoration" (1995). Our environmental problem-solving systems and 
processes ought to facilitate this reinvigoration of the public sphere as a means to the 
restoration of the ecosphere. As we cope with our real and pressing environmental 
problems, we ought to act in ways that contribute to the health and well-being of both our 
democracy and our environment. 
Moral Action 
The final step draws the SMA to a close through a discussion of moral action. I 
will outline my plan for moral action through three ideas: prescription, education, and 
participation. 
Prescription 
The first moral action is to outline the big-picture guiding norms and moral 
prescriptions derived from the overall inquiry. Prescriptions are informed guidelines for 
solving current problems and preventing future problems. Below I have outlined four 
normative guidelines for US environmental problem-solvers. These moral prescriptions 
are not meant to totally replace the current forces guiding environmental problem-
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solving, namely, administrative and economic rationalism. Rather, they are meant to 
displace and de-center these ethically weaker forms of environmental problem-solving. 
My intention is to make the goals of democratic and environmental pragmatism the 
evaluative criteria for judging the morality of our environmental problem-solving efforts 
in 21st century environmental problem-solving. Our diminished democracies and injured 
environments are symptoms of unwise decision-making. These prescriptions are my 
answer to the question: How can we recreate healthy versions of our hard-used places? 
First and foremost, we must care about hard-used and vulnerable people and 
places. If morality is a concern for the basic needs and legitimate expectations of self and 
others as Weston (2008) suggested, then the first rule of moral deliberation is to care 
about the needs and rights of the people and places affected by one's decisions. We ought 
to value (regard as worthy and important) the needs and rights of the people who depend 
on us and the places on which we all depend. The moral prescription is to care about 
hard-used people and places as a means towards realizing environmental justice. 
Second, when making decisions that will affect people and places, value the vital 
health and systemic integrity of communities and their environment. Integrity is an 
essential property of living systems. Integrity refers to the ability of living systems to 
integrate their environmental conditions into their life-structures and processes. Integrity 
is the ability of a living system to recreate healthy and adaptive versions of self and 
environment. Systemic integrity is a basic need; without it, disintegration leads to death 
in living systems. Aim for vital health and well-being-eudaimonia-in the public sphere 
and the ecosphere. 
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Third, cultivate authentic meaningful participation by creating conditions, 
processes, and structures conducive to deliberative democracy. The guiding normative 
principle of environmental justice requires deliberative democracy. There can be no 
environmental justice without authentic deliberative democracy. Public meetings and 
written comments do not constitute meaningful participation. Meaningful participation 
requires that the freely expressed concerns and ideas of the public somehow guide and 
influence the decision-making process. Current methods for including the public in 
decision-making create the appearance of dialogue but rarely result in meaningful 
adjustments to the predetermined bureaucratic solutions. The current mode of 
environmental decision-making is often referred to as decide-announce-defend. 
Bureaucratic inertia, backroom politics, and market dynamics become the most powerful 
forces. Still, however, the decisions are presented as emerging from a deliberative 
process that included "meaningful participation" by the public. They are called 
democratic but are democratic in name only. Dewey and Habermas provide useful 
normative guidelines with regard to the conditional requirements for deliberative 
democracy. Environmental problem-solvers must take authentic meaningful participation 
seriously. 
Fourth, evaluate success or failure of democratic environmental problem-solving 
against the vitality of the democratic processes in combination with the health of the 
restored ecosystems. If the democracy remains diminished and the ecosystem remains 
injured, the decisions were not intelligent. 
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These normative prescriptions are not exhaustive, but their adoption by the 
network of moral agents in environmental decision-making would lead to more 
legitimate, and one would hope, more effective environmental restoration projects. 
If decision-makers acknowledge their moral obligations to (1) care about the basic 
needs and rights of affected people and places, (2) make the vital health and well-being of 
the living democratic and environmental systems primary goals, (3) cultivate and ensure 
real and meaningful public participation, and (4) evaluate success and failure against the 
vitality of the democratic process and the health of the injured people and places, the 
likelihood of rendering decisions that are both legitimate and intelligent increases. 
Education 
According to John Dewey, education through deliberate and purposeful 
communication is a requirement for the survival of communities. The ultimate aim, 
however, is not survival, but learning and growth. Education intends to help us get better 
at preventing and solving problems. In Democracy and Education (1916), Dewey wrote: 
Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life. This transmission 
occurs by means of communication of habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older to the 
younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions, from 
those members of society who are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, 
social life could not survive ... it is a work of necessity. (3) 
After articulating moral prescriptions, my plan for moral action requires teaching 
and education. In partnership with the Clark Fork Watershed Education Program 
(CFWEP), I have already initiated efforts to integrate moral dimensions of US 
environmental problem-solving into CFWEP's curriculum. The CFWEP mission is to 
foster environmental stewardship through place-based inquiry into the UCFRB. Students 
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learn about environmental history and science by studying the injured ecosystems they 
inhabit. CFWEP's emphasis on stewardship, however, requires that the scientific 
information students' uncover be used to foster intelligent environmental decision-
making. Historical and scientific understanding is purposeful; that is, it is a means to the 
end of stewardship and wise use. 
Participation 
Finally, my pragmatic orientation requires active civic participation in 
environmental decision-making. In December 2009, Butte's Chief Executive, Paul Babb, 
named me to the newly created Butte Natural Resource Damages Board. Along with 
eight other community members, I will be responsible for determining how to spend 
$28.3 million dollars on the remaining environmental clean-up projects within the Butte 
Priority Soils Operating Unit (BPSOU). 
The reality of the complexities of environmental decision-making is crystal clear 
for this board. Some have estimated that we have $300 million dollars worth of worthy 
projects and less than a' tenth of that to spend (Vincent, 201 0). Intelligent decision-
making is necessary in order to maximize social and environmental goods with limited 
resources. I intend to integrate knowledge gained from this inquiry into the processes of 
environmental decision-making for this board. My goals are to persuade my committee 
members to take both democracy and ecology seriously as a way to insure that our 
complex decisions are made in a legitimate and environmentally just manner. I intend to 
test my conclusions in the real world to see if they lead to increased democratic and 
ecological vitality in my hard-used horne, and to adjust and adapt practices when 
necessary. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A SHORT ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 
OF BUTTE, MONTANA, 1864-2009 
117 
This chapter describes the conditions and guiding forces that worked in concert to 
shape Butte's injured ecological systems from a critical materialist perspective. In this 
chapter, I take worlds seriously. Butte's ecological problems were not natural, nor were 
they inevitable. They were the result of a perfect storm of animating forces including the 
logic of capitalism, technological innovation, and human labor. 
Butte is the site of an ecological revolution that resulted in a metabolic rift. In 
short, the rate of ecological transformation outpaced the community's ability to cope with 
the environmental consequences of such large-scale mining and smelting operations. The 
onset of hard-rock mining in Butte led to the profoundly injured environment, a world 
turned inside-out and upside-down, and a river ran through it dispersing waste throughout 
the floodplain of the Upper Clark Fork River Basin. This chapter is a history of 
environmental problems in Butte, 1864-present. 
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In the first section I define environmental history. In the next, I use its methods to 
tell the story of the ecological revolutions above and below the Butte hill which resulted 
in the area's profound environmental injuries. Today, Butte is the point-source of the 
mining pollution that prompted the creation of the largest contiguous complex of 
Superfund projects in the United States. This chapter takes worlds seriously. 
Environmental History: 
An Earth's*Eye View of the Past 
According to environmental historian Carolyn Merchant, 11Environmental history 
offers an earth's-eye view of the past11 (2002: 1). It is a way to re-conceive the history of 
the earth by imagining the passage of time from the perspective of an embodied mother 
Earth, Gaia in the Greek tradition, Terra Mater in the Roman pantheon. Philosophers and 
scientists have offered a number of narrative metaphors as ways of thinking about earth 
time. Vandana Shiva's (2005) narrative of the 46-year-old earth mother provides the most 
interesting and useful perspective of an earth's-eye view of the past. 
Contemporary geologists often generalize the rough age ofthe planet earth at 
about 4.6 billion years. When conceiving the earth's history from an earth's-eye 
perspective, it helps to humanize this time span by considering the earth's life in the 
context of a human lifespan. In Shiva's thought experiment, the 4.6 billion year old earth 
is conceived of as a 46 year woman. One year in Gaia's life is roughly equal to 100 
million years in the life of the planet earth. With this perspective in mind, it is often 
enlightening to consider when several major events in the history of the earth occurred. 
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The Rocky Mountains, for example, seem ancient from a human perspective at 
65-80 million years old. But from the perspective of 46-year-old Gaia, they did not form 
until about 7 or 8 months ago. Homo sapiens did not appear on the scene until about 4 
days ago. Agriculture and civilization developed about one hour ago. Jesus was born a 
little over ten minutes ago. The United States of America have been around for a bit over 
a minute. According to environmental historians and the vast majority of the world's 
scientific community, within the last 15 or 20 seconds human beings have changed the 
dynamics of life and living systems on earth to such an extent that the future viability of 
life as we know it is vulnerable. 
Environmental history involves the extension of our historical imagination to 
thoughtfully consider the roles and relationships between humans and their environments 
through various spatial and temporal scales. Environmental history's methodologies and 
philosophies of history were put into practice long before they were formally articulated. 
They were prefigured by ancient historians and also the historians of the Annales School. 
They were called for by thinkers from Dewey (1916) to Leopold (1949). But because of 
Western society's tendency toward dualistic thought we have developed a deeply 
habituated set of cultural blinders to the real interconnections and continuities among 
organisms and their environments as they exist. In the retelling of human history, the 
environment was usually, and to some extent still is, perceived as a passive backdrop, a 
stage upon which the human drama unfolded, as opposed to an active and consequential 
force in human history. Nature's role in human history, therefore, was downplayed or 
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lightly considered until the development and institutionalization of environmental history 
in the 1970s. 
Environmental history has been described as a transcendent form of history, even 
as the culmination of historical thought (see O'Connor, 1999) because it takes both nature 
and culture seriously. Environmental history involves the systematic interrogation of a 
diversely constituted historical record and the subsequent interpretation of that record to 
look for interesting relationships between human beings and their immediate 
environments through space and time. It is the story of the mutual influence of people and 
places, and as Carolyn Merchant has suggested, tends to focus on historical moments of 
radical change, or, in her words, "ecological revolutions" ( 1989). 
Like environmental communication and environmental ethics, environmental 
history is a critical mode of interdisciplinary inquiry that takes both worlds and words 
seriously. As Donald Worster (1993) noted, "Wherever these two spheres, the natural and 
the cultural, confront or interact with one another, environmental history finds its 
essential themes" (3). Environmental history was born during the cultural shifts in 
American society and the academy during the 1960s and 1970s and was associated with 
the emergence of US environmental consciousness-that is, our growing collective 
awareness of the relationships among humans and the environment. This consciousness 
development was hastened by the developing awareness of real and pressing ecological 
problems that confronted humanity of planet earth: questions about carrying capacity of 
the biosphere, the effects of newly developed synthetic chemicals on life and living 
systems, and emerging threats posed by the creation and storage of toxic waste. It was 
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further hastened by mass media portrayals of mediagenic environmental tragedies like the 
Santa Barbara oil spill in 1968 and Love Canal in the 1970s. 
Ecological Revolutions 
In 1993, Merchant edited a book titled, Major Problems in Environmental 
History. In it, she and three other prominent environmental historians answered the 
question: What is environmental history? In so doing, several interesting contested 
terrains emerged among the contributors, especially among Merchant, Donald Worster 
and William Cronon. These contestations revolved around two topics: (1) whether to 
place primary emphasis on the material forces or the cultural forces in environmental 
history, and (2) how best to explain radical environmental changes in environmental 
history? 
Worster suggested that environmental history falls into three identifiable 
categories: natural history, human productive history, and cultural history. His book 
Rivers of Empire (1985), for example, while nodding to the other forms, emphasizes 
Marxian ideas such as modes of production and a materialist conceptualization of history. 
For Worster, the processes and structures associated with certain modes of production are 
what we ought to study. Worster's scholarship emphasizes social structures, orderings and 
re-orderings, material transformations of the earth, and the power relationships 
characteristic of certain places and periods. 
Cronon, another contributor to the volume, acknowledged Worster's materialist 
approach, noted its dignities, but questioned what he referred to as Worster's "excessive 
materialism" (1993: 1 0). Cronan's more humanistic, culturally based approach is based 
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on the belief that too much is lost in rigidly materialist environmental histories. Cronon's 
work represents environmental history's cultural turn and chooses to take cultural 
networks of meaning and behavior as the most important aspects of environmental 
history. In a sense, given the dynamic and open-ended nature of human culture, Cronon's 
approach adds another level of complexity to Worster's story of material transformations 
and modes of production: the world of communication and culture, which, as discussed in 
Chapter II, can best be thought of as nature in another form. Culture is the way humans 
know the world together and as such, is another mode of cognition or way of knowing. 
Cronon and Worster both acknowledge that nature and culture are mutually 
constituted intersystems, partially connected, structurally coupled. Naturecultures exist in 
materiosemiotic networks. Where Worster takes his initial step in the materialist 
direction, Cronon takes his into the cultural realm. Each, because it places more emphasis 
in one area than the other, sheds light on one interesting and relevant part of the story of 
human/environmental relationships, but, in so doing, casts the other realm into near 
silence and darkness. 
Merchant (1993) suggested that a hybridized approach is called for, one that 
emphasizes the continuities and dynamic interplay between natural and cultural ways of 
knowing. Merchant examined two of the most influential models of understanding 
revolutionary change in the past 200 years: Karl Marx's historical materialism and 
Thomas Kulm's cultural model as outlined in The Structure ofScientific Revolutions 
(1962). Worster's work represents the Marxian approach, while Cronon's tends toward a 
Kulmian presentation of historical change. 
123 
Merchant suggested that Kuhn's cultural approach is useful but flawed (Kuhn later 
admitted as much). Merchant believed that Kuhn overemphasized the internal dynamics 
of cultural signification in revolutionary change and leaves the material, structural forces 
and influences under-considered. Likewise, Marx's materialistic description of 
revolutionary historical transformation overemphasizes the material and leaves cultural 
networks of meaning under-considered, according to Merchant. 
Merchant suggested that we transform our dualistic way of thinking about nature 
and culture into a dialectical mode of considering their relationship. Nature-the 
ecological world-is the material and energetic base, the limit and potential of culture. 
And culture, another form of nature and a different way of knowing and experiencing the 
living world, is engaged in constant and mutually defining transactions with the base. 
These cultural transactions are mediated by modes of natural production and 
reproduction. Centripetal and centrifugal forces are simultaneously at play. They 
mutually constitute natureculture and are in constant dynamic action within a 
materiosemiotic network. 
Merchant, having turned the nature/culture dualism into a dialectical 
understanding of natureculture, next turned her attention to the concept of revolutionary 
change. She suggested the conceptual instrument of ecological revolutions as a useful 
tool for environmental historians. She wrote: 
My thesis is that ecological revolutions are major transformations in human relations to non-
human nature. They arise from changes, tensions, and contradictions that develop between a 
society's modes of production and its ecology, and between its modes ofproduction and 
reproduction. Those dynamics in turn support the acceptance of new forms of consciousness, 
ideas, images, and world-views. (Merchant, 1993: 23) 
124 
For Merchant, the ecosphere and the noosphere are connected through human 
experience understood in a Deweyan sense as organism/environment transactions. This is 
consonant with Dewey's ecological worldview and understanding of the relationships 
between nature and culture, and with Carbaugh's (2007) normative suggestion that 
environmental communication researchers ought to carefully consider both words and 
worlds. Her model, makes a useful theoretical instrument, especially when combined 
with Marx's notion of "metabolic rift" (18,44). 
Undoubtedly, Worster and Cronon would both acknowledge the mutuality and 
interconnections of nature and culture. In their scholarship, however, each tends to 
emphasize one over the other. Merchant's great contribution to environmental history lies 
in her antidualist and dynamic intersystemic conceptualization of the relationships 
between nature and culture, and in her suggestion that we focus on moments of radical 
change in these relationships-the ecological revolutions. 
The transformations above and below the. Butte hill from 1864-present represent a 
remarkable confluence of animating forces, both natural and cultural. Here, again using 
Merchant's model, the natural base, itself the product of geologic revolutions, was 
engaged via certain historical modes of human production and reproduction, which in 
turn were informed and influenced by particular cultural networks of power and meaning. 
Here, as O'Connor (1999) put it, nature and culture operate as the context and content for 
each other. A dynamic materiosemiotic intersystem was at work on the Butte hill, 
transforming it from lightly used mountain landscape to the Berkeley and Continental 
pits. 
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Metabolic Rift 
In addition to applying Merchant's model of revolutionary ecological change, this 
history relies on the Marxian materialistic historical methods of Foster, especially as 
modeled in The Vulnerable Planet (1999). Foster's "short economic history of the 
environment" utilizes the !=PAT formula as a means of understanding ecological impact 
from a materialist perspective. Environmental impact (I) is a function of population (P) 
affluence (A) and technology (T). Environmental impact-the biophysical 
transformations of living systems due to human activities-is a product of the interaction 
of human population dynamics, political economy, and technology. 
An ecological revolution above and below the Butte hill led to what Foster 
(2001), drawing on Karl Marx, would label "metabolic rift." Marx described this kind of 
ecological alienation as "an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of the social 
metabolism, a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself' (Marx, 1981: 949). 
In his 2009 book, The Ecological Revolution, Foster described metabolic rift as one of 
Marx's three primary critiques of capitalist political economy. By Marx's reckoning, the 
metabolic rift critique "suggests that the logic of capital accumulation inexorably creates 
a rift in the metabolism between society and nature, severing basic processes of natural 
reproduction" ( 49). When a rift is created, the fundamental ability of organisms (or 
communities of organisms) to reproduce themselves and the conditions of their existence 
(their environment) is lost. Integrated systems disintegrate. 
From a Gaian perspective, the Butte hill was transformed from a lightly used high 
mountain landscape, perhaps with a few small-scale diggings of nomadic Amerindian 
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peoples, into the point source of hard rock mining pollution and epicenter of the nation's 
largest contiguous complex of environmental restoration projects under Superfund law. 
This dramatic transformation happened in the space of about one minute in Gaia's 46 
year life. This transformation is an exemplary ecological revolution that resulted in an 
obvious metabolic rift because of the speed, intensity, and scale of the transformation. 
The integrity of the living systems is precariously hanging in the balance. They are 
vulnerable. 
My intentions in the next section are to describe the dynamic interplay among 
natural and cultural systems that resulted in the injured landscapes within the Upper . 
Clark Fork River watershed, originating with mining in Silver Bow Creek. This is a 
complex story in the sense that it requires the identifYing and weaving together several 
dynamic systems in the representation ofhistory.4 Specifically, after defining each, I will 
focus on describing: (1) political economic factors, (2) technological and energy regimes, 
and (3) population dynamics in this place during the period of ecological revolution. I 
will also document the revolution through what I call "metabolic indicators," material 
indeces of a change in metabolic intensity, such as mine-depth or pounds of copper or 
tons of waste rock produced. 
By "political economy" I mean the classical consideration of "the study of the 
social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, 
distribution, and consumption of resources" (Mosco, 1996: 25). And, I am also referring 
to Vincent Mosco's "more general and ambitious definition" of political economy as "the 
4 The etymological origins of the word complex, according to Capra (2002), are derived from complecti (to 
weave) and complexus (network). 
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study of control and survival in social life" (26). Mosco's more expansive view draws on 
Foster (2001) to give "political economy the breadth to encompass at least all ofhuman 
activity and, arguably, all living processes" (2). Mosco's approach is also useful because 
he maintains political economy's classical consideration of history, the social totality, 
praxis, and moral philosophy. Specifically, I will be looking at political economic actions 
that affect the modes of production (and reproduction), distribution, and consumption of 
metals mined from the Butte hill. 
By "technological and energy regimes," I am referring to what Lewis Mumford 
(1934) called technological or power complexes, that is, networks of technology that 
served as the media of production, consumption, and distribution of matter and energy 
within a social system. Mining, for example, has moved through several revolutionary 
changes in technological production throughout history. According to Prain (1975), the 
earliest known copper mining activities (ca. 4000 BCE) operated on a small scale using 
human energy combined with stone and bone implements. The next significant 
technological and energy regime involved what Mumford called the eotechnic phase, or a 
wind, water and wood complex. Next appeared what Mumford called the paleotechnic 
phase, or "coal and iron complex" (in Foster, 1999: 18). The modern era relies on 
dynamite, petroleum, electricity, and steel for mining and processing operations. 
Gradually, through technological innovations, the scale and intensity of mining 
operations has led to an ever-increasing "metabolic footprint" (see McNeill, 2000: 287). 
By "human population dynamics," I mean global shifts in world population, such 
as the significant impact of Ireland's overpopulation due to the mid-191h -century potato 
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famine, which led to unprecedented global immigration patterns, especially a one-way 
flow toward the United States and mining centers like Butte. Here, the human population 
is also considered as labor in the political economic equation. Historian David M. 
Emmons (1989: 13) described the Irish as a "fountain of emigrants" who provided the 
unskilled labor for rapidly industrializing societies like the United States in the post-war 
Reconstruction and nation-building era during the last half of the 19th century. 
A Short Environmental History of Butte, Montana 
In his thoughtful dissertation concerning the history of Butte and southwest 
Montana, Kent Curtis Alexander (2001) wrote: "The history of Western mining ... is 
fundamentally an environmental history" (6). The history of Butte, like all mining 
centers, was shaped by its geology and geography. In Sixty Million Years of History: The 
Formation of Butte Copper (1984 ), geologist Henry McClernan wrote: 
The study ofhistory implies a record of the past activities of man. But, in the case of Butte, its 
history would not be as exciting as it is, perhaps there would not have even been a city there, if 
particular geologic processes had not taken place nearly 100 million years before homo sapiens set 
foot in the Silver Bow Valley. Butte's history is inextricably tied to that part of the earth's crust 
lying below its surface and containing a world-class mineral deposit; a deposit that formed only 
because a number of very delicate geologic parameters were attained. (16) 
One hundred million years is relatively insignificant in terms of deep- or earth-
time (equal to one year of Gaia's 46-year life), but according to McClernan, it nonetheless 
marks an interesting transitional moment in the history of Butte-the formation of the 
"Butte granite" (quartz monzonite) of the Boulder Batholith. This formation served as the 
geological container rock for the area's valuable metal-laden veins and porphyry ores. 
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Geologists disagree about where the granite of the Boulder Batholith originated, 
but it is thought to have been a "molten liquid mass that formed deep in the earth's crust 
and rose within a few miles of the surface" (McClernan, 1984: 17). The granitic mass 
cooled beneath the surface, forming its crystalline structures; this contributed to the 
mass's tendency to fracture when subjected to seismic activity and other geologic forces. 
Mineralized solutions of copper and molybdenum were injected into the fractures first. 
Over several million years, many of these fractures became thousands of feet long and 
deep. "Into these fractures mineralizing solutions deposited copper, silver, gold, lead, 
zinc, manganese and other metals" (18-19). The rich copper veins were sometimes traced 
more than 1 mile below the surface of the earth. 
The first documented mention of the mineralogical peculiarities of the Butte hill, 
according to Michael P. Malone (1981), is in the diary of Caleb E. Irvine in 1856 (7). 
According to Malone, Irvine and a small trading party camped on the hill enroute to 
trading posts. Irvine noted a small hand-dug "trench" and nearby, an elk-antler that was 
apparently used as a pick or digging stick. Malone placed Irvine somewhere near the 
Original lode on the Butte hill in Town Gulch (now Dublin Gulch), directly atop Butte's 
world-class mineral deposit. Irvine guessed that native peoples were digging at the 
exposed metals on the hillside. His explanation is plausible according to archaeological 
evidence in Europe and America (see Prain, 1975). 
While Irvine camped along the southern flank of the Boulder Batholith miners 
were working the placer diggings around the American West with great fervor and 
intensity. But gold wouldn't be discovered in the Butte area for another eight years. 
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In 1862-3, prospectors in the region searching for the next California explored the 
mountainous regions of present-day Montana. They discovered massive amounts of gold 
in Bannack (1862), Alder Gulch ( 1863), nearby Virginia City (1863), and in Last Chance 
Gulch (1864). Prospectors from Alder Gulch discovered traces of "color" in the creek 
they named Silver Bow in 1864. Silver Bow Creek is the northeasternmost tributary to 
the Columbia River, a gigantic cyborgean system that Richard White (1995) has called 
"the organic machine." These rootless miners noted the tell-tale signs of metal-rich crust 
as they meandered the gulches and gullies surrounding the solitary conical butte that 
would later provide the mining camp its name. The Summit Valley mining district was 
formed on the hill in 1864. Butte's gold years were significant-but only marginally so 
when compared to gold camps of the time and area. 
The Pre-mining Environment 
The ecological world that Butte's first prospectors found as they entered the 
Summit Valley via Silver Bow Creek was very different than the one that would result in 
the nation's largest complex of Superfund sites nearly 120 years later. James Cook, one 
of Butte's pioneers and a former jailer, recalled green grasses so tall in the valley that 
cattle could scarcely be seen. Another chronicler of the early landscape wrote of the 
evergreens covering the "gently undulating foothills" surrounding the town. In the valley, 
strawberry and alder bushes grew along with a variety of wildflowers, grasses, willows 
and shrubs (Hortsmann, 1984: 14). 
Trappers and Ranchers described the Deer Lodge Valley, connected to the 
Summit Valley via Silver Bow Creek, as a beautiful and productive landscape as early as 
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the 1830s. Warren Ferris, a trapper in the American Fur Company, described the valley 
this way in 1831. 
All the streams by which it is intersected are decorated with groves and thickets of aspen birch and 
willow, and the occasional clusters of currant and gooseberry bushes. The bottoms are rich and 
verdant and are resorted to by great numbers of deer and elk. (Hortsman, 1984: 15-16) 
Butte was never a rich and diverse Garden of Eden, however. The high altitude, 
lack of water, and brutal winters limit the fecundity ofthe soil and the length of the 
growing season. The land is hard like the granitic soils of the Boulder Batholith. Here, 
rainwater running over much of sulfide-rich landscape becomes acid mine drainage. The 
soils on the hill are naturally hostile to many forms of life. 
Still, the ecosystem the prospectors found was functional and had operated 
relatively undisturbed since the last ice age. Though only seasonally inhabited, the 
watershed was home to an enduring and integral living ecosystem fed first by small 
headwater streams of Silver Bow Creek: Blacktail, Little Basin and Yankee Doodle 
Creeks. 
191h -Century Placer Mining and Its Environmental Problems 
Gold miners in Idaho and Montana Territories were explorers and prospectors, 
nomadic by nature, wandering the foothills in search of the yellow dust. Many were 
veterans of the California diggings. Still others were greenhorns, pushed and pulled into 
the West in search of a better life. The miners were mostly men and a high percentage 
were foreign born in comparison with the rest of the United States. They comprised Civil 
War veterans and deserters from the Confederate and Union armies, immigrants from 
England, Ireland, Germany, Central Europe, Turkey, and China. The boom and bust 
cycles of gold camps kept miners moving, always searching for the next California. 
Primarily through the Idaho diggings, gold miners found their way into present-day 
Montana. 
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The population in the Butte area went from the occasional seasonal inhabitants on 
or before 1863 and peaked as a gold camp around 1867 with nearly 5,000 people in the 
general area of Butte. By 1870, as the relatively meager placer gold played out, 241 
people remained. The 98 Chinese, who often entered a gold camp near the end of its 
productive period to re-work (often successfully) already-mined areas, signaled the end 
of the easy gold in Butte. According to Malone (1981 ), the Butte area was dwindling into 
another ghost town. 
Gold mining technology had developed very little in hundreds of years. The pick 
and shovel, the gold pan, the rocker ("long tom"), and the sluice box composed a gold 
miners toolkit. Initially, placer deposits were concentrated in streambeds. Erosion, water, 
and gravity worked in concert to wash gold dust into the streambed. All a miner needed 
was a pick, shovel, and gold pan. Later, after initial deposits played out, the introduction 
of a sluice-box or rocker was added to the process to move more earth and water through 
the miner's hands. 
In Butte, at its peak, nearly every workable foot of Silver Bow Creek and the 
surrounding creeks were claimed and worked with a human labor, wood, water, and iron 
energy complex. The sound of clanking picks, moving water, rock, and wood, was briefly 
joined by the heavy staccato sounds of two early attempts to develop crude ore crushers 
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with the tools on hand between 1866-7 (Shovers, et al., 1991). No major developments in 
placer mining technology were implemented on the Butte hill. However, as the digging 
played out, the scale and scope of their work increased. By 1869-1870, the gold miners 
on the hill had developed larger sluice-boxes and rockers to perform the same function 
over larger areas for diminishing returns. While the technologies were relatively crude, 
the combination of human labor and the increasing scale and scope of the tools created a 
significantly changed landscape. According to Alexander (2001), the gold miners "etched 
thousands of miles of ditches into the mountains" ( 68) of gold country in south west 
Montana. 
Environmental problems were largely localized phenomena during the gold camp 
days, in part due to the crude implements and methods these early miners employed. The 
streams were hardest-used and most affected. The bottoms were turned over in search of 
gold dust. The resulting sedimentation prevented primary photosynthetic production, 
which led to a loss of plants, the bugs that fed on them, and the fish species that fed on 
the bugs. The gulches, gullies, and streambeds around Butte were etched with the gold-
miners footprints. 
Still, by 1869, as the camp existed precariously close to becoming the next of 
hundreds of ghost towns across the American West, one reporter from the New North-
West of Deer Lodge described Butte as a "pleasant town, sunny, lying away up the hill, 
fair in the eye ofthe sun, broad-streeted, well-built, overlooking a beautiful circular 
valley, and yet central to the vast extent of placer mines" (Alexander, 2001: 69-70). 
While gold mining altered the dynamics of the living systems in the watershed, the scale, 
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scope, and intensity of placer mining's effects were relatively insignificant compared to 
the Butte's quartz mining periods. 
191h -Century Quartz Mining and Its Environmental Problems 
In 1870, Butte was a far-offhinterland, disconnected from the railroad tracks and 
telegraph wires that were beginning to connect the eastern US to the West, and the USA 
to Europe and the rest of the planet. No census was taken in Butte. A steady few, 
however, stuck around the hill and continued to try to develop the strange and metal-rich 
ores found there. Early in Butte's gold-camp history, several significant silver and copper 
discoveries were noted. In 1865, for example, a 6-7-ft-wide, high-grade copper vein was 
found in the Parrot lode (Shovers, et al, 1991: 4). 
Hard rock mining, also called "quartz" or "lode" mining, is a radically different 
venture than surface placer mining for gold. It requires tremendous capital investment in 
labor and infrastructure, and it also requires scientific and managerial expertise. 
Moreover, during this period, recovered ore had to be shipped by horse-drawn cart to 
Utah and then to Swansea, Wales, for processing. Butte was simply too far removed from 
the rest of the world to take full advantage of its obvious mineral wealth. For a variety of 
reasons, including expensive recovery, shipping, and processing costs, hard rock mining 
was not a viable venture until1875. 
Butte's population continued to dwindle. By 1874, 50 people inhabited the area, 
serviced by one tavern (Shoebotham, 1956). William Parlin, a veteran hard-rock miner 
from Pennsylvania who came to Butte through the Idaho and then the Virginia City gold 
fields, tried in vain for several years to work the intriguing black quartz reefs of his 
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Asteroid claim. In 1874, Farlin, too, abandoned Butte, but he had some ore samples from 
the claim assayed in Idaho. They proved to be rich in silver and copper. He returned to 
Butte and re-staked his claim as the Travona under the General Mining Law of 1872 on 
December 31, 1874. Farlin convinced W.A Clark, a bank-owner and fierce mining 
entrepreneur from Deer Lodge by way of the Colorado gold fields, to finance the 10-
stamp Dexter Mill. Parlin's operation was promising and "galvanized the camp into a 
frenzied activity" (Malone, 1981: 16). Clark began to acquire old claims, including the 
Travona. He sent the copper-rich ore to Corinne, UT, and on to Wales for smelting. 
Within a year, Butte's population again swelled to nearly 1,000 people. In the centennial 
year of 1876, Butte City was officially constituted and a street plan developed. Two years 
later, the United States Congress would pass the Silver Purchase Act, which made silver 
coins legal tender in the United States and increased American demand for silver. Within 
the next four years, the population of Butte, now a bustling silver town, would more than 
triple. 
Unlike gold mining, hard rock endeavors advanced at a rapid pace during this era 
because of a convergence of factors, including the professionalization of mining 
engineering, technological innovation, and increased global capital investment. In 1908, a 
professor at the Columbia School of Mines in New York noted, " ... undoubtedly greater 
progress was made in mining in all its departments during the period of30 years 
beginning with 1860 than had been made during the preceding 500 years" (in Wyman, 
1979: 86). Much of the innovation had been developed at the Comstock mines in Virginia 
City, Nevada. By 1860, steam-hoist machinery had been installed at the Ophir mine. 
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Within a year, miners had tunneled their way 160 feet below the earth's surface. In 1866, 
Alfred Nobel invented dynamite and the increasing intensity of earth moving activity 
advanced even more rapidly in hard rock mining districts across the world. By 1868, they 
had reached a depth of 1 ,000-ft. 
By 1870, 5,802 miners worked the Comstock: 2,155 ofthem were Irish. The 
Comstock served as a direct conduit of labor, technology, and managerial expertise for 
the hard rock mines of Butte, Montana. 
Marcus Daly (1841-1900), one ofButte's Copper Kings, embodied the animating 
forces of his time better than most. In Daly, we see the convergence of global population 
dynamics and migration patterns, political economic forces, scientific and managerial 
expertise, and technological innovation. Malone (1981) described him as "one ofthe 
greatest practical miners and mine developers who ever lived" (18). He was born in 
Ireland to poor Catholic parents and grew up during the potato famine years. At 15 and 
on his own, he joined the hundreds of thousands of 
Irish who migrated to the United States by way of New York. He worked as a 
longshoreman and telegraph operator before moving to the American West via ship to, 
and then over, the Isthmus ofPanama. He landed in San Francisco, and by 1862 made his 
way to Western hard rock mining frontier at the Comstock Lode. He learned the trade, 
befriended the well-known and powerful (including Mark Twain and George Hearst), and 
rose to the position of mine foreman at the Comstock, a job he held for six years. 
Intelligent but without formal education, Daly's rough edges endeared him to his mostly 
Irish miners. To them, he represented the possibility of a poor Irishman making it big. 
Eventually, Daly was hired by the Walker Brothers, a well-known banking family in 
Utah, to run their Alta mine. 
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In 1875, as the quiet gold camp transformed into an incipient silver town, two 
prospectors, McEnry and Packard staked the Acquisition claim and sent ore to the Walker 
Brothers for assaying. It proved rich in silver, and the Walkers sent Daly to Butte to 
investigate in August of 1876. Butte was still isolated from most of the world at that time. 
In order to get there, Daly took a train from Utah to its terminus in Franklin, Idaho, and 
from there rode the rest of the dusty way in a horse-drawn coach. What he found so 
impressed him that he brought two of the Walker Brothers and a mine appraiser with him 
in September. They acquired several mines, including the Alice, near the top of the hill. 
Today, the hamlet of Walkerville bears their name. Daly and his family moved to Butte 
to run the Walker acquisitions. He ordered the dismantling of their 20-stamp mill at 
Ophir, Utah and had it shipped it to Butte. By October 1876, Daly had the mine up and 
running with a small, mostly Irish, workforce. One year later, Daly's miners had reached 
a mine depth of 200-ft (Shovers, et al., 1991: 18). 
The Alice, under Daly's management, quickly proved to be an incredibly 
profitable silver mine, attracting the attention of outside investors to Butte. The Butte 
Daily Miner, W.A. Clark's newspaper, described The Alice's development under Daly as 
"the first gun to awaken Eastern capitalists to the extent and permanence of our 
resources" (Malone, 1981: 20). The Alice was incorporated in 1880 at a value of 
$10,000,000 and had sixty stamps crushing silver ore. The mineral wealth of the Butte 
hill attracted massive amounts of outside global investment. 
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In December of 1881, the first of several railroads arrived in Butte, easing 
transportation costs and serving as a conduit for labor from the far reaches of earth. 
Global capital investment continued. That same year, the Lexington Mining Company, a 
French corporation, built a 50-stamp mill in Walkerville. A London-based company built 
a 90-stamp mill in 1886 to service the Bluebird Mine. Butte boasted more than 300 
stamps crushing silver ore by 1887 (Shovers, et al., 1991 : 6). In 1889, Montana became a 
state. It is nicknamed, partly based on the fantastic mineral production of Butte, the 
Treasure State. The state motto is oro y plata, which is Spanish for "gold and silver." 
Silver production continued apace in Butte until the repeal of the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act in 1893, effectively cancelling the purchase of silver for the coinage of 
money and devastating silver mines. 
By this time, however, Butte had already become the most productive copper 
camp in the world, surpassing Michigan's Keweenaw Penninsula in 1887 with more than 
78 million pounds of copper produced. 
Copper was in high demand for several reasons, especially the electrification of 
the United States and the world through technologies like the telegraph and Thomas 
Edison's incandescent light bulb. It is during this same period that Butte's first major 
environmental problems were noted. 
In 1875, Michael Hickey, a Civil War veteran of the Union army staked the 
Anaconda claim because of the obvious copper carbonate outcroppings on the hill. He 
named the claim after a newspaper description of his commander's strategy to enfold the 
Confederate forces like an Anaconda snake. He was a small-time miner and was 
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primarily in search of gold and silver. The copper-laden ores proved too tough to reduce, 
and in 1880, Hickey and his partner, Charles Larabie, sold their interests in the mine to 
Marcus Daly. Daly, convinced that "there [was] a mine in the Anaconda," had recently 
sold his interests in the Alice mine and invested in several Butte properties (Malone, 
1981: 25). 
Daly next sought financial support from his friends in San Francisco: "Honest" 
George Hearst, James Ben Ali Haggin, and Lloyd Tevis. Together, they formed a 
syndicate that funded and decided the direction of future endeavors of the company until 
1895. 
Early in Daly's operation of the Anaconda, his miners found a "new material" at 
the 300-foot level. When Daly descended to inspect the mine, he quickly realized he had 
hit what was to become "the largest deposit of copper sulfide the world had ever seen" 
(Marcosson, 1957: 32). Daly, in a shrewd move, immediately shut down all mining 
operations and moved in to purchase the claims adjacent to the deposit. 
By 1883, the Anaconda mine was 600-feet deep. By 1885, the West Shore 
magazine out of the Pacific Northwest wrote that "the largest, busiest and richest mining 
camp in the world to-day is Butte, Montana" (Malone, 1981: 30). 
The tink-tink sounds of the busy gold camp gave way to the heavy crushing thrum 
of the hard rock mining town of Butte. More people were using more effective 
instruments moving more earth ever faster. The metabolic footprint of the company 
increased apace. The metal-laden crust was turned inside out in the search for valuable 
ore deposits within the Richest Hill on Earth. 
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Eventually, the productive camp attracted investors from San Francisco, New 
York, and finally London, the center of the financial world during this period. The 
prevailing trends in large-scale industry at the time were toward concentration of 
ownership and vertical integration of production. More was concentrated into the hands 
of fewer. Familiar names like Hearst, Rockefeller, and Rothschild all held a significant 
interest in various corporate formations of the Anaconda Company during the first decade 
of its corporate existence. 
This industrial period was also characterized by a transition toward scientific 
management of the production processes. Daly, a self-educated Irish immigrant, had seen 
the profits technological innovation could create at the Comstock. He brought that 
appreciation to Butte and applied it to the mines under his management. Daly, for 
example, installed electric lights in his mines as early as 1880, merely two years after 
Edison invented them. W.A. Clark's paper wrote that it was a "difficult matter for the 
boys to tell whether they are on day or night shift" (Shoebotham, 1956: 154). With 
electric lights, 24-hour mining entered the picture and nearly doubled the metabolic rate 
of Butte's geomorphic transformations. 
It is during this period that the nature ofthe area's environmental problems 
intensified. Several early attempts at smelting and reducing Butte's complex ores via the 
process of"heap roasting" led to open social protests by many of Butte's citizens as early 
as the 1880s. Butte, once "fair in the eye of the sun," had become barren and hostile to 
life because of the smoke and pollution created by so many crude and destructive hard 
141 
rock mining endeavors on the hill during this incredible period of increased metal mining 
activity. According to MacMillan (2000): 
By 1890 practically all the vegetation in Butte and on the surrounding hillsides had disappeared. 
For the four trees that survived in the city, there was, one newspaper reported, 'general 
commiseration.' (30) 
20t11-Century Hard Rock Mining and Its Environmental Problems 
As the old gu.ard passed on and the Anaconda Company was enfolded into larger 
corporate networks and webs, scientifically trained mining engineers, lawyers, and 
bankers transformed the company through technological innovation, streamlining of 
production processes, vertical integration of nearly every phase of copper production: 
"from mine to consumer" (Marcosson, 1957: 167). 
Daly, early on, led the way. The Ana~ond!i Comg_any developed the world's most 
technologically advanced smelters and reduction works to locally process a variety of 
precious and base metals and created the smelter town of Anaconda in 1883. It also 
ventured into logging and milling to satisfY its vast need for fuel for steam machinery and 
for mining timbers. In the process it established the logging town of Hamilton in 1890. In 
1907, Anaconda created the Montana Power Company to feed its always increasing 
energy requirements. It expanded its global mine holdings and diversified into the 
production of other valuable elements such as phosphorus for fertilizer production. It 
created copper and brass works to add value to their metals for direct sale to the copper-
hungry global markets of rapidly industrializing countries. Anaconda provided copper for 
the war effort in World War I. It weathered the economic contractions of the post war 
economy and the Great Depression. It again ramped-up production during World War II 
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and in the post-war American period of economic exuberance and expansion. Anaconda's 
footprint was global. The Anaconda Company was a vast metabolic and cultural force, 
transforming people and places from Butte to Chuquicamata Chile (see Finn, 1998). 
Anaconda continued to expand during the 1950s. In Butte, the Greater Butte 
Project and the Berkeley Pit introduced new technologies and methods for the mining of 
the low-quality ore bodies that remained below the hill. The Kelley Mine could haul 52 
tons of ore at a time and penetrated the earth to a depth of one mile below the surface. 
Some 2,500 miners still worked underground during this time period. 
Underground mining continued until ARCO purchased The Anaconda Company 
in 1977. Mining continued in the Berkeley Pit until 1982. When the pit was shut down, 
the water pumps which diverted groundwater that naturally flowed toward the pit like a 
giant sink were turned off. The Berkeley Pit and the underground workings of the hill's 
more than 10,000 miles of tunnels began filling with highly acidic water and they 
continue to fill to this day. The critical water level for community safety and health will 
be reached in 2023 (Pitwatch, 2010). 
Enough copper was mined from the Berkeley Pit to pave a four-inch-thick 
interstate highway the approximately 360-miles from Butte to Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Pitwatch.org). For every pound of copper produced, tons of waste rock (overburden) 
resulted. The overburden was piled in the man-made foothills to the Continental Divide 
that surround the city. Heavy metals that could not be rescued from the highly efficient 
reduction processes still leach from the waste rock during rain storms and as snow melts. 
This is one major source of pollution in the community. 
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In 1986, ARCO sold Anaconda's Butte mining operations to Montana Resources 
Incorporated, a subsidiary corporation to Washington Corporation owned by Dennis 
Washington, Butte's current copper King (Munday, 2008). MRI has successfully 
operated The Continental Pit, an open-pit copper and molybdenum mine that employs 
roughly 300 workers. The scale and intensity of the operation is awesome. Today, giant 
haul trucks move 300-tons of rock at a time, 24-hours a day, 365 days a year. The 
Continental Pit is nearly as deep as the Berkeley Pit today. The mine projects another 20 
productive mining years in Butte. 
Shortly after ARCO ceased operations in the Berkeley Pit, a lawsuit under 
CERCLA (1980) was filed on behalf of the people of Montana, especially those most 
affected by the environmental problems originating in the Company's mining and 
smelting operations around Butte and Anaconda. This initiated the environmental clean-
up and restoration projects in the area. The projects have been underway for more than 25 
years and will likely carry on for another quarter century. Over $1 billion has been spent 
to date in the process. 
21 st_Century Environmental Problems 
The scale and scope of the environmental injuries from Butte to Milltown, 
approximately 110 river miles, are staggering. Four National Priorities List Superfund 
sites interlock around the stream channel of the Upper Clark Fork River to form one of 
the largest environmental restoration projects on earth. The state of Montana identified 
and described ecological injuries to nine geographic areas from Butte to Milltown along 
the Upper Clark Fork Watershed. They are as follows: Butte hill groundwater resources, 
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Butte Area One ground and surface water resources, Silver Bow Creek aquatic and 
riparian resources, Montana Pole groundwater and soil resources, Rocker groundwater 
and soil resources, Smelter Hill area upland resources, Anaconda and Opportunity Ponds 
and other Anaconda area resources, Upper 
Clark Fork River aquatic and riparian resources, Milltown groundwater resources. 
Damages to these resources were "caused by the release of hazardous substances as a 
result of mining and mineral processing operations of ARCO and its predecessors" 
(NRDP, 2001: 8). 
The following descriptions of the ecological injuries in question come from a 
2001 report prepared by the Montana Natural Resource Damage Program (NRDP). 
The Butte Hill Groundwater Resources 
The Butte Hill groundwater resources are contaminated by high concentrations of 
metals and other chemicals "grossly in excess of drinking water standards" (11). The 
groundwater on the Butte hill is contaminated by the leaching of mineralized materials in 
the overburden piles and in underground workings. The product is acid mine drainage. 
According to the report: 
Presently, the total volume of injured groundwater in the Butte Hill alluvial aquifer is estimated to 
be 4,860 acre-feet. The aerial extent of the injured groundwater in the bedrock aquifer is about 
4,133 acres (6.5 square miles) and in the alluvial aquifer, about 505 acres. When the [Berkeley 
Pit's] critical water level is reached, the volume of contaminated water in the Pit is expected to 
increase to 196,000 acre-feet; at that time, the volume of the contaminated groundwater in the 
bedrock aquifer will have increased to about 131,000 acre-feet (12). 
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Butte Area One Ground and Surface Water Resources 
This area of town operated as an industrial sewer for mine wastes and has resulted 
in profoundly injured ground and surface water resources. 
Since the late 1800s, disposal practices from mining and milling operations in Butte have resulted 
in the presence of tailings and other mining-related wastes along the Metro Storm Drain, Silver 
Bow Creek, and throughout the city of Butte ... In addition to these waste sources, dispersed 
surface and buried tailings, mine and mill sites, dumps, and contaminated fill areas are located 
throughout Butte. These sources ... contribute to the surface and groundwater contamination. (13) 
Silver Bow Creek Aquatic and Riparian Resources 
Silver Bow Creek and its small tributary streams are the Columbia River's 
easternmost headwater streams. Like the Columbia River, this fluvial network has 
operated as a kind of"organic machine" for most of the last century and a half. The first 
five-mile reach ofthe stream has been reclaimed, and an additional IS miles is in the 
process. According to the NRDP report: 
From the late 1800s until the 1980s, tailings and other mining wastes containing hazardous 
substances (including arsenic, admium, copper, lead, and zinc) were discharged into Silver Bow 
Creek. (15) 
This activity resulted in toxic surface water resources; streambed sediments with 
high concentrations ofhazardous materials; elimination of river life including benthic 
macroinvertebrates and nearly all fish species; a polluted flood-plain; the elimination of 
most other river life including otter, mink, and raccoons; and reduced populations of 
birds and other wildlife along the riparian areas. 
146 
Montana Pole Groundwater and Soil Resources 
The Montana Pole plant was used to cut and prepare mining timbers. The primary 
contaminant in this area is pentachlorophenol (PCP) which was released directly to the 
ground surface and contaminated underlying groundwater resources. "An estimated 1.1 
million pounds of PCP contaminated the site" ( 17 -18). Other hazardous contaminants 
include: benzene, toluene, ethyl benzene, and dioxins and furans. This area also 
contributed to the contamination of Silver Bow Creek. 
Rocker Groundwater and Soil Resources 
Rocker, a srna11 town site located along Silver Bow Creek about six miles west of 
Butte, was also horne to a timber framing and treatment plant. "While arsenic is the 
contaminant of most concern, contaminants in the groundwater include cadmium, copper, 
lead, zink, iron, manganese, sulfate and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons" (19). The 
aerial extent of the damages is about 26 acres. 
Smelter Hill Area Upland Resources 
The Anaconda Smelter, built in part to remedy Butte's air pollution at the turn of 
the 20th century, resulted in 11,366 acres (17.8 square miles) of injured upland landscape. 
The smelter, the largest of its kind in the world, released tons of contaminants that settled 
and deposited onto the land and denuded it of vegetation. This resulted in loss of topsoil. 
The soils became toxic to plants and proved devastating to entire upland ecosystems. This 
area is characterized by elevated levels of arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead and zinc. 
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Anaconda and Opportunity Ponds and other Anaconda Area Resources 
Five areas in and around the smelter city of Anaconda were injured by large and 
ongoing "disposal, releases, and spills of solid mining wastes, milling debris, smelting 
by-products, and process fluids ... have caused injury to the area's groundwater, riparian 
vegetation, and wildlife resources" (20). The total volume of injured groundwater in the 
Anaconda area is estimated to be 440,000 acre-feet extending over 40 square miles. In the 
Opportunity Ponds, one of five subareas within this site, the complete absence of 
vegetation has completely eliminated wildlife across 3,400 acres. 
Upper Clark Fork River Aquatic and Riparian Resources 
The Upper Clark Fork of the Columbia served as a receptacle for all of the taxies 
moved by its headwater streams from Butte and Anaconda. Repeated flood events 
common to the region dispersed upstream taxies across the entirety of the river's 
floodplain. Tailings piles, sometimes 15-feet deep, form "slickens" along the stream bank 
and leach contaminants into the river system. Animals, from insects to humans, 
metabolize these toxins into flesh. The integrity of the river system is precariously 
situated due to the environmental damages. 
Milltown Groundwater Resources 
Until2008, at the confluence of the Upper Clark Fork and Blackfoot Rivers, 
Milltown dam trapped most downstream flowing contaminants. They settled into the 
streambed and leached into local groundwater supplies of the people in the communities 
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of Milltown and Bonner. Although the dam was recently removed as part of the cleanup 
efforts, the groundwater contamination problems still exist. 
Summary 
Despite the triumphal rhetoric in corporate environmental histories like 
Marcosson's Anaconda (1957), copper mining in Butte, Montana was not a necessary, 
inevitable, and natural expression of American progress. The hard rock mining that 
emerged upon the Butte hill was created at the confluence of several obvious animating 
forces: the logic of capitalism, global population dynamics, post-Civil War nation 
building, and technological innovation. In short, the dramatic increase in the scale and 
intensity of Butte's geomorphic agency resulted in an ecological revolution. The change 
in ecological dynamics was so intense that a metabolic rift opened between the 
communities inhabiting the hill and the ecosystem that supported them. Mining turned 
the world inside out, and a river ran through it, dispersing contaminants from Butte to 
Missoula. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
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The final chapter identifies key insights, notes significant limitations, and 
examines scholarly contributions of this dissertation research. This chapter concludes 
with a consideration of the value of this inquiry into the democratic and moral problems 
of the community of Butte, Montana, and an expression of my hope for the future of this 
hard-used community. 
Key Insights 
As stated in the first chapter, this work is atypical in form, content, and 
methodology. I am thankful to have been given the academic freedom to explore these 
subjects in novel ways. The inquiry has yielded some interesting and, one would hope, 
useful insights. 
Key insights within this dissertation include: (1) identification of the complex and 
integrated nature of US environmental and democratic problems; (2) clarification of the 
relationships among nature, environment, culture, and communication from a pragmatic 
perspective and based on insights from contemporary scientific investigations in 
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ecological and cognitive science; (3) articulation of the role pragmatic environmental 
communication theory can and should play in broadening and deepening our 
understanding ofthe areas where nature and culture overlap and merge; (4) clarification 
and articulation of the moral dimensions of our integrated crises in democracy and 
ecology in the US from a pragmatic perspective; (5) articulation of an underlying 
metastructure in practical and systematic moral reasoning frameworks (i.e., recognition, 
diagnosis, analysis, evaluation, and action); (6) articulation of the components and 
dynamics of what I call the moral ecosystem; (7) reinterpretation of Butte history from a 
critical and materialist perspective through the concepts of ecological revolutions and 
metabolic rift; and, (8) suggestion of principled and pragmatic normative criteria to guide 
future US environmental problem-solving in hard-used places such as Butte, Montana 
based on a systematic moral analysis. 
Limitations 
This work is not without limitations, however. Perhaps the most obvious is my 
attempt to explore a variety of subjects in a variety of ways. The inquiry may have been 
spread too thin at times, though I would argue that the center holds. Any time one tries to 
describe the particular and the general through a variety of methods and across a number 
of disciplines one risks overreaching. Mixed methodologies and trans-disciplinary inquiry 
often risks slipping into dilettantism-the delight in subjects about which one knows 
little. That said, I believe the work avoids this peril because, as a student and professor of 
ethics, communication, and environmental history, I have developed depth knowledge in 
each of these areas. Were I to begin this project tomorrow, however, I would write less 
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about the details of Butte's environmental history (though I still believe it is an integral 
part of the story) and more about the particular community struggles for justice that have 
so greatly contributed to the community's collective character through the last 150 years. 
Another obvious limitation of this work is the deeply entrenched perspective I 
bring to the table. I am part of the community I write about. And, I love this place and 
these people. I have made no claims to objectivity, but have tried to maintain a certain 
distance from the ongoing public participation in Superfund decision~making in the 
Upper Clark Fork River Basin. For example, I have never actively participated in public 
meetings, or contributed comments to the EPA regarding the many problematic aspects 
of the Superfund cleanup projects under way. Still, I side with the frustrated citizens of 
the UCFRB. I have made no attempt to cloak this research in a false notion of objectivity. 
But, always, I have been critical of my own ideas, have been responsive to the critical 
insights of others, and have made diligent efforts to be open~minded and fair in my 
representation of the stories I have been writing about for the last five years. 
Another substantial limitation of this work concerns a neglect of the emotional 
and pre-rational aspects of moral decision-making. In these pages, I have focused on 
systematic and rational moral analysis, but have neglected the intuitive and emotional 
origins of our ethical impulses. In many ways, for example, this dissertation research is 
born of my emotional responses to the pain and suffering of the most vulnerable members 
of my cornmw1ity. Were I to rewrite this dissertation, I would weave the insights of 
Dimasio (2003), Gladwell (2005), and Williams and Newton (2007) into my discussion 
of the moral dimensions of our integrated crises in democracy and ecology. Morality is 
informed by both reason and intuition, and my consideration of the emotional and 
intuitive origins is too light. 
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Though there are certainly several other limitations of this work, the final and 
most glaring one as I look back on the work from the perspective of the final chapter is 
the neglect ofHabermas's (1979) relevant and useful notion of a legitimacy crisis. 
According to Habermas, "Legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to be 
recognized" (1979: 178). In a democracy the negotiated and collective values and will of 
the common people are to be expressed by institutions that represent them. Legitimacy is, 
in part, measured by the degree to which governing institutions represent the values and 
will of the people. A legitimate institution is fit to exercise power in an effort to realize 
community values. Institutions that ignore the common good they say they are working to 
create and protect are illegitimate-unfit to exercise power in the name of the people. 
Decisions made in the name ofthe public that fail to meaningfully involve the public are 
suspect, that is, their legitimacy can rightly be called into question. Such decisions ought 
to be challenged. My future reworking of this aspect of my research will surely pay more 
attention to Habermas's critical notion oflegitimacy crisis. 
Contributions 
With several of the important limitations of this research acknowledged, I wish to 
turn my focus upon some of the most interesting contributions I hope this inquiry has 
made to the lively academic conversations I am attempting to participate in. 
First, in the inaugural volume of Environmental Communication: A Journal of 
Nature and Culture (2007), Cox posed a provocative first question to the members of the 
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environmental communication discourse community in the opening essay: "Does 
environmental communication have an ethical duty?" (5). In many ways this entire 
project has been an affirmative answer to Cox's interesting first. My answer seems to 
echo the work of Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson's (2007) contribution to the same 
volume. Peterson, Peterson, and Peterson suggest that the answer is, without question, 
yes. They state that, as a "crisis discipline," environmental communication "should 
facilitate environmental democracy" (74). Scholars who study the problematic aspects of 
public participation in environmental decision-making, for example, should actively work 
to translate their knowledge into practical wisdom and action in the public sphere 
precisely because our democratic and environmental systems are in crisis states that 
require immediate intelligent action in order to avert impending disasters. My work 
contributes to this conversation, affirms this response, and provides a framework for 
future environmental problem-solving efforts. 
Second, this dissertation contributes to the development of an authentic Deweyan 
voice for environmental communication research and environmental ethics. Though not 
often considered as a significant voice in either discourse community, Dewey an 
pragmatism, as I have tried to demonstrate, offers many useful ideas in this arena. This 
dissertation, from beginning to end, has been an attempt to resuscitate Dewey's lost voice 
because it is both useful and relevant in so many ways. Moreover, Dewey's philosophy is 
an elegant vision that entangles nature, culture, community, communication, democracy, 
environment, and ethics together in a coherent philosophical framework. His critical and 
scientific attitude is expansive and not easily translated. But, with work, it is 
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comprehendible and useful. I intend to continue translating Dewey into 21st century 
English. I intend to continue exploring the practical implications of his important work. 
Finally, This work contributes to the development of a sophisticated and 
philosophically defensible pragmatic moral orientation that may be able to guide and alter 
future environmental problem-solving efforts in places like Butte, Montana. The 
normative guidelines that emerged in Chapter V can and will be used as talking points in 
future environmental problem-solving deliberations in Butte, Montana. As a member of a 
newly formed citizens advisory board appointed by the Governor of the State of 
Montana, I can now work to ensure that the voices of the most vulnerable are heard 
through the rumble of the bureaucratic and corporate decision-making machinery. This 
research will lead to, at the very least, actual attempts to persuade decision-makers that 
the best decisions will result in both a vital democracy and a healthy environment. 
Closing Thoughts 
Mary MacLane, a clever and controversial young Butte socialite from a well-to-
do family living in the raucous wide open town of Butte at the turn ofthe 20th century, 
wrote about her experience living on "The Richest Hill on Earth" in her nationally 
renowned book, The Story of Mary MacLane (1902). Early in the book she noted that: 
Butte and its immediate vicinity present as ugly an outlook as one could wish to see. It is so ugly 
indeed that it is near the perfection of ugliness. And anything perfect, or nearly so, is not to be 
despised. I have reached some astonishing subtleties of conception as I have walked for miles over 
the sand and barrenness among the little hills and gulches. (7) 
Three aspects of this passage are striking when read through contemporary eyes. 
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First, had Ms. MacLane been walking through "the sand" in the 21st-century she 
would have known that she was most likely walking through mine tailings containing 
significant levels of toxic heavy metals like lead, arsenic, cadmium, and copper. This 
would explain "the barrenness among the little hills and gulches" that she observed. This 
point emphasizes the importance of problem recognition in the problem-solving process. 
Though she obviously was not trying to cope with Butte's turn of the century 
environmental problems, had she recognized them as such, she may have altered the 
route of her daily walks. Before we can cope with our problems we must first recognize 
them as such. 
Second, young Mary MacLane was able to reach "some astonishing subtleties of 
conception" (7) as she walked through the mine waste. Hard-used places tend to cause a 
certain dissonance, not unlike Peirce's "irritation of doubt" (1955: 1 0), which leads to 
further inquiry into these places. That is what environmental historian Mark Fiege (1999) 
meant in the opening quote of this dissertation. Remember that he urged historians to 
explore the "hard-used landscapes" in an effort to "directly confront the reality of our 
deeply tangled and problematic relationship to the natural world that we inhabit" (1 0). 
This entire dissertation was an attempt to inquire into the hard-used place I call home in 
hopes of reaching some real and useful understanding of what has happened, what is 
happening, and what ought to happen in Butte. My deepest hope is that any subtleties of 
conception reached through this inquiry might lead to a better way of coping with my 
home community's serious environmental problems. I hope they might lead to both a 
vital democracy and a healthy environment. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Mary MacLane saw something valuable in 
what was then a putrid and smoke-filled toxic landscape. Butte was nearly perfectly ugly. 
She reminded her readers that "anything perfect, or nearly so, is not be despised" (7). 
Like the old dog that made its home on the borders of the Berkeley Pit for years before 
succumbing to his toxic environs, Butte hangs on, even if only precariously so (Vincent, 
2008). Such a clinging to our most basic gift-life-in the face of hardship and despair is 
worthy of our respect. 
The story of Butte is important and valuable, in part, because it has continued to 
exist against all odds. Butte's story is a story of struggle, of survival in the face of 
impending doom. In the words of Edwin Dobb (2002), a contributing editor to Harpers 
magazine who was born and raised in Butte, "Like Concord, Gettysburg, and Wounded 
Knee, Butte is one of the places America came from" (31 0). With a little luck and some 
hard work, the citizens of Butte will continue fighting the good fight. It is my deepest 
desire to see our mere survival transform into flourishing as our injured democracy and 
environment return to a vital state of health and wellbeing. 
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